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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
MARITAL HISTORY AND RETIREMENT SECURITY: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
 
December 2015 
 
 
Lauren A. Martin Palmer, B.S., Northeastern University 
M.S., University of Massachusetts Boston 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston 
 
 
Directed by Professor Maximiliane E. Szinovacz 
 
 This dissertation investigates the relationship between marital history and 
individuals’ retirement resources, namely Social Security, employer-sponsored pensions, 
and non-housing wealth. Prior research provides a foundation for understanding 
marriage’s positive relationship to retirement security, and suggests that marriage is 
financially beneficial and can even lessen some external factors that would otherwise 
damage a family’s financial situation. Yet changing demographics, with fewer people in 
first marriages and rising numbers of individuals experiencing divorce and choosing to 
remain unmarried, suggest our understanding of this relationship for today’s retirees may 
be limited. The purpose of this research is to identify which aspects of complex marital 
histories are associated with individuals’ retirement security, paying particular attention 
to gender differences.  Using data from nine waves of the Health and Retirement Study 
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(1992-2008), four facets of marital history are examined: marriage type, frequency, 
timing, and duration. Currently married and currently unmarried respondents are 
separated during the analyses in order to adequately capture the association between 
previous marital events and retirement resources. The results indicate that marital history 
is associated with Social Security, employer-sponsored pensions, and non-housing wealth 
differently, and that these relationships vary by gender and current marital status. The 
findings provide support for the argument that marital history, and in particular marital 
duration, has a strong relationship to retirement resources. Contrary to expectations, 
currently married women with longer marriages have less Social Security and pension 
income than married women who experienced shorter marriages. Marital history has no 
relationship to the retirement security of married men. For the unmarried groups, never 
married men have the lowest odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension and have 
less non-housing wealth than both divorce and widowed men. Unmarried women’s 
retirement security is associated with the type of disruption experienced; women with 
multiple past marriages have more resources if they are currently widowed but less if 
they are currently divorced. Further study is needed to understand how and why complex 
marital history factors have a relationship to retirement finances, and to expand our 
knowledge about certain understudied populations such as remarried women and never 
married men. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Background 
For decades, researchers and policy makers have considered the demands an 
aging population places on social services, future generations of workers, and society as a 
whole. The number of older adults living in the United States is projected to increase 
from 43.1 million people in 2012 to 83.7 million by the year 2050 (Ortman, Velkoff, & 
Hogan, 2014). If, for the most part, this enormous older population could financially 
support themselves in old age much of the current discussion and political debate 
surrounding the country’s social programs would be minor. Our social safety nets, 
however, have become less generous, and most businesses have adopted defined 
contribution plans that shift the risks of investment onto individual workers and their 
families. Compounded with the economic downturn of the late 2000’s, many Americans 
nearing retirement experienced financial loss and unemployment. Even in the best of 
times, individuals often enter into retirement with inadequate portfolios (i.e., lacking 
retirement income from multiple sources: Social Security, pensions, and savings). In 
some cases, workers possess insufficient knowledge on how and how much to save 
(Helman, Copeland, & Van Derhei, 2011), are forced out of their jobs early (Szinovacz & 
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Davey, 2005), or never take part in retirement planning at all (Ekerdt, DeViney, & 
Kosloski, 1996).  
Research consistently suggests that, even in the face of unfavorable financial 
conditions, being married can lessen or even negate some external factors that would 
otherwise damage a family’s financial situation. Picturing the financial benefits of 
marriage is not difficult; two people are engaged in a long-term contract designed to 
ensure commitment and mutual benefit to both parties. For example, in a two-earner 
couple if one spouse loses his job the couple can live on the other spouse’s salary while 
the unemployed spouse seeks work. Underlying sources of the financial advantages 
married couples have over single persons include an efficient division of labor and their 
ability to consume goods jointly. Consequently, just as marriage has financial benefits, 
exiting a marriage and the years spent unmarried also have financial consequences. 
The purpose of this research is to identify which aspects of complex marital 
histories are associated with older workers’ retirement security, paying particular 
attention to gender differences. Specifically, the study will determine whether a lifetime 
of marital changes has a relationship to the major sources of retirement income (i.e., 
savings, Social Security, and pensions) and whether these associations differ for men and 
women. 
The linkages between marital histories, retirement security, and old-age poverty 
need to be better understood. For decades, researchers explored how individuals end up 
with varying levels of wealth and assets in retirement. Prior research has identified three 
major areas that have a large influence on the accumulation of wealth: health, education, 
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and work history (Braveman, Egerter, & Williams, 2011; diPrete & Eirich, 2006; Pollack 
et al., 2007; Sirin, 2005). A better understanding of the influence of these life course 
trajectories on old age finances has developed over time. Chapter 3 presents the idea of 
cumulative advantage and disadvantage, which forms the basis of this dissertation’s 
conceptual framework. The framework will guide data analysis exploring whether to add 
a fourth life course pathway, marital history, to the list of areas that have a major 
influence on the accumulation of retirement resources. Marital pathways, I argue, have a 
significant and lasting influence on the financial security of individuals in retirement.  
Research Contributions  
Older Americans can live financially independent in old age if an adequate 
amount of retirement income is flowing from all three sources: Social Security, pensions, 
and savings. Yet adequate funding from all three is far from the reality for most retirees 
(National Research Council, 2012; Yao & Peng, 2012). Individual histories of marriage 
and the family, and the relationship to building retirement income and wealth provide 
insight into the complexity of and variation in saving for retirement. 
Extant literature, however, is inadequate for understanding the connection 
between marital disruptions and long-term economic outcomes. First, the majority of 
research on marital status and retirement income focuses on married people or compares 
married individuals to the unmarried, measuring the effects of marriage solely by relying 
on current marital status. The changing demographics of the new cohorts of retirees, with 
fewer individuals in first marriages and rising numbers of individuals with complex 
marital histories (Holden & Kuo, 1996), suggest this research is limited in understanding 
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how the institution of marriage affects retirement income. Within marital groups, such as 
the widowed or the remarried, individuals experience different trajectories such as 
multiple marital dissolutions or diverse lengths of time in their married or unmarried 
states (Holden & Kuo, 1996). Historically, research has focused on factors that promoted 
or impeded financial retirement planning among the married (Coile, 2004; Matthews & 
Fisher, 2012). As a result, there is now limited information about the widowed, divorced, 
separated, remarried, and never-married groups.  
Several studies explored marital history to understand wealth accumulation and 
used data from the Health and Retirement Study (Angel, Jimenez, & Angel, 2007; 
Holden & Kuo, 1996; Ulker, 2009; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zissimopoulos, Karney, & 
Rauer, 2008), as will this dissertation. Much of this work was exploratory analysis of 
marital history's relationship to household wealth and assets. Wilmoth and Koso (2002) 
were the first to truly expand upon the range of marital statuses by distinguishing 
remarried people from those in their first marriage. They found that the continuously 
married had more wealth than the remarried. Work done by Ulker (2009) years later 
confirmed this wealth difference, but argued that the difference was small enough to 
suggest that remarriage helps individuals recover from previous marital shocks. Other 
researchers explored how wealth gains and losses were influenced by the event of a 
marital change and whether financial outcomes differed for men and women (Angel et 
al., 2007; Ulker, 2009; Zissimopoulos, 2009; Zissimopoulos et al., 2008). Overall, the 
results demonstrated that marital history, specifically having a complex marital history, 
played a role in reducing the wealth holdings of individuals but particularly for women. 
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This dissertation will enhance earlier research in several ways. First, this research 
investigates the economic situation of individuals at retirement, not during their working 
years, providing a better picture of their retirement security. Most individuals do not 
begin thinking and planning for retirement until mid-life and have a significant increase 
in retirement savings in the years preceding retirement (Ekerdt, Kosloski, & DeViney, 
2000). Although individuals can go back to work to supplement income, this study 
measures financial security at the point of retirement to provide a picture of the effect of a 
lifetime of marital transitions on retirement resources. Second, this research will study 
marital history variables on each piece of an individual’s retirement portfolio to explore 
whether marital changes are associated with Social Security income, pension income, and 
assets equally. Third, though all of the papers highlighted above greatly enhanced our 
understanding of marital history’s relationship to wealth, none of them included all the 
crucial element of marital history in their study: the type of transitions, the timing of 
events in the context of the life course, the duration of marital statuses, and the frequency 
of marital changes. Lastly, this work will pool sixteen years of data on individuals from 
nine waves of the Health and Retirement Study improving our understanding beyond the 
majority of authors’ narrow focus on individuals of working age in 1992. 
An additional aim of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of whether 
the changes to women’s family-work life balance have improved their retirement 
prospects. On the one hand, the women of today may be better equipped to plan and save 
for their own retirement and deal with marital disruptions. There are more women in the 
workforce today and, when the option to contribute to a pension plan is available, they 
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are contributing at similar or even slightly higher rates than men (Munnell & Quinby, 
2009; Munnell & Sass, 2005). Complex marital histories may affect these women less 
because they are more educated, have their own work history, and experience labor force 
shifts that protect them against overwhelming financial losses (Dushi & Iams, 2008). On 
the other hand, the retirees of today are more likely to experience marital disruptions and 
to spend less time married compared to older cohorts (Lin & Brown, 2012). The growth 
in defined contribution plans combined with the increase in the rates of divorce and 
decrease in remarriage rates may influence the ability of today’s women to plan and save 
for retirement (Holden & Smock, 1991; Munnell & Sass, 2005; Zagorsky, 2005). 
Therefore, marital history may affect them more than previous generations because of the 
accumulation of disadvantages over time due to experiencing more marital disruptions, 
spending less time married, and being more likely to experience disruptions while 
planning for retirement. This dissertation hopes to investigate these contradictory 
viewpoints. 
Organization of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter 2 presents a summary of the three main sources of retirement income in 
the United States and an in-depth literature review. The purpose of the first half of this 
chapter is to provide the reader with a foundation for understanding the ways in which 
average Americans can and do accumulate retirement assets for their later years. For each 
financial resource, the section outlines a brief history and definitions, an understanding of 
the resource’s current utilization and a comparison of utilization by gender. The chapter 
will proceed with an exhaustive literature review of marital history and retirement 
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security, focusing on the different pathways individuals can take through their married 
life including choosing never to marry. This will follow with a discussion of the evolving 
work-family life over the last half-century, exploring how these changes may affect 
retirement security for different generations. 
Chapter 3 presents the paper’s theoretical framework developed from the life 
course perspective and the cumulative advantage/disadvantage framework in order to 
guide our understanding of the potential reasons behind inherent disadvantages for 
individuals with marital disruptions. First, the chapter describes the life course 
perspective and cumulative advantage/disadvantage theory, and then applies each 
specifically to the topic of this research. The chapter follows with a discussion of the 
conceptual framework guiding this dissertation and ends with an outline of the research 
questions. 
Chapter 4 will illustrate the methodology for testing these research questions and 
Chapter 5 will present the results from the analyses. In the final section of the paper, 
Chapter 6 outlines the conclusions drawn from these research findings, explores how the 
results add to previous literature and inform policy, and suggests policy implications and 
directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MARITAL STATUS AND ECONOMIC SECURITY IN LATER LIFE: A REVIEW OF 
THE LITERATURE 
Problem Statement 
Economic security in old age is extremely important for the well-being of 
individuals, yet almost half of today’s older Americans are finding themselves 
“economically vulnerable” and unable to improve their financial situation (Gould & 
David, 2013). As policy makers debate changes to the social programs relied on by older 
Americans, researchers continue to investigate the reasons behind certain people’s 
financial shortcomings. Economically vulnerable populations are often on the cusp of 
poverty, where a single financial shock could push them over the edge (Gould & David, 
2013). These lower-income elderly households depend heavily on programs such as 
Social Security, and dramatic changes to this public pension system may drive them into 
poverty. For these and future generations of retirees, it is important to understand how 
our current social policies and vehicles for retirement saving are assisting or hindering 
their ability to build their retirement resources. Do all people feel the advantages and 
disadvantages equally or do retirement saving opportunities vary for different groups? 
Specifically for the purposes of this paper, are those experiencing complex marital 
histories inherently disadvantaged?  
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Retirement Income Sources in the United States 
Understanding what influences a person’s ability to grow their retirement security 
is of particular importance to policy makers, researchers, and politicians. Increases in 
defined contribution pension plans (e.g., 401(k) plans) and debates about the privatization 
of Social Security suggest a growing interest in requiring workers to take on more 
responsibility and risk in financial preparations for retirement (Butrica, Iams, Smith, & 
Toder, 2009; Chan & Stevens, 2003; Kitao, 2014; Orlova, Rutledge, & Wu, 2015; Shuey 
& O'Rand, 2006). The reality is that many individuals enter into retirement with 
inadequate funds because they have little to no income from pensions and personal 
savings, and must rely on Social Security (Waid, 2014). Social Security benefits are the 
most common source of income for Americans aged 65 and older. Furthermore, 22 
percent of married and 45 percent of unmarried people over age 65 are receiving 90 
percent or more of their income from their Social Security checks (Social Security 
Administration, 2013a). Partly to blame is the limited financial and investment 
knowledge of the average investor (Lusardi, 2006), yet many workers do not have 
employer-sponsored pension options or may not have disposable income to contribute to 
such plans. For those who are eligible and able, a quarter do not participate in their 
company’s 401(k) plan (Munnell & Sunden, 2004). Policies to expand savings under 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and employer-sponsored 401(k) plans could 
provide workers with increased incentives to save, but policy makers must consider how 
the ownership of such plans varies significantly by income. 
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Both work histories and marital histories influence the ability to build adequate 
retirement income because of their influence on Social Security benefits, employer-
sponsored pension plans, and personal savings (Tamborini & Whitman, 2007). For 
example, Social Security benefits favor marriage and, as politicians debate changes to the 
system’s benefit structure, understanding retirement preparedness as it relates to marital 
history can inform the discussion. Given the increasing number of unmarried older adults 
with complex marital histories, retirement income policy must consider the rationale 
behind government services and tax advantages that benefit married people or assist 
unmarried widows (Tamborini & Whitman, 2007), and whether current pension and 
saving schemes place divorcees, the separated, and the never married at a disadvantage. 
Social Security 
 The United States Congress created Social Security in 1935 to support the 
growing number of older people who lived in poverty and were no longer able to work. 
The Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund began distributing funds to 
retired workers and their families in 1937. Through many reforms over the years, the 
Social Security system remains an indispensable source of income to millions of older 
Americans. Currently, over 46 million beneficiaries are receiving payments from the 
OASI Trust Fund (Social Security Administration, 2013a). About 40 million of these 
individuals are retired workers and their families, while the remaining 6 million are the 
survivors of deceased workers who paid into the Social Security system. Retired workers 
are eligible for benefits if their work history includes enough years in covered 
employment (i.e., a minimum of forty “quarters of coverage” or credits earned during 
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their working years) and they are at least 62 years old. The “primary insurance amount” 
(PIA), which is the amount a person receives if he or she begins receiving at the normal 
retirement age (NRA), is the basis for calculating benefit amounts. The NRA varies from 
age 65 to 67 based on birth year.  Receiving payments earlier than this age results in a 
reduction in benefits, while full benefits are payable if individuals wait until their NRA. 
 In terms of benefits to families, Social Security may provide a spousal benefit to 
the retired worker’s married partner. To receive a spousal benefit, the spouse of a retired 
worker must either have a qualifying child in their care or be at least 62 years old. 
Spousal benefits can be as high as half of the retired worker’s PIA, and this depends on 
the age of the worker when he or she chooses to begin receiving benefits. Increasingly, 
due to the growth in dual-earner couples, spouses may be eligible for their own Social 
Security retirement benefit and if this amount is higher than what they would receive 
from the spousal benefit, their own retirement benefit is paid. The reverse is also true, 
meaning if the spousal benefit is the higher benefit amount the individual will receive this 
payment each month. In other words, the individual’s Social Security benefit from her 
work history and her spousal benefit are not combined into one monthly benefit. If an 
individual is divorced, he or she may still receive a spousal benefit if the following 
eligibility criteria apply: the marriage lasted 10 years or longer and the divorced spouse 
remains unmarried, is age 62 or older, and has a personal benefit that is less than what 
she would receive based on her ex-spouse’s earnings. If the divorced spouse remarries, 
she will not receive a benefit based on her previous marriage. 
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 Social Security also pays benefits to the surviving families of workers who paid 
into the system during their years of employment. A widow(er) who is at least 60 years 
old or a younger widow(er) who has a qualifying child can expect to receive benefits if 
they were married to their spouse for at least 9 months before the individual died. If the 
survivor remarries after age 60, the new marriage will not affect his or her eligibility for 
survivor benefits.  
 Social Security is the single largest financial contributor to the retirement security 
of older adults and remains a steady income source until their death. The average 
monthly benefit in 2013 for a retired worker was $1,269 and for survivors was $1,221 
(Social Security Administration, 2013a). The average benefit of a couple, both receiving 
a benefit, was $2,048 per month. According to the Social Security Administration, 
estimates suggest that Social Security covers 94 percent of all American workers and this 
monthly benefit represents 39 percent of the income of the elderly. The importance of 
this benefit is even more obvious for those who retired with no pension coverage (51% of 
the workforce) or no savings set aside for their retirement years (34% of the 
workforce)(Social Security Administration, 2013b). Social Security is directly 
responsible for keeping many Americans out of poverty. As mentioned, 23 percent of 
married couples and 46 percent of unmarried individuals are receiving over 90 percent of 
their income from their Social Security benefits (Social Security Administration, 2013b).  
Though it provides a livelihood for millions of Americans, the Social Security 
policies and benefit structure are antiquated. The Social Security system was created with 
families in mind at a time in history when a single-earner family, typically with the wife 
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as the homemaker and the husband as the breadwinner, was the norm (Berkowitz, 2002). 
This model of a family was the foundation for the Social Security system and in 1939, 
lawmakers added the spousal and survivor benefits to support the non-working wife who, 
in most instances, would outlive her working husband. Seven decades later, spousal and 
survivor benefits are paid to half of women over the age of 62, indicating their own 
benefit is lower than what they qualify for as a spouse (Harrington Meyer, Wolf, & 
Himes, 2006; Social Security Administration, 2013a). In other words, the benefits from 
their own work history are less than the benefits they receive from their marital history 
(Harrington Meyer et al., 2006). Since the creation of this public pension system, 
however, there have been dramatic changes to family structure in the United States and 
appropriate revisions lag behind. 
As described above, both an individual’s work history and marital history 
determine Social Security eligibility and the amount of benefits received. The fathers of 
Social Security did not anticipate the shifts in work and marital history, particularly for 
women. The rise in two-earner couples and women spending more time in the workforce, 
earning higher wages, and accumulating more pension benefits is coupled with national 
increases in divorce, decreases in remarriage, and postponement of widowhood. These 
trends paint a very different picture of family-work life than when Social Security was 
established. For unmarried individuals, eligibility for divorce and widow(er) benefits is 
modestly declining as the average length of time married is decreasing (Harrington 
Meyer et al., 2006; Iams & Tamborini, 2012; Tamborini, Iams, & Whitman, 2009). Thus, 
women increasingly have to rely on their own work history and Social Security benefits 
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in retirement. Still, the system is particularly supportive of women in old age, even today. 
Due to the progressive benefit structure, the average woman’s lower earnings and longer 
life span mean that she will receive more total benefits over her lifetime than a man 
(Social Security Administration, 2012b). She is also still more likely to benefit from the 
spousal or survivor benefit structure than a man, with over 50 percent of women 
receiving Social Security benefits as a wife or widow and 27 percent of these women 
qualifying for dual entitlement (i.e., paid on the basis of their own earnings and those of 
their husbands) (Social Security Administration, 2012b, 2013a). In contrast, there is very 
little research on the Social Security spouse or survivor benefits for men, perhaps because 
there are so few men to whom this situation applies (Social Security Administration, 
2013a). In 2010, 97.8% of individuals receiving monthly survivor benefits were women 
(Weaver, 2010). Though economic security for women has improved, women are still 
more likely than men to experience poverty in old age (Tamborini et al., 2009). Social 
Security benefits are crucial in keeping many more of them out of poverty. 
Employer-Sponsored Pensions 
Workers make significant strides toward increasing their retirement wealth by 
adding two additional resources to their portfolio: employer-sponsored pensions and 
individual savings. Unlike Social Security benefits, employer-sponsored pension 
coverage is not universal and pension plans are more likely to be offered for some 
occupations and in some industries than others (Clark, Ghent, & Headen, 1994). Research 
suggests that the unfortunate reality of pension savings is that, unless you have a 
company sponsored plan, you don’t save for retirement (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & 
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Madrian, 2009; Munnell & Quinby, 2009). The original nature of employer-sponsored 
pensions was to provide companies with a competitive edge when hiring new employees, 
to encourage worker retention, and to promote orderly retirement of older workers (Clark, 
Burkhauser, Moon, Quinn, & Smeeding, 2004, p. 137; Thane, 2006).  
For the purposes of this paper, so as not to confuse the Social Security system 
with other pension accounts in the narrative, all non-Social Security pension plans will be 
designated by the term “employer-sponsored pension.” There are two general types of 
employer-sponsored pension accounts: defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution 
(DC).  These two plan types differ in benefit determination, funding source, investment 
risks, and plan portability.  
In a DB plan, employers pay out benefits to retired workers based on a formula 
determined by the organization that adheres to the requirements of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Knowing the benefit formula up front means 
employees in a DB plan are aware of their promised benefit amount upon retirement. DB 
plans are generally considered better for employees. Coverage is typically universal for 
workers in a company with DB plans given the worker remains employed for a specified 
period of time. After vesting, the typical formula for calculating benefits factors in an 
employee’s years of service, age at retirement, and final salary level. Payment is in the 
form of lifetime annuities. Another formula, more common in union plans, looks at the 
worker’s years of service and gives a set amount for each year worked. The regulatory 
status of DB plans also separates them from DC plans. For example, current federal law 
requires the default annuity option for DB plans to be a Qualified Joint and Survivor’s 
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Annuity. This means that unless a spouse agrees to a single-life annuity or lump-sum 
payment, the plan will pay the surviving spouse at least half of the retirement benefits 
received while the former worker was living. Moreover, the passage of ERISA in 1974 
created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which insures DB pension benefits in 
the event a company is unable to pay out promised benefits to their employees. 
There are disadvantages tied to DB plans, and one major issue lies with its lack of 
portability. Workers who switch jobs frequently will have drastically lower retirement 
benefits, due to a benefit formula that is based partly on years of service and average 
salary from their last few years of employment. The final benefit amount is not increased 
for inflation, so if the benefit was earned 20 years ago, the benefit will be lower than if 
the benefit was calculated on the average salary at the time of retirement. An additional 
downside of DB plan benefits not keeping up with inflation is that, because benefits are 
fixed upon retirement, the value of the pension is much less 20 years into retirement.  
Furthermore, non-vested individuals are never eligible for the employer-sponsored 
pension benefits. Vesting typically means working for 5 to 10 years with the same 
company, and those who leave before vesting generally receive a lump sum of their 
contributions. 
In a DC plan, funds go into an account for each participating individual, and these 
contributions and any investment gains or losses result in the final funds accrued. 
Workers choose between a number of options to invest their account funds and they 
assume the risk of their investment. Whereas the employer’s benefit formula (not the 
market) determines retirees’ final benefits in a DB plan, in a DC plan the benefit formula 
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determines how much is paid into the account for the employee. An important advantage 
of DC plans, in contrast to DB plans, is their portability. Thus, DC plans allow workers to 
transfer their pension through job changes, making these types of pension plans more 
accessible. Another important benefit of DC plans is that individuals can withdraw their 
contributions as a lump sum at retirement, and the funds can continue to grow depending 
on how the individual distributes and invests the money. The nature of DC plans, 
however, is one of individual financial risk.  
Participation in DC plans is almost always voluntary and savers must make 
personal decisions about contributions, investment, and withdrawal, which has been 
shown to result in a high chance of making the wrong decision (Benartzi & Thaler, 2007; 
Hurd & Panis, 2006). For example, Benartzi and Thaler (2007) show that DC 
contributors often find investment choices too complex, so they have a high share of 
assets in their employer’s stock and do not diversify their portfolio. Since DC plans also 
distribute retirement monies in a lump sum, retirees must decide how to manage the 
funds and take additional steps to annuitize their final sum to ensure a steady stream of 
income in retirement. The vast majority do not annuitize their savings even when given 
the option (Perun, 2007) and this creates the real possibility that retirees will outlive their 
pension benefits. 
 In the United States, most retirement plans offer a significant tax incentive to the 
contributor. The purpose is to encourage individuals and their employers to contribute to 
a retirement pension, yet recent data show only about one-third of older individuals (or 
about 42% of senior-headed households) receive income from employer-sponsored 
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pensions in their retirement years (Social Security Administration, 2012a, 2013b). This 
proportion of workers with employer-sponsored pension coverage has actually remained 
quite stable over the last few decades, yet the composition of pension plans has shifted 
(Clark et al., 2004, p. 151). There was a marked shift away from DB plans toward the 
usage of DC plans as businesses observed a number of disadvantages to DB plans such as 
high employer costs, administrative burdens, and the unpredictability of expenses.  
Regulatory changes to DB plans, and the administrative costs associated with 
these changes in particular, result in a higher burden for employers in offering these 
pension plans. This set the stage for the development and growth of the popular 401(k) 
plan and DC plans in general (Clark et al., 2004). Currently, DC plans are more prevalent 
than DB plans which is beneficial to mobile workers; however, research suggests a 
decrease in overall pension savings compared to DB plans, partly due to the lack of 
participation of workers who are covered. In 2010, individuals over age 65 with a state or 
local government DB pension received a median benefit of about $20,000 per year, while 
seniors with a private DC pension received a median benefit of $8,844, and those with a 
private employer-sponsored DB plan received a median of $12,700 per year (Social 
Security Administration, 2012a). 
Employer-sponsored pension coverage remains an important source of retirement 
income and helps maintain financial well-being beyond what Social Security can provide. 
Holding an employer-sponsored pension has been associated with the decision and ability 
to retire early (Honig, 1996), adequate replacement of pre-retirement income, and 
avoidance of poverty even after the death of a spouse (Brady, 2014; Holden, Burkhauser, 
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& Feaster, 1988). In fact, the introduction of 401(k) plans occurred only about 30 years 
ago, so older cohorts of retirees still benefit largely from DB pensions. Younger 
employees, in contrast, are now more likely to have a DC plan than older generations, 
and scholars continue to study the impact this shift in pension options has on retirement 
security (Butrica et al., 2009; Clark et al., 2004; Orlova et al., 2015).  
While research suggests women are making progress in possessing employer-
sponsored pensions based on their own work history, pension schemes and how they are 
offered may make it harder for women to acquire and contribute to a plan than men 
(Munnell & Sass, 2005; Shuey & O'Rand, 2006). While in general people are not 
contributing enough to their pension plans to save for retirement (Bajtelsmit et al., 2005; 
Chan & Stevens, 2003; Ekerdt & Hackney, 2002), women often have lower rates of 
employer-sponsored pension coverage and lower pension wealth than men given the 
nature of these plans. Women have less continuous work histories (Pienta, Burr, & 
Mutchler, 1994) and have fewer work opportunities because of childrearing and 
caregiving duties which have not lessened for working women over time (Moen, 
Robison, & Fields, 1994; Wakabayashi & Donato, 2005, 2006). Moreover, the industries 
historically staffed by men are more likely to offer employer-sponsored pensions and, in 
particular, to provide defined benefit plans (Clark et al., 1994), though this gender 
difference is changing as government workers now make up the majority of defined 
benefit pensioners and more women are in the workforce (Munnell, 2006).  
The interplay of work history and family life plays a role in pension benefits, 
though the outcomes are very different for men and women. As mentioned above, women 
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performed most childrearing and family caregiving duties, and this still holds true today 
(Moen et al., 1994; Szinovacz, DeViney, & Davey, 2001; Van Houtven, Coe, & Skira, 
2013). These family obligations can directly affect women’s pension wealth; for 
example, taking a hiatus from their careers to raise children reduces the number of years 
of paid work. Literature suggests that women with children receive less hourly wages and 
are less likely to receive an employer-sponsored pension than women without children 
(Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2008; Yabiku, 2000). Furthermore, women, particularly 
those caring for a spouse or aging parent, have a relatively high representation in part-
time work (Jefferson, 2009), decrease their work hours to provide care, or are more likely 
to retire early to assume a caregiving role (Van Houtven et al., 2013). These factors all 
have negative effects on the accumulation of pension benefits. Caregiving can also 
indirectly affect pension wealth; a mother may be passed over for promotion because of 
time spent away from her career, influencing her earnings and lifetime income.  
Women typically benefit from DB plan regulations that default to a joint and 
survivor annuity plan for couples. Statistically, workers are more likely to remain with 
the default option since the law requires written consent from the spouse (Beshears et al., 
2009; Johnson, Uccello, & Goldwyn, 2003). In a way, DB pension regulations safeguard 
women from the significant costs of declining health, spouse death, and subsequent 
widowhood. The shift to fewer DB pension plans, therefore, could have detrimental 
consequences for older women. Women are more likely to outlive their husbands, and 
research suggests that there are increased costs prior to a spouse’s death (Fan & Zick, 
2006) and additional costs after widowhood (Fan & Zick, 2004). The highest proportion 
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of older people living in poverty continues to be unmarried women living alone 
(Hartmann & English, 2009). 
In terms of DC plans, gender differences exist with regard to participation, 
investing, and withdrawals. Recent literature suggests men are more likely to take part in 
employer-sponsored pension plans (Bovbjerg, 2012) yet when only full-time, covered 
workers are considered, women have higher rates of participation (Copeland, 2006). 
Similar to DB plans, however, women’s lower wages, part-time work, and caregiving 
duties affect the participation in and contributions to a DC plan (Jefferson, 2009). When 
they change jobs, women are also more likely to cash out any pension assets compared to 
men (Hardy & Shuey, 2000). Unmarried women in particular are the most likely to cash 
out a pension, putting them at risk of having no pension plan at all in retirement (Shuey & 
O'Rand, 2006). 
Married individuals are generally better off than all unmarried groups with regard 
to their employer-sponsored pensions. Though one study found never married or divorced 
women had higher odds of receiving a pension compared to married women (Yabiku, 
2000), it studied workers reporting on perceived pension benefits, rather than actual 
receipt of pension income. A more recent study suggests female-headed households, 
particularly those headed by divorced women, are the least likely to possess an employer-
sponsored pension plan (Shuey & O'Rand, 2006). Women also have less knowledge 
about employer-sponsored pension plans than their male counterparts (Gustman & 
Steinmeier, 2001; Hardy & Shuey, 2000; Lusardi, 2006). Given workers with more 
financial literacy are more likely to respond appropriately to pension incentives and boost 
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their assets (Chan & Stevens, 2003), women are further disadvantaged particularly in DC 
plans. In terms of family history and men’s pension receipt, unmarried men have lower 
odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension compared to married men, and men 
with children are more likely to have a pension compared to their counterparts with no 
children (Yabiku, 2000).  
In order to build adequate pension income and ensure financial security in 
retirement, it appears individuals are at an advantage if their company provides pension 
options and, if the plan is a defined contribution plan, they contribute to their pension and 
enhance their financial education. Social Security is an important piece of the puzzle, but 
is often considered a “safety net.” Contributing significantly to employer-sponsored 
pensions can have a greater impact not only on achieving retirement security but also on 
living comfortably in retirement. As outlined above, not everyone has equal access to 
pension plans, the shift from DB to DC plans has placed investment risk on individual 
contributors, workers are often inadequately prepared to make decisions about their 
pensions, and the family-work life balance and marriage norms still put women at a 
disadvantage. Building personal savings and assets is an additional way workers can 
enhance their retirement portfolios. 
Personal Savings and Assets 
The final source of retirement income includes personal financial resources like 
checking and savings accounts, stocks and bonds, real estate, Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh’s, rental property, homeownership, and businesses. An 
individual’s net worth or wealth is determined by taking the value of his or her assets 
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owned minus any debts. While most Americans’ primary saving vehicle is through their 
bank accounts (i.e., savings and checking accounts), the government has introduced 
additional mechanisms over time to encourage investment assets such as the savings bond 
programs and the creation of Traditional IRAs. United States policy promoted 
homeownership through the creation of government-sponsored entities that encourage 
homeownership and tax policies that allow tax deductions on mortgage payments. The 
more recent shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans has 
encouraged both employers and the government to take steps to enhance financial literacy 
and improve individuals’ ability to save on their own (Lusardi & Beeler, 2006).  
There is consistent evidence, however, that a significant number of people are not 
saving enough for their retirement (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Munnell, Golub-Sass, & 
Varani, 2005; Munnell, Webb, & Golub-Sass, 2007). Among the general population, 
personal saving rates are low and on the decline, in particular among those with low 
incomes (Hogarth & Aguelov, 2003; Munnell et al., 2005). Only one-fourth of workers 
with household incomes under $35,000 have saved for retirement, which is down sharply 
from 49 percent in 2009 (EBRI, 2013). This suggests that many individuals may be 
unable to take on the responsibility and risk associated with growing their retirement nest 
egg, or that someone with less than $35,000 in income has little disposable income to 
save. Researchers suggest that many individual retirement choices are based on 
misinformation and short-sighted goals (Gustman & Steinmeier, 2001), so even workers 
with good intentions may find themselves with insufficient savings in retirement. 
Individuals are found to accumulate less than they projected (Haider & Stephens, 2007) 
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or to actively under-save because they overestimate what they will receive in Social 
Security benefits (Rohwedder & van Soest, 2006). 
A review of the retirement savings literature found the majority of papers focus 
on understanding the decision to save and asset allocation (see Gough & Niza, 2011). 
Gough and Niza (2011) show that very few papers examine family and social influences 
on savings behavior. Literature that does explore this topic compares married individuals 
to their unmarried counterparts and focuses almost exclusively on wealth. Findings 
suggest that married couples experience the benefit of economies of scale, allowing them 
more consumption for less expenditure compared to unmarried people (Zissimopoulos et 
al., 2008). Thus, the first major bolster to a married couple’s wealth is their ability to 
consume goods jointly. The second relates to the benefits of shared labor, or labor 
specialization, which allows a married couple to work more efficiently as a unit rather 
than as two single individuals (Becker, 1981). Third, literature suggests married 
individuals receive health benefits from being married (Pienta, Hayward, & Jenkins, 
2000) and therefore, they are able to work longer and arguably have more time to save 
before retiring (L. A. Lillard & Waite, 1995). Fourth, marital disruptions are shown to 
result in unexpected losses to wealth because of the costs associated with divorce and 
widowhood (Ulker, 2009; Zissimopoulos et al., 2008).  
The timing of retirement also has implications for the savings and assets 
individuals have in old age, and research suggests marital status/history affects retirement 
timing. Retiring early, “on time,” or late directly affects wealth in old age because upon 
retirement most individuals begin spending down assets, though most withdraw 
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conservatively  (Smith, Soto, & Penner, 2009). While increasing numbers of individuals 
are going back to work after retirement or exiting the labor force gradually through 
“bridge jobs,” these positions are often lower pay and less hours than their career 
employment (Giandrea, Cahill, & Quinn, 2007; Quinn, 1999). Retirement timing is a 
household decision that most married couples consider jointly by evaluating both 
spouses’ work histories and assets (Henkens & van Solinge, 2002; Honig, 1998). In dual-
earner couples, individuals often retire together even if this means an early retirement for 
the younger spouse (O'Rand & Farkas, 2002), and spouses with a close relationship are 
more likely to retire early than couples in unsatisfactory marriages (Szinovacz & 
DeViney, 2000). Unplanned health shocks, however, also have implications for 
retirement timing. While earlier retirement can be triggered by a spouse’s diminishing 
health and the burden of caregiving (Hayward, Friedman, & Chen, 1998), the costs of the 
spouse’s condition or disability may instead delay retirement (O'Rand & Farkas, 2002; 
Pienta, 2003; Szinovacz & DeViney, 2000).  
While unmarried workers may not be dealing with a spouse’s health issues, 
individuals who experienced a marital disruption may find themselves planning and 
saving alone after they previously planned for joint retirement endeavors and/or joint 
retirement incomes. Moreover, individuals who experience divorce, even if they 
eventually remarry, have less retirement income and assets than people who remain 
married (Holden & Kuo, 1996). Unfortunately for women, they are more likely to be 
unmarried than men (Zissimopoulos et al., 2008) and it is unclear if women’s increases in 
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labor force participation and earnings will offset the loss of shared retirement income 
(Holden & Fontes, 2009). 
Women are also at a disadvantage when it comes to their personal savings 
compared to men. Women are not only more likely to experience widowhood and less 
likely to remarry, which can have negative consequences for their ability to save, they are 
also found to be risk averse. Therefore, even at times when women are able to save, they 
are less likely than men to take risks and capitalize from high reward investments 
(Neelakantan & Chang, 2010).  Neelakantan and Chang (2010) find, however, that 
gender preferences for financial risk taking alone cannot explain the gender gap in wealth 
at retirement. To reiterate, the interplay between family and work life is significant. The 
time women spend on childrearing and caregiving, and its influence on their lower pay, 
limited work opportunities, and reduced ability to save undermines their capacity to build 
financial security for later life. 
Individuals grow their retirement security by developing a portfolio that includes 
Social Security, employer-sponsored pension income, and income from personal savings 
and assets. This research paper explores the argument that marital histories, particularly 
complex marital histories, influence a person’s ability to build an adequate retirement 
portfolio. Complex marital histories are increasingly common among older adults; 
therefore, it is imperative that we understand whether our current retirement saving 
policies and programs are placing these individuals at a disadvantage. The next section 
will present a comprehensive literature review of the research on marital history and 
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retirement security in order to outline previous work that supports our current 
understanding of how marriage patterns affect retirement income.  
Marital History and Retirement Security  
Retirement policy researchers and economists are at the forefront of studying the 
financial effects of marriage dissolution. This literature presents the benefits of assistance 
provided to the unmarried through Social Security benefits, child support, and alimony as 
well as the negative effects of complex marital histories for women (Butrica & Iams, 
1999; DeViney & Solomon, 1995; Tamborini et al., 2009; Tamborini & Whitman, 2007). 
The research is limited, however, on the accumulation of marital changes and transitions 
over the life course. Whether a political intention or not, one of the factors that continues 
to influence the way society supports a person in old age is their marital history.  
Marriage Trends and Family Structure in the United States 
Most studies on the relationship between marriage and retirement wealth were 
conducted on cohorts that did not experience several influential changes to family-work 
life: increases in two-earner couples, expectations of remaining in the workforce past age 
65, postponement in widowhood and decreases in remarriage rates, increases in divorce 
rates, and increases in the variation of retirement plans (Holden & Kuo, 1996; Maestas, 
2007). From the 1960s to the 1990s, trends in attitudes about the family were changing. 
Among shifting values were an increased acceptance of married women in the workforce 
(Goldin, 2006), trends toward gender equality and egalitarian decision-making in the 
family (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001), and increased tolerance toward divorce, 
remaining single, and choosing to be childless (Arnet Connidis, 2010; Goldstein & 
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Kenney, 2001; Mammen, 2008; Ruggles, 1997). At the same time, the way workers 
planned, saved, and experienced retirement was changing. Employer pension schemes 
and retirement accounts shifted to a more individual approach where workers were 
responsible for ensuring their future financial well-being. 
 Though responsibilities shifted, literature suggests that the increases in working 
years, earnings, and pension participation resulted in more retirement wealth for those 
nearing retirement (Butrica, Smith, & Iams, 2012; Dushi & Iams, 2008; Johnson, Butrica, 
& Mommaerts, 2010; Munnell & Aubry, 2010; Stevens, 2008). Projections on the 
retirement patterns of the Baby Boomer cohort suggest that they will continue to work 
longer, earn more, and claim their Social Security benefits at later ages (Michaud & 
Rohwedder, 2008). Large discrepancies in who will find themselves financially secure in 
retirement, however, have also increased over time. The particular characteristics of race 
and ethnicity (Butrica & Smith, 2012b), education (Butrica & Iams, 2003), marital 
history (Smock, 1993), financial literacy (Lusardi & Beeler, 2006), and employer pension 
options (Stevens, 2008) all result in financial inequalities over the life course. These 
individual differences suggest that it is inaccurate to state that younger cohorts will be 
better off in retirement than older cohorts will be, simply because they have accumulated 
more wealth as a group. Retirement wealth does not equate to retirement security and 
some researchers suggest that even though current workers have accrued more retirement 
wealth than previous generations, it is not enough to maintain their current standard of 
living (Butrica et al., 2012). 
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With a clear shift from a modally continuously married population to one with 
increased heterogeneity and variation, understanding retirement security becomes more 
complex. Middle-aged Americans today are more likely to have experienced a marital 
disruption during their lifetime than past generations. These younger cohorts are more 
likely to be divorced or never married, and less likely to experience widowhood than 
previous generations of near-retirees (Lin & Brown, 2012; Zissimopoulos et al., 2008). If 
divorced, the younger cohorts tend to experience the disruption at earlier ages and their 
total years spent married are fewer than those of older cohorts (Zissimopoulos et al., 
2008).  
Complex marital histories are increasingly becoming the norm, indicating that 
marital status is now a discontinuous facet of many people’s lives. To measure marital 
state as fixed and resilient is inappropriate. Demographic shifts with regard to the 
institution of marriage may be influencing individuals’ retirement security. The first shift 
is in the frequency and type of marital disruptions, specifically that marital disruptions 
are more likely to happen, and more likely to be caused by divorce. Marital dissolutions 
(i.e., a legal term for a divorce) have historically hindered the ability of women to sustain 
? ? ? ? r current lifestyle after the marriage dissolves. Women may have to divide their 
and resources between caregiving and working in the labor market, reducing their work 
history.  Until the 1970s, however, a break in marriage due to divorce was rare and most 
marriages that dissolved before retirement were due to widowhood (Becker, 1981). Thus, 
the second shift is the trend toward marriage instability (i.e., the propensity to be 
unmarried). Not only are marital dissolutions more likely to occur, but there is an 
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increase in the number of individuals who remain never married or choose not to 
remarry. 
Demographic shifts that influence marital trends also include those related to 
changes in family patterns. Since World War II, the birth rate has declined, the divorce 
rate doubled, and women have increased their labor force participation and remained 
employed even after having children (Becker, 1981, p. 245; Isen & Stevenson, 2010). 
While these divergent features did not change all at once and to the same extent, they 
resulted in a very different picture of the American family by the 1980s. The nature of 
modern marriages and families is now distinctly different from that of the past. During 
the last few decades, cohabitation (i.e., living with a partner while unmarried) has 
become commonplace, women have more control over fertility and better access to 
education and employment, and families have to consider the costs associated with 
having a stay-at-home spouse (Isen & Stevenson, 2010). This increase in complex family 
patterns and marital histories will have a lasting effect, and for the purpose of this 
dissertation, may have an effect on individual retirement security. 
Marriage, Family Life, and Retirement 
Research on the importance of family formation and marital history as a predictor 
for well-being in later life is accumulating, particularly with regard to wealth (Angel et 
al., 2007; Fethke, 1989; Holden & Kuo, 1996; McNamara, O'Grady-LeShane, & 
Williamson, 2003a; Ulker, 2009; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zissimopoulos, 2009; 
Zissimopoulos et al., 2008). This area of research on family-retirement planning 
generally focuses on married couples, compares individuals who are married to those 
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who are not, or highlights the effects of being an unmarried woman. When considering 
detailed marital histories and their influence on retirement security specifically, the 
literature becomes sparser. 
Marital status is a significant predictor of retirement behavior and wealth (Ekerdt 
et al., 2000; Kosloski, Ekerdt, & DeViney, 2001; McNamara et al., 2003a; Morgan, 1992; 
Szinovacz, Ekerdt, Butt, Barton, & Oala, 2012).  Marriage generates a form of inequality 
which results in the married being financially better off than unmarried individuals (Lee 
& Rowley, 2009; O'Rand, 1996). Married people have higher savings and more high-risk 
investments (Glass & Kilpatrick, 1998), more wealth (Zissimopoulos et al., 2008), and 
lower poverty rates (Holden & Kuo, 1996). Marriage is also associated with better health 
(Pienta et al., 2000) and increased longevity (L. A. Lillard & Waite, 1995) which means 
these individuals can work longer and accumulate more wealth (Zissimopoulos et al., 
2008). People who marry and stay married for a certain period of time are supported by 
tax incentives, Social Security’s spousal and survivor benefits, and the option to share a 
single health plan (Tamborini & Whitman, 2007). Marital status, however, fluctuates for 
a large majority of the population and individuals in a particular status (i.e., married, 
divorced, widowed, etc.) are not homogeneous. Though research focusing on the effects 
of marital fluctuations is limited, scholars extensively studied financial inequalities 
between marital groups. One of the major relationships to emerge when exploring marital 
status’s influence on retirement wealth is the moderating effect of gender.  
Women in all types of marital statuses experience lower wealth holdings 
compared to men, due largely to the strong relationship between work life and family life. 
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Caregiving obligations also disproportionately fall on women and often result in sporadic 
work histories (Szinovacz et al., 2001). As previously mentioned, women are also more 
likely to work part-time or in a job with limited pension options, have lower rates of 
participation, and limited pension and financial knowledge. Moreover, women continue 
to experience lower workplace earnings (Shuey & O'Rand, 2006) and more than half of 
working women elect Social Security benefits as a wife or widow because their own 
work history provides fewer benefits than what they receive under their spouse’s work 
history (Social Security Administration, 2012b).  
The relationship between marital history, caregiving, and retirement demands 
greater attention from social researchers (Szinovacz et al., 2001). Women with children 
are less likely to receive a pension (Yabiku, 2000) and are more likely to experience a 
sporadic, limited work history. This results in less job experience and lower wages when 
compared to childless women (Budig & England, 2001; Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 
2008), though the timing of childbearing matters (Pienta, 1999). Women who wait to 
have children and spend their younger years getting an education and working often build 
a greater attachment to the labor force once they do have children (Pienta, 1999).  
Children are not the only care-receivers that influence retirement security for 
women. Though literature on the financial effects of caring for older relatives is limited, 
studies find caregiving forces people into an early retirement (Dentinger & Clarkberg, 
2002; Orel, Landry-Meyer, & Spence, 2007; Szinovacz & Davey, 2004, 2005). Though 
women’s labor force participation has increased for younger generations, some 
researchers suggests their caregiving responsibilities have not decreased and that there 
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may be little difference between employed and non-employed women with regard to their 
caregiving duties (Feinberg, Reinhard, Houser, & Choula, 2014; Moen et al., 1994; 
Wakabayashi & Donato, 2005). The need to care for an ill or disabled spouse or older 
family member also influences women’s retirement timing (Dentinger & Clarkberg, 
2002; Szinovacz & Davey, 2005), and women in low paying jobs are particularly at risk 
of leaving the labor market early (Henz, 2006). The fact that wives are often the 
caregivers rather than their husbands is tied to women’s lower wages and employment 
opportunities (Sarkisian & Gerstel, 2004), in addition to traditional attitudes about 
caregiving. The long-term effects of this family-work relationship puts women at a 
disadvantage in later life, and is part of the reason women are more likely than men to 
experience poverty in old age (Tamborini et al., 2009; Wakabayashi & Donato, 2006). 
Women with marital histories that include marital disruptions are even worse off than 
their continuously married counterparts (Iams & Tamborini, 2012; Lee & Rowley, 2009).  
Disruptions, Remarriage, and Retirement 
If marriage creates tangible benefits to a couple, the dissolution of a marriage 
should have costly consequences. Moreover, the effects associated with the disruption 
may influence the individual over the life course. Extent literature indicates that 
individuals becoming divorced or widowed often experience a decrease in their 
household income and financial well-being (Angel et al., 2007; Holden & Kuo, 1996; 
McKeever & Wolfinger, 2001; Smock, 1993; Smock, Manning, & Gupta, 1999), labor 
force participation (Williamson & McNamara, 2003), and wealth accumulation (Ulker, 
2009; Zissimopoulos, 2009). These negative outcomes are particularly true for unmarried 
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women. Both before and after marriage dissolutions, household expenses increase. For 
example, there are increased expenditures prior to the spouse’s death (Fan & Zick, 2006) 
and additional costs after widowhood (Fan & Zick, 2004; Zissimopoulos, 2009). In 
addition, there is an automatic reduction in pension benefits that stems from losing the 
deceased spouse’s benefits (Karamcheva & Munnell, 2007). With regard to divorce, 
wealth decreases significantly prior to divorce though there is some wealth recovery over 
time (Zissimopoulos, 2009). Research on cohorts of divorced women from the 1960’s, 
70’s and 80’s suggests that increasing labor force participation did not protect them from 
the cost of their divorce (Smock, 1993).  A more recent study indicates that women’s 
own work histories and the increases in income transfers from husbands have lessened 
the high cost of divorce (McKeever & Wolfinger, 2001) though costs remain greater for 
women than men.  
For women, the challenge in attaining a secure retirement may relate to the loss of 
a partner for joint retirement planning, their spousal benefits, and any pre-retirement 
health insurance. As outlined, women experience difficulty building a retirement 
portfolio compared to men, and these gendered disadvantages compound with the effects 
of marital disruptions. Divorced women in particular struggle with financial preparations 
for retirement compared to their widowed counterparts (Lee & Rowley, 2009) which may 
be partially due to their ineligibility for Social Security spousal benefits if the marriage 
lasted less than 10 years (Iams & Tamborini, 2012).  
Men also experience financial consequences after divorce and widowhood. A 
review of the literature from the 1980’s (see Holden & Smock, 1991) suggests that men 
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experience an increase to their economic well-being following a divorce or separation. 
More recent research, however, suggests that men do experience a loss in household 
income, an increase in expenditures through support payments associated with divorce 
(McManus & DiPrete, 2001), and a loss in housing wealth (Zissimopoulos et al., 2008). 
While both men and women appear to suffer from costs associated with a marriage 
ending, women are notably worse off in situations that involve children (Smock, 1994). 
Specifically, Smock (1994) suggests that the reason women are financial worse off 
following a marital disruption stems partly from the mother’s role as the primary 
caregiver.  Zissimopoulos (2009) reveals that demographic and income control variables 
cannot explain the longitudinal changes in wealth among women in different marital 
status groups. In contrast, factors such as education and income did explain differences in 
men’s wealth holdings. This suggests that marital history may influence women’s, but not 
men’s, retirement security. Research by Williamson and McNamara (2003) illuminate 
this gender difference further. They find that women, but not men, had a significant 
decrease in their labor force participation following a marital disruption. A more recent 
review of the literature focusing on divorce, however, finds that women are increasing 
their work substantially after a divorce occurs (Ozcan & Breen, 2012). Though these 
results are at odds, both studies indicate that marital changes have a relationship to 
women’s work histories, but not to men’s, further suggesting that a strong family-work 
life relationship exists for women. 
Generally, people who remain continuously married accrue the most valuable 
retirement income portfolios. Marriage is so financially advantageous that a remarriage 
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lessens the negative effects of marital dissolution. Remarriage after a marital disruption 
benefits individuals, particularly widows, by increasing their wealth (Duncan & 
Hoffman, 1985; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zissimopoulos, 2009) and allowing women to 
exit the labor force as they planned (Williamson & McNamara, 2003). In the case of 
individuals with multiple divorces, however, remarriage has fewer advantages (Wilmoth 
& Koso, 2002). This may be partially due to the decline in savings rates that begin years 
prior to a divorce (Zagorsky, 2005; Zissimopoulos, 2009). Though the positive effects of 
remarriage lessen with each marital disruption that occurs, there are always advantages. It 
is better, from a financial perspective, to be married, and researchers demonstrate that 
remarriage supports individuals as they plan and save for their retirement years (Holden 
& Kuo, 1996; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002). 
The marital makeup of our population is changing dramatically, as the prevalence 
of complex marital pathways continues to grow and is increasingly due to divorce rather 
than widowhood. A national portrait of divorce in 2009 shows one in four divorces 
occurred to people ages 50 and older, and most of these individuals were separating from 
a remarriage rather than their first marriage (Brown & Lin, 2012). A snapshot of Baby 
Boomer families shows that one-third are unmarried, and the majority of these single 
Boomers are either divorced or never married (Lin & Brown, 2012). Research on marital 
dissolution in later-life must expand beyond widowhood since we are less knowledgeable 
about the causes and consequences of later-life divorce. The growing never married 
population also needs attention.  
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Never Married Individuals and Retirement 
 An often-overlooked population that has been slowly increasing in size over the 
last few decades is the never married (Tamborini, 2007). While never married people 
should be included in studies on the effects of being unmarried, researchers often remove 
this group because of small sample size. Literature on never marrieds is scarce and often 
focuses on never married mothers, who generally occupy the lowest socioeconomic status 
(Bianchi, 1995; Zhan & Pandey, 2004). Less attention is paid to never married men and 
elders. Given the never married group currently has the largest proportion of elders in 
poverty, scholars cannot continue to exclude this population from research studies. Never 
married individuals by definition do not experience an unanticipated marital shock and, 
theoretically, are better prepared to build their retirement portfolio than divorced and 
widowed individuals. Yet, existing literature on never married people reveals a mixed 
picture.  
Never marrieds make up only about 4.5 percent of older adults but this group is 
increasing. For example, only 5 percent of women between the ages of 50 and 59 were 
never married in 1990 but twenty years later, this group has nearly doubled to 9 percent 
of women (Iams & Tamborini, 2012). As the number of never married people continues 
to grow, they are becoming a larger proportion of the unmarried population. A recent 
snapshot of unmarried Baby Boomers shows that of all unmarried individuals, 26 percent 
of women and 38 percent of men have never married (Lin & Brown, 2012). This 
indicates that the makeup of the unmarried population is changing considerably from 
previous generations. Projections suggest that the economic security of retired never 
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married individuals will improve (Tamborini, 2007) as the status of being never married 
becomes more common. Perhaps more than any other marital status group, however, 
gender plays a major role in the financial status of never marrieds.  
Previous research on older never married people suggests that both men and 
women are economically vulnerable (Tamborini, 2007). Characteristics related to the 
likelihood of a person getting married include higher education, earnings, and wealth 
suggesting a selectivity effect. Never married individuals may therefore be 
disproportionately in a low socioeconomic status group (White & Rogers, 2000). Recent 
examinations of the financial situations of never married Baby Boomers, however, 
reveals striking gender differences. Lin and Brown (2012) find that never married women 
are better off financially than their divorced and widowed counterparts, but that never 
married men are worse off than other unmarried men. Zissimopoulos et al. (2008) support 
this finding and show that never married men have significantly less lifetime earnings 
compared to divorced men, but never married women earn more than all other women. 
As the never married population reaches retirement age, studies focusing on this group 
must also increase. They are becoming a larger part of the experience of retirement, yet 
too little is known about this group. 
As summarized above, retirement security in America generally refers to having 
adequate resources from Social Security benefits, employer-sponsored pension plans, and 
individual savings and assets. Retirement security and its relationship to marital history is 
an understudied, yet important area of research. Since both work history and marital 
history influence the ability to accumulate an adequate retirement portfolio, this 
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dissertation focuses on understanding how a lifetime of marital changes affects retirement 
income and whether there are gender differences. The theoretical framework and 
conceptual model guiding this research is presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The 1960s and 1970s were a promising time for advances in theoretical concepts 
in the social sciences. During this period, the concepts of cumulative 
advantage/disadvantage and the life course perspective came to fruition (Elder, 1974; 
Merton, 1968; Price, 1965). Both provided important theoretical elements and 
groundwork for understanding cohort and age-related processes two decades later 
(Dannefer, 1987). Indeed, prior to the creation of longitudinal research methodology and 
datasets, and the development of theories that explored inequality and its relationship to 
aging, social scientists argued that aging – in particular the act of retirement – resulted in 
an “equalizing effect” in income and wealth among individuals (Crystal & Shea, 1990). 
Scholars pointed to the changes in people’s income sources as the equalizing force: 
retirees no longer brought home a paycheck and began receiving checks from social 
programs, like Social Security, that have a progressive benefit structure. Over time, 
changes to social programs, improvements to data analyses techniques, and the use of 
theoretical frameworks based on the life course perspective resulted in reversing this 
assumption. 
Individual development and aging are lifelong processes; a typical person’s life 
unfolds over time as he or she passes through several stages of life events, notably 
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educational attainment, marriage, parenthood, career advancement, and retirement. The 
development of the life course concept in the social sciences provides a framework for 
understanding how major life events or transitions affect the trajectories of the life span. 
This framework is a natural fit for understanding how individuals build retirement 
income sources and wealth. The accumulation of these resources occurs over an 
individual’s lifetime, and therefore the ideal way to understand resource accumulation 
involves looking at a person’s entire life. Cumulative advantage/disadvantage theory 
enhances this concept further by explaining how different life course processes increase 
the heterogeneity of outcomes in later life. The cumulative advantage/disadvantage 
framework provides context for understanding individual inequalities that develop and 
build on each other over time. 
Life Course Perspective 
Through the lens of the life course perspective, individual and group experiences 
are shaped by the social, historical, and cultural forces that occur over the life time 
(Settersten, 2006). Life course theory states that individual lives include transitions or 
discrete changes in roles and statuses, and trajectories or the long-term patterns of 
stability and change a person experiences (Elder & Kirkpatrick Johnson, 2002; Hagestad, 
2003). Transitions are events where the individual experiences an exit from prior roles 
and statuses and enters into a new phase, for example starting kindergarten, getting a first 
job, or getting married. Trajectories, on the other hand, are a longer view of the life span 
and take into account multiple transitions (Hutchison, 2010). These terms are important 
in understanding the major tenets of the life course perspective. 
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Over time, as more longitudinal data became available to study individual and 
family life trajectories, scholars began to recognize several themes. First, research must 
recognize the context of historical time in order to comprehend human development. The 
societies and cultures people live in transform their lives, and the age they are when 
experiencing a societal change results in very different consequences for the development 
of their beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviors. For example, the age of a person during 
the adoption of unilateral divorce laws may have influenced their attitudes toward 
marriage and divorce. Indeed, research suggests those who were younger during the 
1970’s “divorce revolution” have a higher propensity to divorce and remain unmarried 
(Rasul, 2003). Thus, a second theme to emerge among life course scholars is an 
appreciation of the importance of timing. Age is important in most societies, and social 
institutions, roles, and behaviors are often centered or organized around age (Settersten, 
2003). What this means for researchers is that transitions in a person’s life can be 
considered on- or off-time if society has determined a specific age or age range is 
associated with an event. Some individuals will be early or late in relation to the “norm” 
and this timing influences their life trajectory. Job loss at age 55 may result in a forced 
retirement that many people would consider early and “off-time.” This early retirement 
timing, which is often due to job loss or health issues (Szinovacz & Davey, 2005; 
Williamson & McNamara, 2003), can have serious consequences for the individual’s 
financial future. 
Third, life course researchers appreciate that the trajectories of human lives are 
interdependent or linked, in particular among family members. People do not make 
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decisions or act in a vacuum, and the family unit is often the place where individuals 
experience and interpret larger historical and cultural phenomena (Hutchison, 2010). The 
family is a particular unit of support, and the linkages among members even extend 
across generations. For example, the financial successes of parents may contribute to 
their son’s ability to attend and pay for college, ultimately providing him better job 
opportunities that will support his own family. Likewise, detriments and misfortunes 
have a real and lasting impact on family members and future generations. Finally, the life 
course perspective suggests that human agency, or the individual actions and personal 
choices taken in order to achieve goals, influences the life course. Individuals do 
construct their own life pathways, however, life course theorists accept that people are 
inevitably constrained by the historical and social circumstances that they live in (Elder, 
Kirkpatrick Johnson, & Crosnoe, 2003). 
The life course perspective is a natural fit for studying retirement because of the 
theory’s focus on time, process, and context (Elder, 1995). The theory leads to the 
assumption that employment history and family experiences influence retirement and 
individuals’ attitudes toward it (Szinovacz & DeViney, 2000), and that linkages among 
spouses influence important life plans and transitions. Retirement itself is a life course 
transition and the event has associated expectations and preferences, and results in the 
beginning of a new identity (i.e., retiree) and new status in society (Moen, 1996).   
The life course is also a valuable framework for studying family patterns and 
marital history. As mentioned above, one of the major tenets of life course theory is that 
the life events (e.g., marriage, childbearing, widowhood) of a person and their significant 
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other are interdependent. Marital histories that include a marital disruption, for example, 
may force individuals to plan and save for retirement alone after they previously planned 
for joint retirement with their spouse. Society largely believes marriage is a partnership 
and resources should be pooled, so divorcees and widow(er)s may discover they have a 
limited understanding of household finances or financial planning if previously 
dependent on their spouse (Burgoyne & Kirchler, 2008). Indeed, planning for retirement 
is partly contingent on marital status, and disruptions can influence a person’s ability to 
financially plan for him or herself if the couple separates. Resource pooling actually 
diminishes among couples who are not in their first marriage (Burgoyne & Kirchler, 
2008), and the preference to manage their own money may be related to experiencing 
challenges with the division of assets following a divorce.  
A second consideration of the life course perspective that is particularly relevant 
to a study of marital history and retirement includes the effects that stem from when an 
event or transition occurs in one’s life. The timing of events influences current choices, 
current transitions, and future transitions (Elder & Giele, 2009). This dissertation 
examines a number of ways timing influences the interrelated trajectories of work and 
family life.  
First, the relationship between work and the timing of family formation is 
important for understanding a person’s individual economy and ultimately their 
retirement security (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Johnson & Favreault, 
2004; Waite, 1995). When in life a person decides to get married and transition into a 
spousal role will influence when he or she decides to start working or have children. In 
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other words, it is assumed that the timing of family formation will affect work patterns 
and that work will affect family formation. The timing of an event, like marriage or 
childbearing, has a rippling effect on educational attainment and work history. This is 
particularly true for women, as presented previously. Becoming a mother is associated 
with a reduction in educational attainment, lifetime work history, and wages (Budig & 
England, 2001; Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2008). Women who wait to have children 
build a greater attachment to the labor force (Pienta, 1999) though they still experience a 
reduction in their years of paid work and wages compared to women without children 
(Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2008) and this is directly related to the time they take away 
from work to raise children. 
Second, the timing of any marital disruptions is also a major family-life transition 
that has repercussions on work history. When a change in family structure occurs, 
individuals may need to alter their work lives. For example, Williamson and McNamara 
(2003) find that unplanned marital changes in mid-life result in increased labor force 
participation for Black men but decreased participation for White women. They conclude 
that for about one-third of the population, unplanned marital or disability changes in later 
life can disrupt trajectories and drastically change any retirement plans. Thus, the timing 
of disruptions also influences the degree of effects on retirement planning and saving. For 
example, an early life divorce occurring before the individual began retirement planning 
may have less of an effect than a divorce occurring mid-life. In addition, retirement 
timing is often a household decision (Henkens & van Solinge, 2002; Honig, 1998) and 
therefore, family influences on retirement will have less of an influence when a person is 
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unmarried.  In these situations, particularly because the person is dependent solely on 
their own retirement resources, their finances may play a larger role in the decision to 
retire than for married couples. 
Finally, timing’s influence on the interplay of work and family life suggests that 
participation in work roles is made more difficult by increased participation in family 
roles, and vice versa (Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985). The timing of both family transitions 
and work transitions (e.g., new job, job loss, and promotion) influence each other and 
individuals’ life trajectories.  
The third and final life course tenet relevant to this discussion states that historical 
and cultural contexts define the landscape of constraints and opportunities available to 
individuals at any specific time. Whether long-term trends or random fluctuations, the life 
courses of individuals are shaped by the historical context they live in and the life stage 
they experience at that time (Elder et al., 2003). In terms of retirement security and 
planning, historical context influences the options that are available for retirement saving, 
the current market forces, and the unemployment rates. For example, defined contribution 
pensions are now more common among private sector employers (Munnell & Soto, 
2007), while previous generations had defined benefit pensions if an employer-sponsored 
pension option was available. Historical, cultural, and market changes can reduce the 
resources individuals have for retirement (Bosworth & Burtless, 2010), affect expected 
retirement age, and influence retirement plans with a trend toward uncertainty or to 
continue working (Szinovacz, Davey, & Martin, 2014; Szinovacz, Martin, & Davey, 
2013).  
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Historical circumstances and cultural context have also influenced social norms 
around marriage. Such changes include the appropriate age to get married, the treatment 
of unmarried people, and society’s overall perception that marriage is “forever.” For 
example, policy changes affecting the divorce process make it easier to get a divorce 
which results in increased risk of marital disruption (Stevenson, 2007). Government 
services and tax advantages are currently in place to benefit married people or assist 
unmarried widows, while little is provided to financially support divorcees, the separated, 
or the never married (Tamborini & Whitman, 2007). The people who grew up 
experiencing these changes in marital laws and marriage trends (i.e., the Baby Boomer 
cohort) have a notably different view of family, and the family-work life relationship than 
their parents’ generation. The Baby Boomers also have the most complex and diverse 
marital histories of any previous generation, and these viewpoints play at least some role 
in their marital behavior. 
Cumulative Advantage/Disadvantage  
In his classic paper, “The Matthew Effect in Science,” Robert K. Merton (1968) 
described accumulation of advantage in the scientific world that unevenly distributed 
resources and rewards among more seasoned scholars, a process he argued affected the 
flow of new ideas and projects. Merton noticed that previously published, well known, 
and respected scientists had a significant advantage over new scholars; they were more 
likely to get additional publications, win grants, or obtain other professional resources. 
Observing the cumulative effects that stemmed from a socially structured allocation of 
resources, Merton dubbed this phenomenon the “Matthew effect,” named after a quote in 
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the Bible. Studies on the accumulation of advantage in professional career paths exploded 
in the 1970’s (Zuckerman, 1988).  
The Matthew effect framework argues that the very nature of scientific study, a 
typically collaborative institution, “may serve to heighten the visibility of contributions to 
science by scientists of acknowledged standing and to reduce the visibility of 
contributions by authors who are less well-known” (Merton, 1968, p. 7). Essentially, the 
accumulation of advantages over time results in a concentration of resources among a 
few scholars within a given field, and thus the adage “the rich get richer and the poor get 
poorer” is observed (O'Rand, 2003). Though the Matthew effect’s linkage to time and age 
is clear, scholars did not explicitly analyze this relationship until two decades later. 
Dannefer (1987) draws from Merton’s account of the Matthew effect and applies 
this concept of cumulative advantage to study aging and the life course. Cumulative 
advantage/disadvantage explains how different life-course processes, such as family, 
health, or work, increase the heterogeneity of important outcomes in later life for 
individuals within a birth cohort (O'Rand, 1996). The diversity that increases as people 
aged is a phenomenon previously attributed to outcomes of individual differences or 
social-psychological processes, but not of social and institutional processes (Dannefer, 
1987). Dannefer argues that, in fact, social and institutional processes have a strong and 
lasting effect on the accumulation of advantages and disadvantages, and that the 
consequence of these circumstances are intensified in old age. A recent review of the 
cumulative advantage literature by Dannefer (2003) defines the concept of cumulative 
advantage/disadvantage as “the systemic tendency for interindividual divergence in a 
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given characteristic (e.g., money, health, or status) with the passage of time” (Dannefer, 
2003, p. S327).  
This theory enhances the life course perspective by explaining how factors such 
as linked lives and the timing of transitions promote age heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in 
this context is defined as “the growing variability in domains such as health, lifestyle, and 
socioeconomic well-being within a cohort as its members enter old age” (Pallas & 
Jennings, 2009, p. 212). In other words, life course study presents a theoretical basis for 
what can affect current and future choices and transitions, ultimately shaping a person’s 
life. Cumulative advantage/disadvantage complements the life course perspective by 
illuminating how different transitions and life trajectories affect a person’s resources and 
promotes inequalities. This paper will use three concepts developed from the cumulative 
advantage/disadvantage literature. 
First, the theory recognizes the importance of early-life differences on later-life, 
specifically stating that differences accentuate with the passage of time and therefore 
early advantages or disadvantages are determinants of later life outcomes (Dannefer, 
2003).  Those individuals who obtain valued resources early in life, and who sustain these 
resources, are assumed to accumulate more advantages over the life course (Crystal & 
Shea, 1990). Second, cumulative advantage/disadvantage scholars argue that certain 
social institutions and social processes create heterogeneity by supporting some people 
while neglecting or even injuring others over the life course (O'Rand, 1996). This concept 
is particularly important for any life course study because it assumes that even if 
everyone starts out equal, inequalities will still emerge over time. Finally, cumulative 
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advantage/disadvantage recognizes the importance of interpersonal dynamics in 
generating or reinforcing certain differences and influencing individuals’ perceptions 
about their environment, their own life, and their future (Ferraro & Shippee, 2009). Often 
described as “self-fulfilling prophecies,” this concept suggests that how people perceive 
themselves and/or compare themselves to others affects not only the way society treats 
them, but how they view their own abilities and make decisions. 
The first important concept that stems from cumulative advantage is that early-life 
differences exist and become magnified over time. Diversity and inequality among those 
in old age evolves from not only individual choices (i.e., lifestyle), but available 
resources and institutional arrangements over the life span (Dannefer, 1987). Those with 
early life advantages are expected to have better exposure to opportunities, while the 
disadvantaged are expected to have an increased exposure to risk (Ferraro & Shippee, 
2009). The proposition supports this paper’s argument that knowing only a person’s 
current marital status is insufficient because disruptions exacerbate existing 
disadvantages. Following a particular marital trajectory through life or having a complex 
marital history results in the accumulation of advantages and disadvantages that may 
affect retirement income and wealth. Thus, marital history factors such as knowing at 
what age people get married, how many marriages they have had, and how previous 
marriages ended should enhance an understanding of retirement income inequalities.  
Second, the concept of cumulative advantage/disadvantage suggests social 
systems generate inequality. The work of Pallas and Jennings (2009) identifies a link 
between an individual’s class of origin and early sorting and selection mechanisms. They 
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also find a relationship between class of origin and the domains of the family, education, 
and the economy. Just as Merton noticed with the professional career patterns of 
scientists, social institutions may support some groups of people while overlooking or 
even harming other groups. This paper considers marital status a similar form of social 
standing that stratifies individuals and produces inequality. The institution of marriage 
has rules, forms of capital (e.g., cultural, social, economic), and structural features that 
systematically advantage some and disadvantage others. Starting one’s early adult life in 
a certain “marital standing” has sustained effects on outcomes over time and this 
cumulative process generates growing inequality (Pallas & Jennings, 2009).  
Finally, cumulative advantage/disadvantage assumes that individuals make life 
choices based on perceptions about their environment, their own life, and their future. 
People consider what is possible or attainable and seek these or similar alternatives based 
on preference, need, or ability. Related to the “marital standing” identification previously 
discussed, those who perceive themselves as beneficiaries of the institution of marriage 
may be more likely to get and remain married. Marital history and its specific 
components may also influence people’s perceptions about themselves and their future, 
which may affect their desire or capacity to save for retirement. Cumulative 
advantage/disadvantage suggests that the opportunities people strive for are only those 
that they view as attainable. Thus, if a person believes they are unhealthy relative to their 
peers and will not live long, they may choose to spend in the present over saving for 
retirement. The subjective probability of reaching retirement age may influence an 
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individual’s entire work life and lifelong saving habits so that she may find she is ill-
prepared in retirement (Hurd, Smith, & Zissimopoulous, 2004).  
The Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this research (Figure 1) has a distinct focus on the 
marital life pathways of individuals in order to understand how marital relationships, 
transitions, and trajectories are related to retirement security. The segment on “Marital 
Factors” displays the importance of marital history in this research, and encompasses 
both marital history and spouse characteristics. A person’s marital history includes when 
in life marital transitions occur, what form these transitions take, how long he or she 
remains in a particular status, and how many marital transitions occurred over the 
lifetime. Cumulative advantage/disadvantage theory and the life course perspective touch 
on specific facets of marital history, leading to a framework focused on the type, timing, 
duration, and frequency of marital changes. Time is a unique concept in this model, and 
the timing of life events and simultaneous transitions warrants attention. During a life 
course, the timing of a change can result in two individuals reacting to the same change 
(i.e., divorce) differently or can result in different outcomes. The model therefore takes 
into account both past and current life events when examining marital history’s effect on 
retirement resources.  
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Various demographics (i.e., age, gender, race, and cohort) are contextual factors 
controlled in the model. These factors are invariably interlinked and influence the type, 
timing, duration, and frequency of marital changes. In general, whites are more likely to 
get and stay married than non-whites but college-educated non-white women are more 
likely to marry than minority women with less education (Isen & Stevenson, 2010; Kim, 
2010). Age and gender also play a role in marital history, in particular, men are less likely 
to be unmarried than women in mid- and late-life (Zissimopoulos et al., 2008). These 
background characteristics and any associated early life inequalities will influence an 
Retirement Resources 
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Figure 1. A life course model for understanding how individuals accumulate retirement 
income and assets. 
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individual’s choices or ability to deal with transitions, as well as influence the 
accumulation of advantage or disadvantage throughout the life course. 
As the life span proceeds (Figure 1), the model identifies “Life Events and 
Transitions” made up of the main characteristics being studied (i.e., work history, 
personal history, marital history). The model brackets these three areas of life together in 
order to show that each influences and constrains the other. For example, more educated 
and higher income workers are more likely to be married and remain married compared 
to less educated and lower income individuals though there are racial differences in this 
trend (Isen & Stevenson, 2010). Within each “Life Events and Transitions” grouping, 
variables related to a similar life area are expected to affect each other as well. It is also 
well documented that education affects health outcomes (Braveman et al., 2011; 
Feinstein, 1993) and furthermore, an individual’s background characteristics invariably 
influence these relationships. The framework purposefully aims to highlight the interplay 
between personal background characteristics, work-related factors, personal factors, and 
marital factors prior to retirement. Retirement is the point in time used to draw the study 
sample, in order to capture the retirement income and assets before retirees can begin to 
“spend down.” This cross-sectional design, which takes into account previous marital life 
events and transitions, explores marital history’s association with particular income 
trajectories and pays specific attention to gender differences.  An outline of the research 
objectives based on the theoretical framework and conceptual model is discussed next. 
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Research Objectives 
Core findings from the theories and literature review suggest that a person’s 
history of marital transitions, the timing of these transitions, and the duration of specific 
marital statuses all have a relationship to personal finances. Findings also suggest major 
gender differences. Thus, the research objectives of this dissertation are to uncover 
whether these marital history factors are related to specific retirement resources (i.e., 
Social Security, pensions, and savings/assets). Further, the research will explore whether 
these effects differ by gender. 
 
Objective 1: To determine whether the type of marital disruption and the frequency of 
marital transitions are related to retirement income and assets.  
Hypothesis 1. Among the married sample, those who experienced a prior marital 
disruption will have less retirement income and assets than those who have been 
continuously married. 
Hypothesis 2. Individuals with more marital disruptions will have less retirement 
income and assets than those who have experienced one disruption. 
Hypothesis 3. The reduction in retirement income and assets associated with marital 
disruptions will be greater for those who experienced divorce than all other 
marital statuses. 
Objective 2: To determine whether longer marital durations matter (i.e., those with longer 
marriages and those who spend more of their life being married) and whether they are 
related to retirement income and assets. 
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Hypothesis 4. Individuals who have spent a greater proportion of their lives married 
will have more retirement income and assets. 
Hypothesis 5. Marriage stability will be positively related to retirement security, so 
those with longer marriages will have more income and assets than those in 
shorter marriages. 
Objective 3: To explore the timing of a change in marital status, and determine whether 
the timing of marital transitions is related to retirement income and assets.  
Hypothesis 6. Experiencing marriage earlier in life will have positive effects on 
retirement income and assets. 
Hypothesis 7. People who experienced a disruption later in life will have less 
retirement income and assets than those who became unmarried earlier in life. 
Objective 4: To determine whether the effects of marital history vary by gender. 
Hypothesis 8. Women’s marital history will have a stronger association with 
retirement income and assets than men’s. 
Hypothesis 9. Never married men will have less retirement income and assets and 
never married women will have more relative to other unmarried men and 
women.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
This study uses secondary analysis techniques based on data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), waves 1 through 9: 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, and 2008. Conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan, the HRS is a longitudinal panel study that began in 1992 with the purpose of 
surveying a nationally representative sample of Americans over the age of 50. The 
primary sample in the HRS consists of individuals between the ages of 51 and 61 in 
1992, and their spouses of all ages. The HRS surveys study participants every two years, 
and introduced new cohorts into the sample in 1998, 2004 and 2010.  The current HRS 
sample consists of more than 38,000 individuals and the sample design and response rates 
are discussed at length elsewhere (Juster & Suzman, 1995; National Institute on Aging, 
2007).  
This study also uses data from the RAND HRS data files. The RAND data files 
are developed and maintained by the RAND Corporation, and are considered user-
friendly versions of the HRS data. Certain variables from the RAND file or variables 
constructed from the RAND file are used in this analysis, in particular the cleaned and 
imputed retirement income and assets (RAND HRS Data Version M.).  
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Sample 
In order to focus on the financial security of individuals in their retirement years, 
the sample selection technique attempts to capture people before they begin to “spend-
down” their retirement income and assets. Eligible respondents report being not retired in 
a given “entry wave” (i.e., 1992, 1998, and 2004) and then retiring at a subsequent wave. 
Respondents who identify as retired prior to joining the study or respondents who never 
report retiring during the study timeframe are excluded from the analysis. Retirement 
status is based on whether a person self-identifies as retired and is not receiving any 
employment income (i.e., not partially retired). 
Respondents who identify their marital status as “partnered” are also excluded 
from analysis. The way marital history questions are asked by the HRS results in 
incomplete histories for respondents who state their marital status as “partnered.” For 
some individuals, their marital status changed to “partnered” between waves. This small 
number of cases (n=40) are not included in the final sample since the HRS does not 
differentiate between cohabitation and domestic partnership among people who 
transitioned into a “partnered” status.  
This analysis uses data from the wave of an individual’s date of first retirement. 
The retirement status of individuals often changes in old age, for example someone 
leaves the labor force and then decides to go back to work years later. Data for each 
respondent in this study is counted once, at the point when the individual first identifies 
as retired based on the sample criteria described above, and any employment changes 
after that are unrelated to this study’s research goals and are ignored.  
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Based on the exclusion criteria above, the initial sample (n=5,272) consists of a 
group of retirees interviewed as close to their actual retirement date as possible. This 
allows for an investigation of the retirement portfolio they possess when they enter 
retirement. The breakdown of cases from each entry wave is as follows: of 12,521 
respondents who entered in the 1992 wave, 4,506 individuals retired between 1994 and 
2008; of 4,849 respondents who entered in the 1998 wave, 583 individuals retired 
between 2000 and 2008; of 3,330 respondents who entered in the 2004 wave, 183 
individuals retired between 2006 and 2008. A brief reminder that the definition for 
retirement in this research project is strict; the respondent must self-identify as 
completely retired and not be receiving any income from employment. 
Due to the number of individuals in each birth cohort who retired within the data 
collection timeframe, this analysis only includes the HRS Cohort (born 1931-1941) and 
the War Babies or WB (born 1942-1947). During the timeframe, 248 Children of the 
Depression (CD) and 285 Early Baby Boomers (EBB) experienced a first retirement, 
however this occurred after age 65 or before age 60 respectively. These retirees are not 
the norm for their cohort group, and including them may bias the data though arguably 
real trends may be missed by excluding these groups. For the purposes of this study, 
these cohorts are excluded from analysis, leaving a sample of 4,739 cases (3,856 HRS 
Cohort and 883 War Babies).     
 The sample also excludes proxy respondents. People with chronic health 
conditions and/or cognitive decline may require the use of proxy respondents, however 
the determination for using a proxy is often subjective and the reliability of proxy 
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responses is often dependent on the relationship of the proxy to the individual (Nelson, 
Longstreth Jr., Koepsell, Checkoway, & van Belle, 1994). The definition of sample 
inclusion is based on a self-reported measure of retirement status, and the main 
independent variables on marital history require self-reporting of past marriage 
information; therefore, proxy respondents are excluded. After removing the CD and EBB 
cohort groups and proxies from analysis, the final analytic sample contains 4,443 cases. 
Measures 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables representing retirement security include ratio variables 
measured in actual dollar amounts: (1) annual income from Social Security benefits, (2) 
annual income from employer-sponsored pensions or annuities, and (3) total net value of 
non-housing financial wealth. In addition, some individuals have no income coming from 
Social Security and pensions, therefore additional analysis includes dummy dependent 
variables for these two income sources (1=has income from this source, 0=no income 
reported). These variables, as mentioned above, are derived from the RAND HRS data 
file and missing values were imputed by RAND. 
Questions about income and wealth in the HRS generally follow the same pattern, 
where the interviewer asks the respondent whether he (or his spouse/partner) have that 
type of income source or wealth holding. For example, an interviewer asks about owning 
any shares of stock. If the respondent answers that they do own stocks, the interviewer 
proceeds with a question about the value of those stock holdings. One of the major 
benefits of using the RAND HRS data file for income and wealth variables is that they 
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impute missing information for these variables and impute amounts for all cases with 
bracketed information (i.e., answers that identify a respondent’s income range, rather 
than exact amount). For the income and wealth dependent variables in actual dollar 
amounts, each is recoded into $1,000 units and then natural logged. To reduce the 
influence of outliers, dependent variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  
In a number of cases, individuals state they are retired by the end of a study wave 
but do not report that they are receiving retirement income from Social Security and 
employer-sponsored pension benefits until the following wave. In these instances, income 
amounts are taken from the subsequent wave in order to account for the fact that many 
people do not begin claiming benefits immediately upon retirement. Using data from the 
next wave results in updating 973 cases for Social Security income and 789 cases for 
employer-sponsored pension income. Still, many individuals do not report receiving any 
Social Security (n=1,512) or employer-sponsored pension income (n=2,403) by this next 
wave. This was often due to early retirement patterns. In over half the cases related to no 
Social Security income, for example, the individual retired before age 62. Including 
dependent variables that account for both the real income amounts and dummy variables 
for possession of each income source will help to enhance the analysis of marital 
history’s relationship to retirement resources.  
Independent Variables 
The major independent variables of this study include factors that relate to marital 
history. Using a hierarchical regression technique, marital variables are entered into the 
model with increasing complexity starting with basic marital status and then adding 
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variables pertaining to marital history: timing, duration, and frequency of transitions. 
Caution is used when adding these variables because transitions and durations are closely 
linked together, and linked with age (i.e., adding up marital transitions and durations 
should total a person’s age). Most marital history variables are calculated using the raw 
entry wave data files from 1992, 1998, and 2004. Variables computed from the raw data 
files include: current marital status, age at first marriage, age at first disruption, length of 
first marriage, total years married, and proportion of lifetime married.  A few variables 
are taken from the RAND file instead of the raw data and are manipulated for this 
research: total marriage count, total number of divorces, total number of widowhoods, 
and length of longest marriage.  
Current marital status is manually calculated in order to distinguish the separated 
from the divorced, and the remarried from the continuously married, something that is 
not done by RAND. Based on frequencies, this results in a breakdown of 4 statuses for 
those married at retirement: continuously married (reference), remarried after one 
divorce, remarried after one widowhood, remarried after multiple disruptions; and 5 
statuses for those unmarried at retirement: never married, currently divorced-divorced 
once, currently divorced-multiple disruptions, currently widowed-widowed once 
(reference), and currently widowed-multiple disruptions. 
Age at first marriage and first disruption are both calculated using the individual’s 
date of birth and first marriage start and end date information. The length of first 
marriage is calculated by subtracting these dates (i.e., Age at first disruption – age at first 
marriage) for those who have experienced a marital disruption, and by subtracting age at 
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first marriage from current age for the continuously married. Categorical dummy 
variables are computed based on terciles and include: first marriage lasted between 1 and 
14 years, between 15 and 29 years, 30 or more years (reference), and where applicable, 
first marriage = 0 years (i.e., never married). Total years of marriage are calculated by 
combining the length of up to four marriages to give a total number of years. The HRS 
does not collect information about marriages beyond an individual’s fourth marriage. The 
variable for total years is then used to calculate a proportion variable that signifies the 
proportion of an individual’s life (after age 15) that he or she spent married, ranging from 
0 to 1.  
A variable representing the type of marital status change and the timing of these 
transitions is calculated using age at first disruption data, and additional data that 
identifies the type of disruption. This series of mutually exclusive dummy variables 
represents the first marital disruption experienced and includes divorced under age 30, 
divorced between age 30 and 49, divorced at age 50 and older, widowed under age 50, 
and widowed at age 50 or older. In the models for married respondents, the continuously 
married are the reference group, while people widowed at age 50 or older are the 
reference category for unmarried respondents. 
Calculating marital history information using the raw data files is complex. Many 
individuals have missing information relating to a previous marriage, conflicting date 
information (e.g., a new marriage occurs before the previous marriage ends), or missing 
information on status changes that happen between waves. Using spousal data, data from 
subsequent waves, and manually editing obvious coding errors (e.g., beginning and end 
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dates reversed) most of the marital history errors are corrected. In instances where the 
data cannot be corrected, the case is assigned a missing value. For example, to calculate 
total marriage years for someone with three marriages requires dates for all three 
marriages. If any dates are missing, then total marriage years for this respondent is 
uncertain. The case is marked as missing, and any variables computed from that 
information are also missing. 
After calculating and correcting this information on the entry wave data, each 
respondent’s marital history is then “updated” with information about any marital 
changes between waves. Marital history information is updated until the individual’s year 
of retirement, so if an individual is widowed prior to retirement, for example, her marital 
history data reflects this status change. If multiple transitions happen within the same 
wave (e.g., widowed and remarried in the same year) then these cases are double-checked 
to ensure accuracy.   
Control Variables 
Based on the conceptual framework, the control variables for this analysis are 
contained in the following categories: demographic characteristics, work history factors, 
personal health factors, and family variables. Table 1 presents all independent and control 
variables.  Note that all variables are taken from or calculated with data from the 
associated wave of retirement, so a cross-sectional snapshot of each respondent’s 
situation is used for the analysis.   
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Work History Variables 
The study controls for work history factors by including the following four 
measures: years in the labor force, years of tenure with one employer, self-reported 
voluntary retirement, and health insurance coverage in retirement. 
Total working years and longest job tenure are computed from the RAND data 
file. The total number of years worked is a continuous variable based on self-reported 
information summarizing all reported jobs including those reported retrospectively in the 
job history data asked at first interview. The longest job tenure is a continuous variable 
also computed from this data and identifies a respondent's years of tenure on the longest-
held job. 
Voluntary retirement is calculated using the raw HRS data files for waves 1 
through 9 which asks respondents, “Thinking back to the time you retired, was that 
something you wanted to do or something you felt you were forced into?” Respondents 
can answer that retirement is something they “wanted to do,” was “forced into,” or “part 
wanted, part forced.” These categories are used to create three mutually exclusive dummy 
variables identifying whether the respondent retired by choice, with involuntary 
retirement (i.e., “forced into”) as the reference.  
Finally, health insurance coverage in retirement is comprised of several dummy 
variables from the RAND data file that are not mutually exclusive: covered by Medicare, 
covered by previous employer’s insurance, and covered by spouse’s health insurance 
(which is only used in married models). Though the categories are not mutually 
exclusive, this only applies to a few individual (i.e., 285 cases report having Medicare 
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and employer health insurance, 7 cases report having employer health insurance and 
spouse health insurance). Most individuals only report having either Medicare coverage 
(n=1,047), employer insurance in retirement (n=1,438), spousal insurance coverage 
(n=704), or no coverage (n=976). As with all other variables, observations are at the time 
of retirement and since the majority retired before age 65, the distribution of health 
insurance coverage is typical.  
Spouse and Family Variables 
Spousal variables include information about the spouse’s employment status and 
income, and self-reported health. The spouse’s work income variable is a continuous 
measure pulled from the RAND data file, so it includes corrections and imputations. 
Spouses’ current earnings range from $0 to $600,000 with a mean of $15,456. This 
variable is recoded into three mutually exclusive variables based on a descriptive analysis 
of earnings. Roughly half of the sample have no spouse earnings (reference group), while 
one quarter have been coded into low earnings ($3,176 or less) and the remaining quarter 
coded into high earnings (over $3,176). Employment status is a dummy variable from the 
RAND data file’s recoding of the HRS question, 'Are you currently working for pay?’, 
which allows the spouse to self-report their status. The self-reported health variable asked 
spouses to rate their health on a scale of 1 to 5, and has been recoded into 4 categorical 
variables: health excellent, health very good, health good, and health fair/poor (reference 
group).  
Data from the RAND Family Files are used to compute the family variables, 
which include information on childbearing, number of children, and current co-resident 
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children. A series of three dummy variables identify the number of co-resident children 
present in the household (i.e., 0 children, 1 child, 2 or more children). Most respondents 
do not have children living in the household (77.0%), so the variable is recoded as a 
dummy variable representing the presence of resident children (1=co-resident children, 
0=no co-resident children). Due to the small number of resident children, this variable is 
not refined by age but descriptive information shows that most of these children are over 
18 years old (74.4%).  
The respondent’s age at the birth of their first child is used as a measure of 
childbearing timing. The variable is calculated using the age of the parent minus the age 
of the oldest biological child. Given the distribution of this variable, categorical dummy 
variables are calculated as follows: first time parent between ages 15 and 19, between 
ages 20 and 25, and age 26 or older. Finally, total number of children is calculated from 
the RAND file, which combines the number of living children of the respondent and 
spouse (i.e., includes both biological children and stepchildren). The range of total living 
children is from 0 to 14, with an average of 3.21 kids. This continuous variable is 
truncated at 6 children to restrict the distribution of the variable. The original variable has 
a long tail distribution with 306 cases having 7 or more children.  
Health Variables 
Since health status is such an important predictor of early retirement, measures 
controlling for physical health, functional limitations, and disability status are used in the 
analysis. Physical health is based on respondents’ self-reported health on a scale of 1 
(excellent) to 5 (poor) and, like the spouse health variable described above, is recoded 
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into four categorical dummies: health excellent, health very good, health good and health 
fair/poor (reference group). 
A measure of instrumental activities of daily living, or IADL index, is computed 
from the RAND data’s raw recodes which are as they appear in the raw HRS data files 
but account for skip patterns. Five variables indicate if the respondent has difficulty 
performing a task (0=no difficulty; 1=difficulty): using the phone, taking medications, 
managing money, shopping for groceries, and preparing meals. If the respondent answers 
“can’t do” or “don’t do” to the question, follow-up questions are asked about whether this 
is due to health or memory issues. If the respondent answers “yes,” than the variable is 
recoded to 1=difficulty. These five variables are combined to create an IADL index 
measure from 0 to 5. The IADL index has a mean of 0.125, suggesting an extraordinarily 
positive skew. Therefore, a dummy variable representing the presence/absence of IADLs 
is used in the final analysis. 
Disability status is represented using an ADL index, which is computed similarly 
to the IADL index. Six variables indicate if the respondent has difficulty with performing 
activities of daily living (0=no difficulty; 1=difficulty): walking across a room, dressing, 
bathing, eating, getting in and out of bed and using the toilet. These six variables are 
combined to create an ADL index measure from 0 to 6, and have a mean of 0.228 which 
suggests a positive skew. Thus, the final analysis uses a dummy variable for the 
presence/absence of ADLs. 
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Demographics 
Demographic characteristics used in the analysis include identifiers for gender 
(female =1, male =0), minority status (dummies for White, Black, Hispanic and other, 
with White as reference group), education (number of school years), cohort status 
(dummy for War Babies), and homeownership (own home =1, does not own home =0). 
Respondents’ current age at retirement is coded using four mutually exclusive dummy 
variables: age 61 or younger, age 62 to 63, age 64 to 65, and age 66 or older (age 62 to 63 
being the reference group).  
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Table 1. Coding descriptions for all independent and control variables used in the models. 
Study Variable Variable Type and Coding  
Major Independent Variables 
Current and previous 
status  
categorical dummies  (married group* – continuously married†, 
remarried widow(er), remarried divorcee, remarried 
multiple marriages; unmarried group – never married, 
divorced once, divorced multiple marriages, widowed 
once†, widowed multiple marriages) 
Length of first marriage categorical dummies  (0, 1-14, 15-29, ≥ 30†) 
Length of longest marriage categorical dummies  (0, 1-9, 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, ≥ 40†) 
Age at first marriage categorical dummies  (15-19, 20-24†, 25-29, ≥ 30)  
Age at first disruption categorical dummies  (15-29, 30-39, 40-49, ≥ 50†) 
Age at first disruption by 
disruption type 
categorical dummies  (divorced ≤ 30, divorced 30-49, divorced ≥ 
50, widowed ≤ 50, widowed ≥ 50†, never married, 
continuously married†*) 
Proportion of life married proportion  (total marriage years / (current age – 15)) 
Control Variables 
Years in labor force continuous  
Years of tenure continuous 
Voluntary retirement categorical dummies  (wanted to retire, forced to retire†, partly 
wanted/partly forced) 
Medicare insurance dummy 
Employer health insurance dummy 
Spousal health insurance dummy* 
Spouse working dummy* 
Spouse earnings categorical dummies  ($0†, ≤ $3,176, > $3,176)* 
Spouse reported health  categorical dummies  (excellent, very good, good, fair/poor†)* 
Resident children  dummy 
Age at birth of 1st child categorical dummies  (15-19, 20-25, ≥ 26†) 
Number of children  continuous, truncated at 6 
Self-reported health categorical dummies  (excellent, very good, good, fair/poor†) 
IADLs dummy  
ADLs  dummy  
Female dummy 
Age at retirement categorical dummies  (55-61, 62-63†, 64-65, 66-69) 
Race/ethnicity categorical dummies  (white†, black, Hispanic, other race) 
School years  continuous 
War Babies cohort dummy  
Homeownership dummy  
Retirement wave categorical dummies  (wave 2†, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) 
*Spousal variables excluded from unmarried models 
†Reference group 
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Analytic Strategy 
The analysis consists of a cross-sectional examination of marital history’s 
relationship to retirement security. People retire at varying ages, although there are 
distinct spikes in retirement at age 62 and 65 (Gruber & Wise, 1999). For the purposes of 
this research, capturing the retirement income and assets individuals possess at the start 
of their retirement, before they have the opportunity to spend down their assets, is 
critical. Therefore, this analysis combines participant information from waves 1 through 
9 for those individuals who experienced retirement between the years 1994 and 2008. 
Data management is conducted using the program IMB SPSS Statistics 21 and data 
analysis is conducted with STATA 12. 
The study analysis occurs in three phases. First, descriptive statistics are used to 
describe the research sample at the time of retirement and to explore marital history, 
retirement income sources, demographic characteristics, and family-work variables. This 
is done for the entire sample, and then for married and unmarried respondents separately. 
The mean and standard deviation for all variables are reported. 
Second, several regression models examine retirement income trends among 
married and unmarried groups. Linear ordinary least squares regression models are 
estimated to test the hypotheses on the continuous income variables for Social Security 
and pension/annuity, and for non-housing wealth. Binomial logistic regression models are 
estimated for dependent variables including the receipt of Social Security and 
pension/annuity (i.e., yes or no).  
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Third, the regression analyses are extended to include gender interaction terms. 
Whether or not these additional models are performed is dictated by the hypotheses 
outlined in Chapter 3 but in general, the purpose is to examine whether marital history’s 
relationship to retirement income and assets vary by gender. All regression models are 
estimated again with gender interaction terms included. Models with significant gender 
interactions are rerun for men and women separately in an effort to further explain any 
gender effects. The dependent and independent variables used in all models are described 
in the text above and in Table 1.  
Previous research focused on examining the financial differences between 
married and unmarried people at retirement, included both marital categories in analyses, 
and found strong relationships between marital status and retirement security. The focus 
of this study is to highlight any association between marital history and retirement 
resources, which may be lost when combining married and unmarried people in the same 
model. Therefore, only within-group differences are analyzed and presented. When 
examining retirement income, assets, and wealth, it is important to include spousal 
characteristics for married couples. Thus, the separation of these groups is also significant 
analytically, and helps to account for any misspecification in the relationships between 
marital history and retirement resources. For example, when looking at the number of 
marital disruptions a person has experienced in their lifetime, a zero in disruptions for a 
currently married person is distinctively different from a zero for someone who is never 
married. Separate models for married people and for unmarried people should help with 
this and other similar life history data issues.  
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Missing Data and Survey Design 
The dependent variables and control variables have very few missing data. For 
dependent variables on retirement income sources and assets, imputed variables are taken 
directly from the RAND data file. For controls, additional information available in the 
data is used to account for missing information (e.g., age at birth of first child is changed 
from missing to zero for those with no biological children). This results in very few 
missing values on the control variables. For those variables with a noticeable amount of 
missing data, often the skip patterns vary between waves and need to be reconciled. For 
example, when computing the ADL and IADL indexes, a skip pattern in Wave 2 is 
identified that accounts for the majority of respondents with missing information. Due to 
changes in the skip patterns across interviews, certain questions about ADLs and IADLs 
were omitted in Wave 2 depending on the respondent’s answers to proceeding questions. 
Therefore, this missing information was checked and recoded as 0 (i.e., no difficulty). 
Some missing data is found among the major independent variables measuring 
marital history. For any missing information on marital history variables, marital data 
from previous or subsequent waves are used to fill in missing information where possible. 
The majority of missing information is filled in by using data from other waves. For those 
variables with a high number of missing, most often the wording of questions or the skip 
patterns vary between waves. This is explored, documented, and accounted for when 
updating the missing information. When missing marital history information cannot be 
reconciled, these respondent observations are excluded from the analysis. 
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A comparison of complete cases versus cases where missing data cannot be 
resolved is conducted using Bonferroni adjustments and helps to determine potential 
limits to the generalizability of findings. Cases with missing information on at least one 
predictor/covariate are identified and compared to those with no missing information. 
Chi-square results indicate that the average number of missing data is significant for the 
nominal covariates of race, homeownership, and marital status.  Using Independent T-
tests on continuous variables shows that missing data is significant on education, total 
years married, total years worked, and number of living children. Specifically, those with 
missing data are minorities, non-homeowners, and currently unmarried. They have less 
education, fewer years married, fewer years worked, and fewer children than those 
without missing information. 
Adjustments are made for the survey design in the analysis. The sample design of 
most surveys, including the HRS, involves design features such as clustering, 
stratification, and differential selection probabilities (i.e., weighting). In stratified 
sampling, for example, the population is partitioned into groups or “strata” based on 
characteristics (e.g., geographic location) before selecting a sample of the population for 
study. This technique has the potential to bias the analyses. Known as a “sample survey 
design effect,” this potential bias can be accounted for using model adjustments that take 
into account the HRS’ complex sample designs (University of Michigan, December 
2008). These techniques are available in the STATA 12 package and are used in this 
research.  
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Sampling weights are not applied in the study analyses. Regressions estimated 
with weighted and unweighted data yield similar results; thus using unweighted data is 
preferable because these results will have smaller variance (Winship & Radbill, 1994). 
Sample Characteristics  
 Mean and standard deviations of the independent variables, representing 
respondents’ characteristics at the time of retirement, are shown in Table 2. This table 
presents data for both the total sample, and a breakdown by married and unmarried 
subsamples.  Among currently married respondents, 79.2% are non-Hispanic White, 
11.7% are Black, 7.4% are Hispanic, and 1.7% are of another race. Half (50.2%) are 
women, with a mean age of about 62 and mean years of education at 12.6 years. 
Homeownership for married respondents is extremely high at 91.6%. On average, these 
respondents were about 23 years old when experiencing the birth of their first child. They 
currently have 3.4 living children, and over three-fourths have no children residing in the 
home (77.2%). The majority of married respondents self-report their health as being 
“good” or better (75.4%), while about a quarter report having fair/poor health (24.6%). 
The presence of ADLs and IADLs are 10.8% and 7.4% respectively. Married individuals’ 
mean total years worked before retirement is 36.7 years, with a longest job tenure of 20.9 
years on average. The majority of married respondents’ retirement is voluntarily or 
partially voluntary (72.2%), while over a quarter (27.8%) state they did not voluntarily 
retire. Over one-third (38.3%) have employer-provided insurance that covers them in 
retirement, and 27.2% have Medicare coverage. Only 21.2% are covered by their 
spouse’s health insurance. In terms of spouse characteristics, 43% have a spouse still in 
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the labor force and the self-reported health of spouses is similar to that of the 
respondents, with 77.7% in “good” or better health and 22.3% reporting fair/poor health. 
The mean proportion of lifetime spent married is 0.81, with the longest marriage being on 
average 35.6 years. The mean age at first marriage is about 23 years old, and the mean 
age at first disruption for those who experienced becoming unmarried is about 35 years 
old.  
 For the sample of currently unmarried respondents, 66.3% are non-Hispanic 
White, 25.2% are Black, 6.9% are Hispanic, and 1.7% are of another race. The majority 
(70.5%) are women, with a mean age of about 63 and mean years of education at 12.6 
years. Homeownership for unmarried respondents is lower than the married, but still 
represents the majority (69.7%). On average, unmarried respondents experienced the 
birth of their first child at 22 years old. They currently have 2.7 living children and most 
do not report having any resident children (76.4%). The majority self-report their health 
as being “good” or better (68.2%), while about a third report having fair/poor health 
(31.8%). The presence of ADLs for unmarried respondents is 15.3% and the presence of 
IADLs is 11.2%. On average, the total years worked before retirement is 36.9 years and 
the longest job tenure is 19.6 years. Many report a voluntarily retirement or state that 
their retirement is partially voluntary (64.7%), while over a third (35.3%) did not retire 
voluntarily. About 40.2% have employer-provided insurance and 37.4% have Medicare 
coverage. On average, the proportion of unmarried respondents’ lifetime spent married is 
0.46 and the length of longest marriage is 20.1 years. The mean age at first marriage is 
about 22 years old, and the mean age at first disruption is about 43 years old. 
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Table 2. Descriptive summary of sample characteristics (not weighted) by married or 
unmarried status (% unless otherwise noted) 
 
Total Sample 
N=4,443 
Married at 
Retirement     
n = 3,278 
Unmarried at 
Retirement   
n= 1,165 
White 75.7  79.2  66.3  
Black 15.3  11.7  25.2  
Hispanic 7.3  7.4  6.9  
Other race 1.7  1.7  1.7  
Age (mean) (SD) 62.2 (4.3) 61.9 (4.3) 63.1 (4.3) 
Female 55.6  50.2  70.5  
Education (mean) (SD) 12.6 (2.9) 12.6 (2.9) 12.6 (2.8) 
Homeownership 85.7  91.6  69.7  
Age at birth of first child (mean) (SD)  22.6 (5.0) 22.7 (4.9) 22.3 (5.2) 
Number of living children (mean) (SD) 3.2 (2.0) 3.4 (2.0) 2.7 (2.1) 
No resident children 77.0  77.2  76.4  
Respondent's health excellent 13.1  14.0  10.4  
Respondent's health very good 30.1  31.4  26.7  
Respondent's health good 30.3  30.0  31.2  
Respondent's health fair/poor 26.5  24.6  31.8  
Presence of ADLs 12.0  10.8  15.3  
Presence of IADLs 8.4  7.4  11.2  
Longest job tenure in years (mean) (SD) 20.5 (10.6) 20.9 (10.6) 19.6 (10.3) 
Total years worked (mean) (SD) 36.7 (11.8) 36.7 (12.0) 36.9 (11.5) 
Voluntary retirement 62.5  64.6  56.6  
Retirement not voluntary 29.8  27.8  35.3  
Retirement part voluntary part involuntary 7.8  7.6  8.1  
Medicare coverage 30.0  27.2  37.4  
Employer insurance coverage  38.8  38.3  40.2  
Spouse insurance coverage (N=3,274) 21.2  21.2  -  
Spouse working (N=3,105) 43.0  43.0  -  
Spouse's health excellent (N=3,109) 14.5  14.5  -  
Spouse's health very good (N=3,109) 33.6  33.6  -  
Spouse's health good (N=3,109) 29.6  29.6  -  
Spouse's health fair/poor (N=3,109) 22.3  22.3  -  
Proportion of lifetime married (mean) (SD) 0.7 (0.2) 0.81 (0.1) 0.46 (0.3) 
Length of longest marriage (mean) (SD) 31.4 (12.8) 35.6 (9.6) 20.1 (13.4) 
Age of first marriage (mean) (SD) 22.4 (5.1) 22.5 (5.1) 22.3 (5.2) 
Age at first disruption (mean) (SD) 39.2 (12.6) 34.7 (10.3) 43.3 (13.0) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
This section begins with a brief descriptive analysis of the marital history 
characteristics of the sample by gender. Then multivariate regression results are presented 
by dependent variable (i.e., Social Security, employer-sponsored pensions, and non-
housing wealth) and are discussed separately for married and for unmarried respondents 
for each retirement resource. Gender differences are explored throughout and the section 
on regression results concludes with a brief description of the significance of control 
variables. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The current marital status and marital history characteristics of men and women 
are presented in Table 3. Given that the analysis is always separated by married or 
unmarried status, the table distinguishes between these two marital samples and displays 
the percentages and chi-square test results for each of the marital history characteristics 
by gender.  
For the married sample, it appears that married men are more likely to have a 
complex marital past than married women. Men have marital more disruptions and then 
remarry more than women. Compared to women they also experience their first 
disruption more often in mid-life, and have shorter marriages. Approximately 45 percent 
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of married women can state that their marriage lasted 40 years or more. This is only true 
for 34 percent of married men, and the gender difference in length of longest marriage is 
statistically significant, χ2 (4, N = 3,278) = 42.38, p < .001. Men may be experiencing 
shorter marriages because they are marrying at older ages than women; about 34 percent 
are entering into their first marriage after age 24. In contrast, the vast majority of women 
(87%) are married by this point in their lives, and this relationship between age at first 
marriage and gender is significant, χ2 (3, N = 3,276) = 418.55, p < .001. Remarried men 
also appear to go through their first marital disruption at later ages than women. Over 
one-third of men experienced their first disruption at age 40 or older, while only about 
one-quarter of remarried women experienced their disruption this late in life, χ2 (4, N = 
3,276) = 9.82, p = .02. For the currently married sample therefore, women get married 
earlier in life and stay married longer than men, and consequently spend a greater 
proportion of their life being married. Compared to married women, married men have 
more unstable marital pasts though the first column in Table 3 with married and 
unmarried group characteristics combined suggests a selection effect. According to the 
percentages for all respondents, 46 percent of women experience a marital disruption 
compared to 38 percent of men. This difference is largely due to widowhood. Women are 
less likely to remarry than men, so women with shorter marriages due to marital 
disruptions are concentrated in the unmarried sample. 
For the currently unmarried sample, 63 percent of women have only one marriage 
in their lifetime compared to 56 percent of men. Indeed, unmarried men are twice as 
likely to have three or more marriages compared to unmarried women. The proportion of 
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unmarried men who are never married is also much higher than for unmarried women 
(18% versus 12%). The relationship between number of marriages and gender is 
significant, χ2 (4, N = 1,161) = 18.88, p < .001. In addition, there are differences between 
unmarried men and women with regard to the type of disruption experienced. For 
unmarried men, the largest group is those who have been divorced once (36%), followed 
by those who experienced multiple past disruptions (27%). In contrast, two thirds of 
unmarried women are widowed (32%) or divorced (31%) from their first marriage. This 
relationship between the type of disruptions and gender is significant, χ2 (3, N = 1,165) = 
20.68, p < .001. The length of longest marriage category also differs significantly by 
gender, χ2 (5, N = 1,165) = 12.74, p = .03. A little over one-fifth of unmarried women are 
either never married or did not experience a marriage lasting 10 years; for unmarried 
men, this group totals one-third. For the unmarried sample, there is a significant gender 
pattern for the age at first marriage that is very similar to the pattern experienced by the 
married sample. Essentially, women are marrying at younger ages than men and 85 
percent enter into their first marriage before age 25. In contrast to the married sample, 
there are no significant differences between unmarried men and women’s age at first 
marital disruption. For the unmarried sample, therefore, men have a more complex 
marital history than women; men experience multiple marriages more often and are more 
likely to be divorced or never married.  
Nevertheless, this descriptive data suggests that the most predominant pattern of 
marital history, regardless of current marital status, is to be married only one time (68% 
of men, 71% of women). Most currently married men and women are continuously 
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married. Among the unmarried sample, most are divorced or widowed from their one 
previous marriage. This descriptive analysis of marital history characteristics suggests 
that women are married longer and experience fewer disruptions, but men remarry more 
often after widowhood or divorce compared to women. Thus, a potential selection effect 
may place women with complex marital histories into the unmarried sample by the time 
of their retirement. There is also the possibility of a selection effect due to differential 
survival, meaning that men have the potential to remarry more often because there are 
more women than men and the ratio only increases as people age (de Graaf & Kalmijn, 
2003; Gelissen, 2004).   
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Table 3. Distribution of marital history characteristics by gender (percentages, N=4,443) 
 
All Respondents Married Sample Unmarried Sample 
  
Men 
(n=1,970) 
Women 
(n=2,473) 
Men 
(n=1,633) 
Women 
(n=1,645) 
Men 
(n=337) 
Women 
(n=828) 
Total number of 
marriages 
 
No marriages 3.0 4.0 n/a n/a 17.8 12.0 
One marriage   67.6 70.6 70.5 74.7 55.5 63.2 
Two marriages  22.3 20.7 22.8 20.3 18.4 20.9 
Three or more  7.1 4.7 6.7 5.0 8.3 4.0 
 
          χ
2
 = 20.83**           χ2 = 10.80*        χ2 = 20.86** 
Number & type of 
disruptions 
  
  
No disruptions 62.2 54.0 70.6 75.1 17.8 12.0 
Divorced once 22.0 21.3 19.8 16.6 35.6 31.0 
Widowed once 5.7 13.0 2.8 3.3 19.9 32.3 
Multiple 
disruptions 
10.1 11.6 6.8 4.9 26.7 24.7 
 
          χ
2
 = 76.70**           χ2 = 8.58*        χ2 = 18.88** 
Length of longest 
marriage 
  
  
Never married 3.0 4.0 n/a n/a 17.8 12.0 
Less than 9 years 3.4 4.7 1.0 1.5 14.8 10.9 
10 to 19 years 9.7 12.4 7.0 5.8 21.1 24.9 
20 to 29 years 19.8 17.9 19.0 14.4 22.3 24.4 
30 to 39 years 35.1 28.8 38.8 33.7 17.8 19.7 
40 years or more 29.1 32.2 34.2 44.7 6.2 8.2 
 
          χ
2
 = 34.78**           χ2 = 42.38**        χ2 = 12.74* 
Age at first marriage     
19 or younger 12.7 41.2 12.3 41.3 13.4 40.8 
20 to 24 52.8 45.0 54.0 45.6 46.4 44.2 
25 to 29 23.9 8.8 24.0 8.7 24.3 8.8 
30 or older 10.6 5.0 9.7 4.4 15.9 6.2 
 
          χ
2
 = 520.02**           χ2 = 418.55**        χ2 = 103.62** 
Age at first disruption     
29 or younger 27.3 28.3 31.2 40.8 15.9 18.6 
30 to 39 30.2 26.5 35.1 31.5 24.4 22.8 
40 to 49 20.9 22.4 23.1 20.0 18.5 24.3 
50 or older 21.6 22.8 10.6 7.7 41.3 34.4 
 
          χ
2
 = 5.52           χ2 = 9.82*        χ2 = 6.62 
** indicates significant gender difference at the 0.01 level 
  * indicates significant gender difference at the 0.05 level 
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Regression Results 
Results from both binomial logistic regressions and linear ordinary least squares 
regressions models test the associations of marital status and history with financial 
retirement resources. Binomial regressions examine the difference between respondents 
who did (=1) and did not (=0) receive a Social Security or pension benefit within the first 
few years of retirement. Linear regressions then examine the differences in the amount 
received for respondents who possess these income sources. This analytic strategy 
explores whether marital history has a relationship to the receipt of retirement benefits as 
well as the actual dollar amount.  When analyzing non-housing wealth only linear 
regressions are performed to study differences in amount.   
Results for Social Security income are discussed first, and gender differences are 
presented. Both gender interaction terms and separate models for men and for women are 
used to disentangle any significant findings. Next, the results for employer-sponsored 
pension income are shown, and gender differences are explored. The section continues 
with an analysis of the amount of non-housing wealth owned at retirement, again with 
and without gender interaction term. Finally, the regression results section concludes with 
a brief discussion of the significant control variables. 
The presentation of regression results that follows will include sets of marital 
history variables. Correlation analysis reveals a strong association between the proportion 
of lifetime married and the length of longest marriage (r = .86, p < .01), and between the 
number of marriages and past disruptions (e.g., marriage count and total number of 
divorces (r = .78, p < .01)). The final sets of marital history variables are designed to 
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exclude highly correlated variables in the analysis while still accounting for a variety of 
marital history factors. The first set includes the features of marital type, frequency of 
disruptions, and first marriage duration. Current marital status is a complex marital status 
variable that incorporates both current marital type and previous marital disruptions. For 
the married sample, current marital status categories include remarried after a divorce, 
remarried after widowhood, remarried after multiple past disruptions, and the reference 
group continuously married. For the unmarried sample, these categories include never 
married, divorced from first marriage, divorced after multiple marriages, widowed after 
multiple marriages, and the reference group widowed from first marriage. As mentioned, 
this set of marital history variables also includes length of first marriage (i.e., never 
married, <15 years, 15-29 years, 30+ years – reference group).  
The second set of marital history variables includes the features of disruption 
type, timing, and longest marriage duration. A group of categorical dummy variables 
incorporates both the type of disruption experienced and the timing of the disruption in 
the life course. This variable is specifically referring to a respondent’s first disruption, 
and subsequent disruptions are not represented. For both the married and unmarried 
samples, the categories are the same but the reference groups are different: divorced 
under 30, divorced between 30 and 49, divorced 50 or older, widowed under 50, 
widowed 50 or older (unmarried sample reference group), and continuously married 
(married sample reference group, excluded in the unmarried model). For this variable, a 
never married category is also included in the unmarried models. The other variable in 
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the second set represents length of longest marriage (i.e., never married, <10 years, 10-19 
years, 20-29 years, 30-39 years, 40+ years – reference group).  
Proportion of lifetime married, given its strong correlation to an individual’s 
marital history, is also tested but separately from the other marital history variable sets 
described above. Models performed on the proportion of lifetime spent married variable 
include only this marital history factor and all control variables. The following discussion 
of results focuses on these aforementioned marital history variables and gender. All 
control variables and their significance are summarized at the end of the chapter. Note 
that the marital history factor, age at first marriage, is excluded from the final analysis 
because it is not significant in any of the initial variable testing and is highly correlated to 
other marital history characteristics. 
The literature review and conceptual framework from the previous chapter guide 
this analysis. Ten hypotheses are derived from this work (see Chapter 3) and they explore 
three general research questions: Do the frequency and type of marital transitions relate 
to retirement resources? Does marital duration have any relationship? Does the timing of 
transitions have any relationship? An additional research question investigates whether 
these relationships vary by gender. Models testing these components of marital history 
and related gender interactions are performed for each income source (i.e., Social 
Security, employer-sponsored pensions, and non-housing wealth) and the results are 
described in detail below.  
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Social Security Benefits  
Married Respondents 
For married respondents who are age 62 or older, I first estimate whether 
receiving Social Security benefits is associated with marital history (Table 4). Results 
suggest that marital history has a relationship to the probability of receiving a Social 
Security benefit in the unadjusted models (i.e., basic model with no control variables), 
but there are no significant relationships present in the fully-adjusted models (i.e., model 
containing all control variables) or the gender interaction models (i.e., model containing 
all control variables and gender interaction terms). Investigating differences among 
married people who do receive a benefit, however, reveals a relationship between marital 
history and Social Security income amount. These results are presented by study 
hypothesis below and can be viewed in Table 5. 
The first set of hypotheses explores whether marital status and frequency of 
disruptions are associated with Social Security income. Hypothesis 1 states that among 
the married, those who experience a prior marital disruption will have less retirement 
income than those who have been continuously married. Instead, remarried people with 
one prior widowhood have more Social Security income than the continuously married  
(b = .15, p = .01), though additional tests indicate that the group of dummy variables 
representing the detailed marital status of currently married respondents may not matter, 
all else being equal (F(3, 50) = 2.42, p = .08). This finding is in the opposite direction 
than hypothesized. There is no support for Hypothesis 2 (i.e., multiple disruptions will be 
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associated with less Social Security income) or for Hypothesis 3 (i.e., married individuals 
who experienced a prior divorce will have less Social Security income).  
The next set of hypotheses proposes that marriage duration is positively related to 
retirement security. Specifically, Hypothesis 4 states that being married for a greater 
proportion of one’s lifetime is associated with more Social Security income, and 
Hypothesis 5 states that longer marriages are associated with more income. Though a 
positive relationship is observed for the longest marriage length variables in the 
unadjusted models, there are no significant relationships observed in the fully-adjusted 
models. Although these coefficients are not significant, a significant Female X Length of 
Marriage interaction is indicated in the gender interaction model; however, the results are 
in the opposite direction than hypothesized.  
Figure 2 presents a graphical representation of the significant interaction between 
gender and length of longest marriage. The relationship between length of longest 
marriage and Social Security income is curvilinear for women, and this relationship is not 
present for men. As indicated in Table 5 and shown in the figure, married women whose 
longest marriage lasted between 10 to 19 years and between 20 to 29 years are receiving 
more in Social Security benefits than women with a marriage that lasted 40 years or 
longer. The relationship, however, may not matter based on the result of the joint F test 
that indicates the group of dummy variables representing longest marriage is not 
significant, F(4, 49) = 1.90, p = .13.  
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Figure 2. Estimated value of Social Security income for married respondents by gender 
and length of longest marriage. Estimated based on the gender interaction model shown 
in Table 5. Reference group: Longest marriage lasting 40 years or more. 
 
 Analysis of the relationship between the proportion of lifetime spent married and 
Social Security income supports the gender-interaction result above (Table 6). The fully-
adjusted model suggests there is no relationship between lifetime married and Social 
Security income; however, there is a significant interaction for Female X Lifetime 
Married (b = -.76, p < .001). Predicted values are calculated for men and women at 
specific proportions of lifetime spent married (i.e., 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%) 
in order to present this interaction graphically (see Figure 3). Social Security income is 
positively associated with the proportion of a currently married man’s lifetime spent 
married, and this result is in the expected direction (Hypothesis 4). The opposite 
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relationship, however, is observed for women. The proportion of a currently married 
woman’s lifetime spent married is negatively related to her Social Security income 
amount. The relationship is statistically significant, F(2, 49) = 8.50, p < .001. 
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted values of married respondents' Social Security income by the 
proportion of lifetime married and gender. Estimated based on the gender interaction 
model shown in Table 6. 
 
Addressing the final marital history characteristic, disruption timing, Hypothesis 7 
proposes that a disruption in later life will result in less retirement income than a 
disruption occurring earlier in life. The fully-adjusted model indicates that married people 
who experienced widowhood under age 50 have more Social Security income than the 
continuously married (b = .13, p = .04).  Additional testing, however, reveals that the 
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group of dummy variables representing disruption timing is not significant, F(5, 48) = 
1.38, p = .25, and further analysis switching the reference group indicates that remarried 
people who experienced widowhood before age 50 are no different than the other 
remarried groups. This suggests that the timing of marital disruptions is not related to 
Social Security income for currently married people. 
In summary, this analysis finds no relationship between married respondents’ 
marital history and whether they receive Social Security benefits. The amount of Social 
Security income they are entitled to, however, may be related to their marital history. 
Marriage duration, measured by the proportion of one’s lifetime spent married and by 
marriage length, has a relationship to Social Security income that is moderated by gender. 
In fact, these findings refute Hypothesis 8, which suggests that marital disruptions and a 
complex marital history will be negatively related to women’s income more than men’s. 
This study suggests that length of marriage has a negative relationship to currently 
married women’s Social Security income. The results also suggest that remarried 
widow(er)s have more Social Security income compared to the continuously married. A 
test of the joint significance of the group of dummy variables representing marital 
history, however, suggests this outcome may be unreliable.  
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Table 4. Binomial logistic regressions for Social Security receipt for married respondents (odds ratios).  
 
All Married Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except 
gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + 
gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Remarried – one divorce 2.304 ** 1.856  1.603  1.664  2.595  
Remarried – one widowhood 1.509  1.051  0.782  0.533  2.550  
Remarried – multiple disruptions 2.651 + 1.088  0.756  0.875  4.315  
1st marriage <15 years 0.410 * 0.658  0.888  0.992  0.425  
1st marriage 15-29 years 0.706  1.004  0.962  1.016  1.313  
Female 0.924  1.113  1.059  n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65 
 
 2.064 * 2.074 * 2.138 * 1.656  
Age 66 and older 
 
 3.589 * 3.614 * 4.356  1.701  
Female x remarried divorce   
  1.625      
Female x remarried widowhood   
  2.310      
Female x remarried multiple   
  5.126      
Female x 1st marriage <15 years   
  0.395      
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 years   
  1.229      
N 1,937  1,641  1,641  936  696  
F 1.82  3.35 * 2.55  7.13 *** 7.67 *** 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 20 years† 0.777  0.743  0.907  1.013  0.955  
Longest marriage 20-29 years 0.525 * 0.840  0.965  0.985  0.861  
Longest marriage 30-39 years 0.745  1.037  1.252  1.284  1.060  
Divorced young (< 30) 1.238  1.031  1.089  1.339  0.939  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 2.159 * 1.831  1.484  1.452  3.169  
Widowed under 50 2.714  1.239  1.043  0.906  1.759  
Divorced/widowed late-life 
(50+)† 1.267  1.450  1.085  0.997  1.052  
Female 0.866  1.122  1.258  n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65   2.056 * 2.040 * 2.165 * 1.599  
Age 66 and older   3.643 * 3.695 * 5.384 + 1.664  
Female x Longest  < 20 years†   
  0.647      
Female x Longest  20-29 years   
  0.707      
Female x Longest  30-39 years   
  0.552      
Female x Divorced < 30   
  0.995      
Female x Divorced 30-49   
  2.010      
Female x Widowed under 50   
  1.542      
Female x Disruption at 50+†   
  1.020      
N 1,947  1,649  1,635  944  682  
F 1.24  2.98 * 1.55  9.39 *** 8.16 *** 
Reference groups: Continuously married, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, age 62-63. Control variables (not 
shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, 
spouse’s health and current employment, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement. 
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
†Note: Due to few observations and collinearity issues, some categorical dummy variables are combined for the binomial models (i.e., 
longest marriage <10 years and 10-19 years, divorced in late-life and widowed in late-life).  
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Table 5. Linear OLS regressions for Social Security income for married respondents (coefficients).  
 
All Married Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Remarried – one divorce 0.092 + 0.027  0.008  -0.011  0.041  
Remarried – one widowhood 0.128 ** 0.147 ** 0.119  0.122  0.177  
Remarried – multiple 
disruptions 0.103  0.064  0.085  0.062  0.036  
1st marriage <15 years -0.086  -0.014  -0.056  -0.042  0.059  
1st marriage 15-29 years 
-0.094 * -0.030  -0.088 + -0.078  0.042  
Female 
-0.354 *** -0.276 *** -0.321 *** n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65 
 
 0.011  0.010  0.027  -0.026  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.031  0.031  0.050  -0.007  
Female x Remarried divorce   
  -0.006      
Female x Remarried 
widowhood 
  
  
0.025 
 
    
Female x Remarried multiple   
  -0.098      
Female x 1st marriage <15 
years 
  
  0.146  
    
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 
years 
  
  
0.183 +     
N 1,782  1,512  1,512  864  648  
F 59.59 *** 30.62 *** 25.84 *** 25.29 *** 50.89 *** 
R-Squared 0.144  0.307  0.311  0.210  0.291  
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years -0.382 * -0.367  -0.653 + -0.647 + -0.056  
Longest marriage 10-19 years -0.044  0.046  -0.054  -0.023  0.123 + 
Longest marriage 20-29 years -0.083 + 0.008  -0.065  -0.049  0.066  
Longest marriage 30-39 years 
-0.069 * -0.034  -0.066 + -0.049  -0.073  
Divorced young (< 30) -0.001  0.002  -0.015  -0.036  0.079  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 0.116 ** 0.012  0.036  0.013  0.017  
Divorced late-life (50+) 0.082  0.044  0.024  0.019  0.288 * 
Widowed under 50 0.079  0.129 * 0.115  0.105  0.115  
Widowed late-life (50+) 0.174 * 0.123  0.069  0.097  0.266 * 
Female -0.359 *** -0.280 *** -0.339 *** n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65   0.011  0.008  0.022  -0.018  
Age 66 and older   0.034  0.030  0.051  -0.006  
Female x Longest  < 10 years   
  0.682 +     
Female x Longest  10-19 years   
  0.256 *     
Female x Longest  20-29 years   
  0.216 *     
Female x Longest  30-39 years   
  0.056      
Female x Divorced < 30   
  0.039      
Female x Divorced 30-49   
  -0.081      
Female x Divorced 50+   
  0.194      
Female x Widowed under 50   
  -0.053      
Female x Widowed 50+   
  0.146      
N 1,792  1,520  1,520  872  648  
F 44.02 *** 28.84 *** 12.50 *** 12.63 *** 17.16 *** 
R-Squared 0.153  0.310  0.319  0.221  0.299  
Reference groups: Continuously married, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, age 62-63. Control variables (not 
shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, 
spouse’s health and current employment, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement. 
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Table 6. Linear OLS regressions for Social Security income for married respondents; Proportion of lifetime 
married model (coefficients).  
 
All Married Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 3 
Proportion of lifetime 
married 0.139 + 0.090  0.396 ** 0.383 * -0.266 ** 
Female 
-0.362 *** -0.282 *** 0.345 * n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65 
 
 0.009  0.009  0.031  -0.027  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.024  0.023  0.059  -0.026  
Female x lifetime married   
  -0.764 ***     
N 1,764  1,498  1,498  859  639  
F 201.78 *** 33.27 *** 26.95 *** 16.58 *** 19.67 *** 
R-Squared 0.148  0.311  0.321  0.221  0.289  
Reference group: Age 62-63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-
reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, spouse’s health and current employment, childrearing patterns, number of living 
children, resident children, and wave of retirement.  
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
94 
 
 
 
 
Unmarried Respondents 
This section addresses whether marital history has any relationship to Social 
Security income for unmarried respondents who are age 62 or older. For the unmarried 
sample, the analysis examining the association between marital history and the receipt of 
Social Security benefits suggests there is only one relationship (Table 7). The only 
significant relationship to emerge pertains to current marital status. Widow(er)s with 
multiple previous marriages have  higher odds of receiving Social Security benefits 
compared to those widowed from their first marriage (OR = 4.87, p = .02). When 
estimating the predicted probabilities, widowed respondents with a more complex marital 
history have a greater probability of receiving a Social Security benefit (probabilities of 
0.98 versus 0.93 for widowed after multiple marriages compared to widowed from first 
marriage). Further analysis reveals that those widowed after multiple marriages have a 
higher probability of receiving a Social Security benefit compared to individuals in all 
unmarried status groups. Never married individuals have the lowest predicted probability 
of receiving a Social Security benefit at 0.87. However, the joint F test for the group of 
dummy variables representing the detailed marital status of currently unmarried 
respondents is not significant, F(4, 49) = 2.11, p = .09. Hypothesis 2, which states that 
more disruptions are negatively related to receiving Social Security, may be refuted for 
the currently widowed. In support of Hypothesis 9, the never married population is the 
unmarried group with the lowest probability of receiving Social Security. Thus, marital 
status may have a substantive relationship to the receipt of Social Security benefits but 
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this relationship is not statistically significant when examining the within group 
differences of unmarried individuals. 
Among those who do receive a Social Security benefit, marital history is related 
to the amount they receive (Table 8). The first set of hypotheses examines the association 
between marital status as well as the frequency of disruptions and an unmarried person’s 
Social Security income. Significant relationships between detailed marital status and 
Social Security income are present in the unadjusted models but no significant 
relationships are observed when the models include control variables. While there are no 
marital history relationships in the fully-adjusted models, a significant Female X Marital 
Status interaction is identified. As indicated in Table 8 and shown in Figure 4, the 
negative sign of the interaction term suggests that being currently divorced after multiple 
past marriages is more detrimental to women’s than men’s Social Security income. 
Divorced women who were married multiple times have less Social Security income than 
widows who were married once, and the group of dummy variables representing detailed 
marital status is significant, F(4, 49) = 2.61, p = .05.  
Gender-specific models (Table 8) support the finding that female divorcees after 
multiple past marriages have significantly less Social Security income compared to 
women widowed once (b = -.19, p = .01; F(4, 48) = 4.58, p = .003). Additional analysis 
with divorced after multiple marriages as the reference group indicates that these women 
are statistically worse off than all other unmarried groups except never married women. 
These findings support Hypothesis 3, which states that marital history’s negative 
relationship to retirement income will be more pronounced for those who experienced 
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divorce. The results suggest, however, that this only applies to divorced women with 
multiple past disruptions. Thus, Hypothesis 2 (i.e., that more marital disruptions will 
relate to less income) is also supported for divorced women’s Social Security income.  
 
 
Figure 4. Estimated value of Social Security income for unmarried respondents by 
gender and current marital status. Estimated based on the gender interaction model shown 
in Table 8. Reference group: Widowed from first marriage. 
 
Marriage duration, the focus of the second set of hypotheses, may have a minor 
role in the Social Security income of unmarried people. Though a negative relationship 
between length of longest marriage and Social Security income is present in the 
unadjusted model, there are no significant relationships in the fully-adjusted model 
(Table 8). The interactions between gender and marriage duration are also not significant. 
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The only significant variable representing marriage duration indicates a relationship 
between proportion of lifetime spent married and Social Security income (Table 9). For 
unmarried respondents, there is a positive relationship between lifetime spent married and 
Social Security income (b = .16, p = .01) providing support for Hypothesis 4 (i.e., being 
married for a greater proportion of one’s lifetime is related to more Social Security 
income). No significant gender interactions are identified.  
Finally, the relationship between the timing of marital transitions and Social 
Security income is investigated. The fully-adjusted model shows that compared to those 
widowed after age 50, people who lost their spouse before age 50 have less Social 
Security income (b = -.13, p = .02; F(5, 48) = 5.43, p < .001). Further analysis switching 
the reference group indicates that people widowed before age 50 (b = -.15, p = .003) and 
people divorced before age 30 (b = -.11, p = .02) have less Social Security income than 
people who divorced in mid-life between ages 30 and 49. These findings refute 
Hypothesis 7, which states that those who become unmarried later in life will have less 
retirement income than those unmarried earlier in life. Instead, the Social Security 
benefits for those widowed and divorced before age 30 are lower than for people 
widowed after age 50 or divorced between ages 30 and 49.  
In summary, the types of disruptions unmarried people experience have a 
relationship to their Social Security income. First, widows and widowers with more than 
one previous marriage may have a higher probability of receiving a Social Security 
benefit. For those who do receive a benefit, divorced women with multiple previous 
marriages appear to be receiving less income than other unmarried women with the 
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exception of the never married. This analysis also finds a relationship between marital 
disruption timing and Social Security income; experiencing a disruption earlier in life is 
associated with less Social Security income, which was not expected.  
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Table 7. Binomial logistic regressions for Social Security receipt for unmarried respondents (odds ratios).  
 All Unmarried Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions† Men only† Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Divorced from 1st marriage 0.809  1.246  0.814  1.277  1.399  
Divorced, multiple marriages 0.736  0.992  0.311  0.364  1.269  
Widowed, multiple marriages 2.730  4.767 * 0.851  2.178  9.053 * 
Never married 0.379 * 0.531  0.729  2.389  0.567  
1st marriage <15 years 0.423 + 0.428  0.715  0.720  0.470  
1st marriage 15-29 years 0.633  0.600  2.485  8.277  0.488  
Female 0.868  0.672  0.762  n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65 
  3.721 * 3.730 * 4.910  4.407 ** 
Age 66 and older 
  14.253 *** 14.729 *** 704.15 *** 16.593 *** 
Female x Divorced once   
  1.583      
Female x Divorced multiple   
  4.143      
Female x Widowed multiple    
  12.552      
Female x Never married   
  0.688      
Female x 1st marriage <15 years   
  
0.614 
 
    
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 years   
  
0.182 
 
    
N 803  723  723  161  527  
F 1.31  5.75 *** 5.87 ** 9.26 *** 9.44 *** 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years 0.325 + 0.911  0.525  0.484  0.687  
Longest marriage 10-19 years 0.561  1.083  0.383  0.429  0.767  
Longest marriage 20-29 years 0.606  0.936  0.481  0.485  0.776  
Longest marriage 30-39 years 0.665  0.733  0.540  0.362  0.766  
Never married 0.308 * 0.523  0.222  0.131  0.578  
Divorced young (< 30) 0.952  0.673  0.355  0.363  1.223  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 0.631  0.632  0.987  0.813  1.032  
Divorced late-life (50+) 0.769  0.759  1.019  0.956  0.882  
Widowed under 50 0.977  0.641  7.409  6.026  0.757  
Female 0.874  0.704  1.869  n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65   3.774 * 6.712 *** 10.370 ** 4.515 ** 
Age 66 and older   14.895 *** 13.007 *** 59.294 ** 15.542 *** 
Female x Longest  < 10 years   
  0.269      
Female x Longest  10-19 years   
  1.257      
Female x Longest  20-29 years   
  0.822      
Female x Longest  30-39 years   
  0.960      
Female x Never married   
  0.853      
Female x Divorced < 30   
  4.079      
Female x Divorced 30-49   
  0.803      
Female x Divorced 50+   
  0.504      
Female x Widowed under 50   
  0.157      
N 803  723  732  161  527  
F 1.30  10.74 *** 3.80 + 6.01 *** 5.53 *** 
Reference groups: Widowed from 1st marriage, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, widowed late-life (50+), age 62-
63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and 
IADLs, health insurance, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement. <0.001 = ***; 
<0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +.  
†Note: Few observations and skewed distribution on longest marriage, these models are interpreted cautiously.  
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Table 8. Linear OLS regressions for Social Security income for unmarried respondents (coefficients). 
 All Unmarried Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Divorced from 1st marriage 
-0.001  0.029  0.114  0.124  -0.002  
Divorced, multiple marriages 
-0.085  -0.101  0.065  0.075  -0.180 * 
Widowed, multiple marriages 0.120 * 0.081  0.103  0.163  0.056  
Never married 
-0.143 * -0.073  -0.233 + -0.262 + 0.001  
1st marriage <15 years 
-0.093  -0.085  -0.184 + -0.153  -0.036  
1st marriage 15-29 years 
-0.065  -0.034  -0.082  -0.117  -0.028  
Female 
-0.142 *** -0.146 *** -0.151 + n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65 
  -0.006  -0.006  0.101  -0.027  
Age 66 and older 
  0.028  0.032  0.030  0.041  
Female x Divorced once   
  -0.121      
Female x Divorced multiple   
  -0.244 *     
Female x Widowed multiple    
  -0.041      
Female x Never married   
  0.225 +     
Female x 1st marriage <15 years   
  
0.145 
 
    
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 years   
  
0.063 
 
    
N 724  653  653  178  475  
F 6.28 *** 9.92 *** 15.35 *** 3.53 ** 11.94 *** 
R-Squared 0.040  0.280  0.292  0.277  0.317  
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years 
-0.174 * -0.077  -0.111  -0.181  -0.086  
Longest marriage 10-19 years 
-0.105  -0.080  -0.184  -0.277 * -0.056  
Longest marriage 20-29 years 
-0.133 * -0.053  -0.092  -0.111  -0.053  
Longest marriage 30-39 years 
-0.076  -0.006  0.054  0.007  -0.046  
Never married 
-0.197 ** -0.107 + -0.240  -0.306 + -0.049  
Divorced young (< 30) 
-0.031  -0.091 + -0.171  -0.077  -0.060  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 0.028  0.029  0.174 + 0.224 * -0.023  
Divorced late-life (50+) 
-0.048  -0.067  0.022  -0.006  -0.140 + 
Widowed under 50 
-0.086  -0.127 * -0.243  -0.236  -0.124 + 
Female 
-0.128 *** -0.134 *** -0.109  n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65   0.010  0.016  0.101  0.005  
Age 66 and older   0.027  0.033  0.029  0.052  
Female x Longest  < 10 years   
  0.017      
Female x Longest  10-19 years   
  0.119      
Female x Longest  20-29 years   
  0.033      
Female x Longest  30-39 years   
  -0.094      
Female x Never married   
  0.184      
Female x Divorced < 30   
  0.110      
Female x Divorced 30-49   
  -0.189      
Female x Divorced 50+   
  -0.167      
Female x Widowed under 50   
  0.123      
N 724  653  653  178  475  
F 3.99 *** 19.15 *** 101.83 * 10.34 *** 9.42 *** 
R-Squared 0.038  0.281  0.301  0.338  0.307  
Reference groups: Widowed from 1st marriage, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, widowed late-life (50+), age 62-
63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and 
IADLs, health insurance, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement.  <0.001 = ***; 
<0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +.  
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Table 9. Linear OLS regressions for Social Security income for unmarried respondents; Proportion of 
lifetime married model (coefficients).  
 
All Unmarried Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 3 
Proportion of lifetime 
married 0.171 ** 0.159 ** 0.328 ** 0.325 ** 0.087  
Female 
-0.126 *** -0.140 *** -0.027  n/a  n/a  
Age 64-65 
  0.001  0.008  0.123  -0.023  
Age 66 and older 
  0.032  0.039  0.058  0.039  
Female x lifetime married 
    -0.239 +     
N 710  639  639  174  465  
F 10.04 *** 15.51 *** 13.49 *** 2.95 ** 8.03 *** 
R-Squared 0.027  0.254  0.258  0.267  0.275  
Reference group: Age 62-63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-
reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of 
retirement. <0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Pension and Annuity Benefits  
Married Respondents 
For the employer-sponsored pensions of married individuals, there are strong 
relationships between benefit receipt and a person’s retirement age, gender, and work 
history. Marital history, in contrast, has little association to pension income. First, the 
models analyzing pension receipt suggest that there is no relationship between receiving 
an employer-sponsored pension and marital history (Table 10). For married people who 
do receive a pension, the fully-adjusted model suggests there is no significant association 
between pension income amount and marital history (Table 11). When gender interaction 
terms are included, the only significant association pertains to the Female X Length of 
Marriage interaction. 
As shown in Figure 5, the relationship between first marriage length and 
employer-sponsored pension income differs by gender. There is a negative relationship 
between women’s first marriage length and employer-sponsored pension income. 
Experiencing a first marriage lasting 15 to 29 years results in more pension income for 
women compared to women with a first marriage that lasted 30 years or longer (b = .39,  
p = .01; F(2, 51) = 3.92, p = .03). The relationship is only approaching significance for 
women whose first marriage lasted less than 15 years but a negative trend is still 
observed (b = .41, p = .06).  For married men, there is no relationship between length of 
first marriage and pension income. Figure 5 identifies an additional gender difference in 
pension income; for all first marriage lengths, men are taking home more pension income 
than women.  
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Thus, for the married sample, marital history has very little association with 
employer-sponsored pensions. This analysis finds no relationship between marital history 
and pension receipt. There is no association between marital status, marital frequency, or 
disruption timing and an individual’s pension amount. Furthermore, the results suggest 
that marital history has no relationship to the pension income of currently married men, 
which provides support for the assumption that remarriage benefits individuals’ 
retirement security. Hypothesis 5 states that individuals with longer marriages will have 
more pension income, but the results indicate the opposite relationship for married 
women. A relationship between women’s first marriage length and pension income is 
observed; the amount of benefits received from an employer-sponsored pension is 
negatively related to the length of women’s first marriages. Gender-specific models 
examining men and women’s pension income separately support these findings  
(Table 11). 
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Figure 5. Estimated value of employer-sponsored pension income for married 
respondents by gender and length of first marriage. Estimated based on the gender 
interaction models shown in Table 11. Reference group: First marriage lasting 30 years or 
more. 
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Table 10. Binomial logistic regressions for pension receipt for married respondents (odds ratios).  
 
All Married Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except 
gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Remarried – one divorce 1.047  1.094  1.061  1.094  1.034  
Remarried – one widowhood 1.280  1.575  1.324  1.376  1.544  
Remarried – multiple 
disruptions 0.698  0.751  0.786  0.777  0.651  
1st marriage <15 years 0.749 + 0.851  0.859  0.856  0.874  
1st marriage 15-29 years 0.816 * 0.846  0.889  0.882  0.838  
Female 0.374 *** 0.563 *** 0.570 *** n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger 
 
 0.965  0.966  0.908  1.001  
Age 64-65 
 
 0.980  0.980  1.026  0.981  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.983  0.987  1.606  0.618  
Female x remarried divorce   
  1.077      
Female x remarried 
widowhood 
  
  
1.396 
 
    
Female x remarried multiple   
  0.873      
Female x 1st marriage <15 
years 
  
  
0.978 
 
    
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 
years 
  
  
0.889 
 
    
N 3,294  2,814  2,814  1,432  1,382  
F 36.25 *** 20.32 *** 18.42 ** 5.03 ** 5.49 ** 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years 0.952  1.233  0.772  0.656  1.419  
Longest marriage 10-19 years 0.761  0.693  0.851  0.848  0.505  
Longest marriage 20-29 years 0.930  0.855  0.727 + 0.727  1.147  
Longest marriage 30-39 years 1.021  0.916  0.998  1.022  0.784  
Divorced young (< 30) 0.715 * 0.942  0.984  0.965  0.823  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 0.966  1.089  1.095  1.146  0.987  
Divorced late-life (50+) 1.301  1.351  1.234  1.284  3.373 + 
Widowed under 50 0.982  1.234  1.412  1.460  0.972  
Widowed late-life (50+) 1.335  2.252  1.487  1.564  3.591  
Female 0.385 *** 0.571 *** 0.587 *** n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   0.982  0.971  0.917  1.023  
Age 64-65   0.985  0.968  1.008  0.988  
Age 66 and older   0.960  0.948  1.545  0.589  
Female x Longest  < 10 years   
  2.426      
Female x Longest  10-19 years   
  
0.629 
 
    
Female x Longest  20-29 years   
  
1.616 
 
    
Female x Longest  30-39 years   
  
0.821 
 
    
Female x Divorced < 30   
  0.842      
Female x Divorced 30-49   
  0.917      
Female x Divorced 50+   
  2.095      
Female x Widowed under 50   
  0.703      
Female x Widowed 50+   
  2.600      
N 3,276  2,823  2,823  1,440  1,383  
F 17.28 *** 11.75 ** .  10.30 *** 7.40 ** 
Reference groups: Continuously married, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, age 62-63. Control variables (not 
shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, 
spouse’s health and current employment, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement. 
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Table 11. Linear OLS regressions for pension income for married respondents (coefficients). 
 
All Married Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Remarried – one divorce 
-0.301 * -0.114  -0.069  -0.117  -0.138  
Remarried – one widowhood -0.409 ** -0.076  0.057  0.009  -0.312  
Remarried – multiple disruptions -0.456 *** -0.192  -0.124  -0.142  -0.185 
 
1st marriage <15 years 0.295 * 0.161  0.024  0.054  0.265  
1st marriage 15-29 years 0.228 ** 0.009  -0.105  -0.104  0.217 * 
Female 
-0.452 *** -0.499 *** -0.585 *** n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger 
 
 0.314 *** 0.310 *** 0.277 ** 0.359 *** 
Age 64-65 
 
 0.038  0.031  0.091  0.004  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.046  0.037  0.176  -0.102  
Female x remarried divorce   
  -0.180      
Female x remarried widowhood   
  
-0.383 
 
    
Female x remarried multiple   
  -0.253      
Female x 1st marriage <15 years   
  
0.414 +     
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 
years 
  
  
0.387 **     
N 1,473  1,330  1,330  832  498  
F 26.42 *** 18.16 *** 22.99 *** 21.23 *** 23.48 *** 
R-Squared 0.067  0.364  0.368  0.340  0.407  
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years 0.319  0.033  -0.239  -0.149  0.181  
Longest marriage 10-19 years 0.391 ** 0.136  0.027  0.066  0.260  
Longest marriage 20-29 years 0.244 * -0.015  -0.109  -0.096  0.064  
Longest marriage 30-39 years 0.248 *** 0.046  0.031  0.019  0.041  
Divorced young (< 30) -0.190 + 0.039  -0.016  -0.012  0.082  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) -0.259 * -0.085  -0.035  -0.104  -0.076  
Divorced late-life (50+) -0.282  -0.116  -0.144  -0.180  0.089  
Widowed under 50 -0.440 * -0.070  0.098  0.024  -0.316  
Widowed late-life (50+) 
-0.244 + 0.070  0.031  0.006  0.196  
Female -0.432 *** -0.494 *** -0.565 *** n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   0.301 *** 0.293 *** 0.259 ** 0.345 *** 
Age 64-65   0.035  0.030  0.081  0.005  
Age 66 and older   0.044  0.036  0.175  -0.115  
Female x Longest  < 10 years   
  0.524      
Female x Longest  10-19 years   
  
0.381 
 
    
Female x Longest  20-29 years   
  
0.294 +     
Female x Longest  30-39 years   
  
0.042 
 
    
Female x Divorced < 30   
  0.077      
Female x Divorced 30-49   
  -0.169      
Female x Divorced 50+   
  0.292      
Female x Widowed under 50   
  -0.440      
Female x Widowed 50+   
  0.109      
N 1,479  1,334  1,334  835  499  
F 15.55 *** 10.31 *** .  32.09 *** 15.38 *** 
R-Squared 0.074  0.363  0.367  0.340  0.408  
Reference groups: Continuously married, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, age 62-63. Control variables (not 
shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, 
spouse’s health and current employment, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement. 
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Table 12. Linear OLS regressions for pension income for married respondents; Proportion of lifetime 
married model (coefficients).  
 
All Married Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 3 
Proportion of lifetime 
married -0.331 * -0.102  0.155  0.047  -0.140  
Female 
-0.462 *** -0.504 *** -0.032  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger 
 
 0.303 *** 0.299 *** 0.257 ** 0.347 *** 
Age 64-65 
 
 0.045  0.046  0.101  0.022  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.063  0.061  0.206  -0.089  
Female x lifetime married   
  -0.583 +     
N 1,463  1,320  1,320  825  495  
F 61.13 *** 18.52 *** 28.13 *** 14.19 *** 26.85 *** 
R-Squared 0.060  0.363  0.365  0.335  0.403  
Reference group: Age 62-63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-
reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, spouse’s health and current employment, childrearing patterns, number of living 
children, resident children, and wave of retirement.  
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Unmarried Respondents 
Continuing the analysis, this section explores marital history’s relationships to 
unmarried respondent’s employer-sponsored pension receipt and income. The results 
reveal a strong relationship to receiving a pension benefit. The binomial regression 
results presented in Table 13 suggest that each characteristic of marital history studied 
may be associated with whether an unmarried individual is receiving an employer-
sponsored pension. Odds ratios are presented for all estimates in Table 13, but predicted 
probabilities for significant results will also be included in the text to provide a more 
informative discussion. 
The first set of analyses examines the relationship between marital status and 
frequency of disruptions and employer-sponsored pensions. The fully-adjusted models 
show no significant association between marital status and pensions. When the gender 
interaction terms are included in the model, however, the group of dummy variables 
representing detailed marital status has a relationship to pensions. Specifically, people 
who are never married (OR = .36, p = .05) or divorced once (OR = .38, p = .04) have 
lower odds of receiving a pension compared to people widowed from their first marriage, 
indicating that there may be a relationship between marital status and pension income for 
unmarried men, but not for women. The joint F test, however, indicates that the 
significance of this relationship is questionable, F(4, 49) = 1.56, p = .20. The gender 
interaction model suggests than men who are divorced from their first marriage have a 
predicted probability of receiving a pension of 0.63, whereas men currently widowed 
from their first marriage have a probability of 0.65.  This indicates that the association 
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between men’s marital history and pension receipt is weak and, given the non-significant 
joint F-test, there appears to be little support for Hypothesis 3 (i.e., divorcees have lower 
odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension). Never married men have the lowest 
probability of receiving an employer-sponsored pension (probabilities of 0.59 for never 
married versus 0.65 for widowed once). This provides some substantive support for 
Hypothesis 9 (i.e., being never married will be negatively related to retirement resources) 
but again, the marital status variable category is not significant. 
Gender-specific models are analyzed to further investigate these findings (Table 
13). In the model for men only, never married men (OR = .15, p = .002), men divorced 
once (OR = .22, p = .01), and men divorced after multiple past marriages (OR = .31, p = 
.03) all have statistically lower odds of receiving a pension compared to men widowed 
once, F(4, 49) = 3.52, p = .01. Being currently divorced, whether from their first marriage 
or another marriage, made it less likely men would be receiving a pension (0.70 and 0.71 
respectively versus 0.72 for first time widowers). The predicted probability that never 
married men will be receiving an employer-sponsored pension is lowest at 0.66. This 
finding supports Hypothesis 9 for men; never married men are less likely than men 
widowed from their first marriage to receive a pension in retirement. There is no 
difference between other unmarried men and never married men’s pension receipt. 
The next set of hypotheses tests the relationship between marital duration and 
pension receipt. As previously stated, Hypothesis 4 suggests a positive relationship 
between retirement resources and the proportion of lifetime spent married. Hypothesis 5 
states that those who are in longer marriages will have more retirement resources. 
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Hypothesis 5 is supported by this analysis, though gender differences are observed. In the 
full-adjusted model, those whose first marriage lasted less than 15 years have lower odds 
of receiving a pension than those with marriages lasting 30 years or more, though again 
the joint F-test is not significant (OR = .57, p = .03; F(3, 50) = 2.15, p = .11), and the 
relative difference is small (0.61 versus 0.63 for a < 15 year first marriage compared to a 
first marriage lasting 30 years or more). Further analysis indicates a significant Female X 
First Marriage Length interaction (Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6. Predicted probability of receiving an employer-sponsored pension for 
unmarried respondents by gender and length of first marriage. Estimated based on the 
gender interaction model shown in Table 13. Reference group: First marriage lasting 30 
years or more. 
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As shown in Figure 6, and supported by the gender-specific models for men and 
women in Table 13, the predicted probability of receiving a pension is greater for 
unmarried men whose first marriage lasted between 15 and 29 years compared to 
unmarried men whose first marriage lasted 30 years or more, F(3, 50) = 6.34, p < .001. 
Never married men have a lower probability of receiving an employer-sponsored pension 
compared to men whose marriage lasted 30 years or longer. For unmarried women, the 
length of first marriage is positively related to the probability they will receive a pension, 
though never married women may be an exception to this relationship. As observed in 
Figure 6, unmarried women whose first marriage lasted less than 15 years have a lower 
probability of receiving a pension compared to women whose first marriage lasted 30 
years or more. There is no support for a relationship between lifetime spent married and 
receiving a pension (Hypothesis 4).  
In terms of the timing of marital disruptions, there is an association between 
divorce, disruption timing, and pension receipt. In the fully-adjusted model, respondents 
whose first disruption was a divorce between ages 30 to 49 (OR = .59, p = .04) or a 
divorce after age 50 (OR = .49, p = .02) have lower odds of receiving an employer-
sponsored pension compared to those widowed after age 50. Additional testing, however, 
suggests that this association may be unreliable, F(5, 48) = 1.75, p = .14. An unmarried 
person whose first disruption was a divorce in mid-life (age 30 to 49) has a predicted 
probability of receiving a pension of 0.51, and a person whose divorce was after age 50 
has a probability of 0.47 (compared to 0.64 for those whose first disruption was 
widowhood after age 50). The non-significant joint F test for the disruption-timing 
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category and additional analyses with either divorced at age 30 to 49 or divorced at age 
50 or older as the reference group suggest that being currently divorced may matter for 
pension receipt and not the timing of the disruption. There were no other relationships 
between these variables and disruption timing. Still, the results provide support for 
Hypothesis 3, which proposes that the negative associations between marital disruptions 
and retirement income will be greater for those who experienced divorce than for those 
who were widowed. The results also provide support for Hypothesis 7, which states that a 
disruption later in life is related to a lower probability of receiving a pension, though the 
type of disruption rather than the timing of the event may primarily drive this 
relationship. 
This analysis finds no significant relationship between marital history and pension 
income amount for the unmarried respondents (Table 14). Thus, marital history has a 
relationship to whether or not unmarried individuals receive an employer-sponsored 
pension but for those who are receiving a benefit, marital history has no association with 
the amount received. To summarize, the odds of receiving a pension are lower for 
divorcees than widow(er)s and first marriage duration has a relationship that is moderated 
by gender. The relationship among unmarried men’s first marriage duration and their 
pension receipt is complex: Men are more likely to receive a pension if they had a first 
marriage lasting 15 to 29 years compared to men with a marriage 30 year or longer. The 
results also suggest that never married men have the lowest odds of receiving a pension 
compared to other unmarried men. The length of women’s first marriage has a positive 
relationship to pension receipt, and there are no other significant findings for women. 
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Table 13. Binomial logistic regressions for pension receipt for unmarried respondents (odds ratios). 
 All Unmarried Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except 
gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Divorced from 1st marriage 0.841  0.797  0.379 * 0.215 ** 1.007  
Divorced, multiple marriages 0.800  0.795  0.402  0.311 * 0.928  
Widowed, multiple marriages 0.861  1.094  0.825  0.844  1.049  
Never married 0.776  0.565 + 0.360 * 0.146 ** 0.717  
1st marriage <15 years 0.671 + 0.565 * 0.941  0.858  0.519 * 
1st marriage 15-29 years 0.928  0.804  2.257 + 2.637 * 0.592 + 
Female 0.885  0.953  1.023  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   1.040  1.088  1.140  1.073  
Age 64-65   1.120  1.173  2.020  1.096  
Age 66 and older 
 
 1.131  1.180  0.958  1.347  
Female x Divorced once     2.541 +     
Female x Divorced multiple   
  2.335      
Female x Widowed once      1.426      
Female x Never married   
  1.804      
Female x 1st marriage <15 
years 
  
  
0.510 
 
    
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 
years 
  
  
0.253 *     
N 1,165  1,047  1,047  299  748  
F 1.90 + 6.28 *** 4.92 ** 4.21 ** 7.54 *** 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years 0.889  0.726  1.031  0.772  0.807  
Longest marriage 10-19 years 1.129  0.837  2.250  2.200  0.653  
Longest marriage 20-29 years 1.148  1.043  2.038  2.039  0.860  
Longest marriage 30-39 years 1.072  0.943  1.432  1.397  0.863  
Never married 0.751  0.536 + 0.405  0.179 * 0.707  
Divorced young (< 30) 0.539 * 0.603 + 0.340 + 0.269 + 0.709  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 0.597 * 0.594 * 0.377 * 0.286 * 0.705  
Divorced late-life (50+) 0.622 + 0.491 * 0.361 * 0.238 ** 0.509 + 
Widowed under 50 0.580 + 0.664  0.883  0.871  0.782  
Female 0.896  0.943  1.199  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   1.056  1.083  1.049  1.067  
Age 64-65   1.186  1.239  2.338 + 1.136  
Age 66 and older   1.162  1.210  1.070  1.370  
Female x Longest  < 10 years     0.646      
Female x Longest  10-19 years     0.258      
Female x Longest  20-29 years     0.392      
Female x Longest  30-39 years     0.569      
Female x Never married     1.542      
Female x Divorced < 30     2.248      
Female x Divorced 30-49     1.891      
Female x Divorced 50+     1.389      
Female x Widowed under 50     0.890      
N 1,164  1,046  1,046  298  748  
F 1.68  6.05 *** 9.13 * 5.98 *** 5.21 ** 
Reference groups: Widowed from 1st marriage, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, widowed late-life (50+), age 62-
63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and 
IADLs, health insurance, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement. <0.001 = ***; 
<0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +.  
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Table 14. Linear OLS regressions for pension income for unmarried respondents (coefficients). 
 All Unmarried Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Divorced from 1st marriage 0.246 * 0.025  -0.120  -0.225  0.066  
Divorced, multiple marriages 0.217  0.204  0.351  0.318  0.080  
Widowed, multiple marriages -0.133  0.004  -0.309  -0.085  0.074  
Never married 0.410 * 0.050  0.018  -0.147  0.057  
1st marriage <15 years 0.132  -0.015  0.109  -0.015  -0.028  
1st marriage 15-29 years 0.026  0.025  0.211  0.273  -0.009  
Female -0.172 * -0.091  -0.013  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   0.360 *** 0.365 *** 0.786 *** 0.161  
Age 64-65   0.044  0.046  0.211  -0.058  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.250 + 0.257 + 0.538 + 0.126  
Female x Divorced once     0.193      
Female x Divorced multiple   
  -0.274      
Female x Widowed once      0.385      
Female x Never married   
  0.040      
Female x 1st marriage <15 
years 
  
  
-0.144 
 
    
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 
years 
  
  
-0.241 
 
    
N 581  533  533  158  375  
F 3.14 ** 17.90 *** 14.43 *** 25.71 *** 11.79 *** 
R-Squared 0.040  0.415  0.423  0.572  0.413  
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years 0.552 ** -0.028  0.102  -0.057  -0.076  
Longest marriage 10-19 years 0.532 *** 0.180  0.278  0.216  0.188  
Longest marriage 20-29 years 0.415 ** 0.092  0.097  0.131  0.158  
Longest marriage 30-39 years 0.335 * 0.251 + 0.501  0.402  0.187  
Never married 0.621 ** 0.140  0.244  0.071  0.109  
Divorced young (< 30) -0.059  0.121  0.375  0.298  0.039  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 0.015  0.063  0.232  0.038  -0.021  
Divorced late-life (50+) 0.046  -0.128  -0.071  -0.157  -0.092  
Widowed under 50 -0.330 + -0.213  -0.036  -0.058  -0.298  
Female -0.162 + -0.095  0.148  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   0.364 *** 0.358 *** 0.715 *** 0.178 + 
Age 64-65   0.075  0.061  0.296  -0.046  
Age 66 and older   0.279 + 0.273 + 0.632 + 0.117  
Female x Longest  < 10 years     -0.155      
Female x Longest  10-19 years     -0.105      
Female x Longest  20-29 years     0.050      
Female x Longest  30-39 years     -0.316      
Female x Never married     -0.111      
Female x Divorced < 30     -0.341      
Female x Divorced 30-49     -0.252      
Female x Divorced 50+     -0.015      
Female x Widowed under 50     -0.246      
N 581  533  533  158  375  
F 3.78 *** 68.85 *** 125.19 ** 13.43 ** 13.03 *** 
R-Squared 0.045  0.424  0.429  0.561  0.424  
Reference groups: Widowed from 1st marriage, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, widowed late-life (50+), age 62-
63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and 
IADLs, health insurance, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement. <0.001 = ***; 
<0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +.  
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Table 15. Linear OLS regressions for pension income for unmarried respondents; Proportion of lifetime 
married model (coefficients).  
 
All Unmarried Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 3 
Proportion of lifetime 
married -0.486 ** -0.023  0.014  0.566  0.028  
Female 
-0.205 * -0.113  -0.089  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger 
 
 0.369 *** 0.370 *** 0.717  0.179 + 
Age 64-65 
 
 0.039  0.041  0.221  -0.069  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.227  0.228  0.524  0.067  
Female x lifetime married   
  -0.052      
N 565  517  517  153  364  
F 5.46 ** 25.95 *** 24.21 *** 16.93 *** 14.11 *** 
R-Squared 0.030  0.404  0.404  0.530  0.403  
Reference group: Age 62-63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-
reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of 
retirement. <0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Non-Housing Wealth  
Married Respondents 
 In exploring marital history’s relationship to married respondents’ non-housing 
wealth, the results suggest that marriage frequency, duration, and type of disruption may 
play a role (Table 16). The first set of marital history hypotheses addresses the 
association between marital status and disruption frequency, and non-housing wealth. 
Hypothesis 1 states that married people who experienced a previous marital disruption 
will possess less non-housing wealth than those who have been continuously married. 
Indeed, remarried individuals who experienced multiple past disruptions have less non-
housing wealth compared to the continuously married, though the non-significant joint F 
test indicates that the group of dummy variables representing detailed marital status may 
not matter (b = -.39, p = .04; F(3, 50) = 1.85, p = .15). Further analysis including people 
with multiple past marriages as the reference group indicates that those remarried after 
one divorce (b = .31, p = .05) or one widowhood (b = .53, p = .04) also possess more 
non-housing wealth than remarried people with multiple past marriages. The findings 
provide support for Hypothesis 2, which states that people with more marital disruptions 
will have less in non-housing wealth than those with one disruption, but again these 
results may be unreliable.   
 In terms of marriage duration, a positive relationship between marriage length and 
non-housing wealth is observed. In the fully-adjusted model, compared to individuals 
whose longest marriage lasted 40 years or longer, married respondents whose longest 
marriage is between 10 and 19 years have less non-housing wealth (b = -.31, p = .03; F(4, 
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49) = 1.92, p = .12). Again, this association may be unreliable given the non-significance 
of the joint F test. There are no significant relationships for the proportion of lifetime 
spent married (Table 17), or the Female X Length of Marriage interaction and non-
housing wealth (Table 16).  
With regard to the final marital history hypothesis, there is a relationship between 
the timing of marital disruptions and non-housing wealth. Compared to the continuously 
married, remarried individuals who experienced widowhood before age 50 have more 
non-housing wealth (b = .33, p = .03); however, the association is again questionable 
given the non-significant joint F test, F(5, 48) = 1.06, p = .39. Furthermore, there are no 
other significant relationships between the timing of disruptions and non-housing wealth 
suggesting timing has a limited role, if any.  
In summary, marital history may have a weak relationship to non-housing wealth 
accumulation for married and remarried people. Although there are some significant 
relationships between non-housing wealth and marriage frequency, marriage duration, 
and the timing of disruptions, the parametric statistical tests for these categorical 
variables suggest that non-housing wealth amounts have no significant association with 
marital history.  
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Table 16. Linear OLS regressions on non-housing wealth for married respondents (coefficients).  
 All Married Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 
No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions, 
all controls 
Men only, all 
controls 
Women only, 
all controls 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Remarried – one divorce 0.034  -0.090  0.039  0.044  -0.239  
Remarried – one widowhood -0.010  0.129  0.100  0.099  0.210  
Remarried – multiple 
disruptions -0.272  -0.390 * -0.490 * -0.464 * -0.234  
1st marriage <15 years -0.353 + 0.094  -0.072  -0.070  0.285  
1st marriage 15-29 years -0.213  -0.007  -0.109  -0.091  0.128  
Female -0.039  0.185 ** 0.108  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   0.095  0.089  0.139  0.074  
Age 64-65   0.201 + 0.198 + 0.233  0.111  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.011  0.000  0.134  -0.268  
Female x remarried divorce     -0.271      
Female x remarried 
widowhood 
  
  
0.034 
 
    
Female x remarried multiple     0.279      
Female x 1st marriage <15 
years 
  
  
0.337 
 
    
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 
years 
  
  
0.225 
 
    
N 3,264  2,814  2,814  1,432  1,382  
F 2.80 * 82.24 *** 58.34 *** 65.51 *** 35.49 *** 
R-Squared 0.008  0.392  0.394  0.416  0.386  
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years -1.256 ** -0.542 + -0.781 * -0.634 + -0.409  
Longest marriage 10-19 years -0.396 + -0.310 * -0.215  -0.097  -0.461 * 
Longest marriage 20-29 years -0.391 ** -0.224 + -0.253  -0.135  -0.215  
Longest marriage 30-39 years -0.002  -0.051  -0.049  0.028  -0.104  
Divorced young (< 30) -0.263  0.080  0.025  -0.016  0.147  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 0.247  0.105  0.014  -0.054  0.234  
Divorced late-life (50+) 0.059  0.072  0.194  0.198  -0.288  
Widowed under 50 0.031  0.331 * 0.202  0.149  0.473 * 
Widowed late-life (50+) 0.225  0.431  0.142  0.088  1.052 ** 
Female -0.020  0.168 ** 0.127  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   0.126 + 0.121 + 0.148  0.120  
Age 64-65   0.190 + 0.182 + 0.213  0.098  
Age 66 and older   0.002  -0.001  0.104  -0.250  
Female x Longest  < 10 years     0.388      
Female x Longest  10-19 years     -0.200      
Female x Longest  20-29 years     0.064      
Female x Longest  30-39 years     -0.012      
Female x Divorced < 30     0.098      
Female x Divorced 30-49     0.205      
Female x Divorced 50+     -0.528      
Female x Widowed under 50     0.215      
Female x Widowed 50+     0.700      
N 3,276  2,823  2,823  1,440  1,383  
F 2.46 * 32.29 *** .  31.55 *** 60.47 *** 
R-Squared 0.013  0.393  0.394  0.412  0.392  
Reference groups: Continuously married, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, age 62-63. Control variables (not 
shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, 
spouse’s health and current employment, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement. 
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Table 17. Linear OLS regressions on non-housing wealth for married respondents; Proportion of lifetime 
married model (coefficients).  
 
All Married Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 3 
Proportion of lifetime 
married 1.265 *** 0.331  0.364  0.273  0.235  
Female 
-0.073  0.170 ** 0.223  n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger 
 
 0.115  0.114  0.130  0.130  
Age 64-65 
 
 0.208 + 0.208 + 0.226  0.135  
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.017  0.017  0.101  -0.229  
Female x lifetime married   
  -0.067      
N 3,230  2,788  2,788  1,421  1,367  
F 12.03 *** 99.29 *** 95.92 *** 48.85 *** 36.58 *** 
R-Squared 0.008  0.393  0.393  0.409  0.393  
Reference group: Age 62-63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-
reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, spouse’s health and current employment, childrearing patterns, number of living 
children, resident children, and wave of retirement.  
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Unmarried Respondents 
The final analysis performed on unmarried respondents suggests that marital 
history has a significant relationship to their non-housing wealth accumulation. Similar to 
the analyses performed above, this analysis explores marital history factors such as 
marital status and disruption frequency, marriage duration, and the timing of disruptions. 
Although the results show no relationship between disruption timing and non-housing 
wealth, the features of marital status, disruption frequency, and marriage duration are 
associated with non-housing wealth (Table 18). 
The first set of hypotheses addresses the relationship between non-housing wealth 
and marital status and disruption frequency. The results suggest that never married 
individuals have less non-housing wealth (b = -.60, p < .001) than people who were 
widowed from their first marriage, and the joint F test is significant, F(4, 49) = 4.07, p = 
.01. This result is further supported by a separate analysis with never married as the 
reference group. Divorced and widowed respondents have significantly more non-
housing wealth than never married individuals with the exception of people divorced 
after multiple previous marriages. This provides support for Hypothesis 9, which 
proposes that being never married is negatively related to non-housing wealth. 
Hypothesis 2, which relates to disruption frequency, states that unmarried people 
who experienced multiple marital disruptions will possess less wealth than those 
widowed from their first marriage. This is not supported in the fully-adjusted models 
shown in Table 18. A gender interaction involving marital status and female gender 
(Figure 7) indicates that among widowed women, those widowed from a previous 
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marriage that was not their first marriage have more non-housing wealth than women 
widowed from their first marriage (b = 1.35, p = .01; F(4, 49) = 2.33, p = .07). In 
contrast, the opposite relationship is observed for men; widowed men who had multiple 
past marriages have less wealth than men widowed from their first marriage. These 
findings indicate that the relationship between multiple disruptions and non-housing 
wealth is tied to gender. The results provide support for Hypothesis 2 (i.e., people with 
multiple marital disruptions will have less non-housing wealth) for widowed men but the 
relationship is in the opposite direction than expected for widowed women.  
 
 
Figure 7. Estimated value of non-housing wealth for unmarried respondents by gender 
and marital status. Estimated based on the gender interaction model shown in Table 18. 
Reference group: Widowed from first marriage. 
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Next the analysis explores whether marriage duration, prior to becoming 
unmarried, has a relationship to non-housing wealth. When examining the fully-adjusted 
models in Table 18, a number of measures representing marriage duration have a 
relationship to non-housing wealth. First, unmarried people whose first marriage lasted 
less than 15 years have less non-housing wealth than those with a first marriage lasting 
30 years or longer (b = -.40, p = .01; F(2, 51) = 3.95, p = .03). Second, length of longest 
marriage has a strong, positive relationship to non-housing wealth. Unmarried 
respondents who are never married (b = -.86, p < .001) or whose longest marriage is less 
than 10 years (b = -.86, p < .001), between 10-19 years (b = -.70, p = .002), or between 
20-29 years (b = -.59, p = .004) all have significantly less non-housing wealth than 
people whose longest marriage is 40 years or more, F(5, 48) = 5.17, p < .001. As 
proposed in Hypothesis 5, these results support the statement that length of marriages is 
positively related to more non-housing wealth. Finally, the marital duration variable 
representing proportion of lifetime spent married is positively related to non-housing 
wealth for unmarried respondents (b = .90, p < .001). Hypothesis 4, that being married 
for a greater proportion of one’s lifetime is associated with more non-housing wealth, is 
therefore also supported (Table 19).  
Further analysis, however, suggests that the interpretation is not that simple. A 
significant Female X Length of Marriage interaction shows that again this relationship 
may be subject to gender differences (Figure 8). For unmarried men there is a positive 
relationship between non-housing wealth and longest marriage length. In support of 
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Hypothesis 5, never married men and men with shorter marriages (i.e., a marriage lasting 
less than 10 years, 10 to 19 years, 20 to 29 years, and 30 to 39 years) have less non-
housing wealth compared to men with a marriage that lasted 40 years or more. The 
figure, however, shows a dramatic difference between the estimated value of non-housing 
wealth for men with a marriage that lasted 40 years or more compared to all other groups 
of men. In order to interpret this finding further, gender-specific models are investigated 
and values are estimated for non-housing wealth by length of longest marriage. There is 
an extremely large, significant difference between the non-housing wealth of the 
reference group (i.e., marriage lasted 40 years or more) and other unmarried men, and 
bivariate analyses indicate a positively skewed relationship between longest marriage 
length and non-housing wealth for unmarried men (Table 20). Unmarried men with a 
marriage that lasted four decades or more are a small and relatively wealthy group 
(n=21); therefore, the results should be interpreted cautiously.  
In contrast, a curvilinear relationship is observed with regard to unmarried 
women’s length of longest marriage and non-housing wealth (Figure 8). Never married 
women or women whose longest marriage lasted less than 30 years have less non-
housing wealth compared to women with a marriage lasting 40 years or more. Women 
with a marriage that lasted 30 to 39 years, however, have more non-housing wealth than 
women with a 40-year or longer marriage. Thus, for currently unmarried women, Figure 
8 indicates shorter marriages are associated with less non-housing wealth compared to 
women with a marriage over four decades long, with the exception of women whose 
marriage lasted between 30 and 39 years. 
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Figure 8. Estimated value of non-housing wealth for unmarried respondents by gender 
and length of longest marriage. Estimated based on the gender interaction model shown 
in Table 18. Reference group: Longest marriage lasting 40 years or more. 
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history characteristics have an association to unmarried people’s non-housing wealth. 
There is support for the hypothesis that never married individuals will have significantly 
less non-housing wealth than divorced and widowed individuals. There is also a 
relationship to non-housing wealth that is moderated by gender for people who 
experienced multiple marital disruptions; widowed men with multiple past marriages 
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support for length of marriage having a positive relationship to non-housing wealth, yet 
the association appears to be complex and moderated by gender. 
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Table 18. Linear OLS regressions on non-housing wealth for unmarried respondents (coefficients).  
 All Unmarried Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 
No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions 
Men only, all 
controls 
Women only, 
all controls 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 1 
Divorced from 1st marriage -0.056  -0.122  -0.154  0.003  -0.153  
Divorced, multiple marriages -0.053  -0.182  -0.403  -0.387  -0.100  
Widowed, multiple marriages 0.354  0.121  -0.960 * -0.809 + 0.390 * 
Never married -0.201  -0.602 *** -0.693 * -0.491  -0.598 ** 
1st marriage <15 years -0.556 ** -0.397 ** -0.189  -0.116  -0.507 ** 
1st marriage 15-29 years -0.062  -0.150  -0.304  -0.329  -0.097  
Female -0.607 *** -0.390 ** -0.571 + n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   0.427 ** 0.424 ** -0.101  0.555 ** 
Age 64-65   0.533 ** 0.507 ** 0.712 * 0.447 + 
Age 66 and older   0.334  0.317  0.814 * 0.132  
Female x Divorced once     0.020      
Female x Divorced multiple     0.313      
Female x Widowed multiple    
  1.354 *     
Female x Never married     0.126      
Female x 1st marriage <15 
years 
  
  
-0.305 
 
    
Female x 1st marriage 15-29 
years 
  
  
0.206 
 
    
N 1,165  1,047  1,047  299  748  
F 5.54 *** 36.42 *** 37.67 *** 36.78 *** 35.66 *** 
R-Squared 0.026  0.465  0.470  0.517  0.475  
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 2 
Longest marriage < 10 years -0.908 ** -0.859 *** -1.477 ** -1.601 ** -0.791 ** 
Longest marriage 10-19 years -0.455  -0.695 ** -1.579 ** -1.718 *** -0.469 + 
Longest marriage 20-29 years -0.346  -0.588 ** -1.774 *** -1.828 *** -0.316  
Longest marriage 30-39 years -0.102  -0.192  -1.632 *** -1.755 *** 0.189  
Never married -0.356  -0.858 *** -1.739 *** -1.806 *** -0.685 ** 
Divorced young (< 30) 0.005  0.153  0.046  0.222  0.155  
Divorced mid-life (30-49) 0.012  0.051  -0.027  0.099  0.023  
Divorced late-life (50+) 0.210  -0.041  0.421  0.413  -0.333  
Widowed under 50 -0.254  -0.143  -0.581  -0.676  -0.157  
Female -0.538 *** -0.352 ** -1.525 *** n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger   0.453 *** 0.431 ** -0.180  0.591 *** 
Age 64-65   0.590 ** 0.559 ** 0.740 ** 0.531 * 
Age 66 and older   0.342  0.278  0.598  0.152  
Female x Longest  < 10 years   
  0.736      
Female x Longest  10-19 years   
  
1.136 +     
Female x Longest  20-29 years     1.496 **     
Female x Longest  30-39 years     1.872 ***     
Female x Never married     1.095 *     
Female x Divorced < 30     0.100      
Female x Divorced 30-49     0.067      
Female x Divorced 50+   
  -0.734 +     
Female x Widowed under 50     0.420      
N 1,164  1,046  1,046  298  748  
F 4.56 *** 52.11 *** 16.48 * 64.04 *** 32.25 *** 
R-Squared 0.030  0.470  0.480  0.540  0.480  
Reference groups: Widowed from 1st marriage, first marriage 30+ years, longest marriage 40+ years, widowed late-life (50+), age 62-
63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-reported health, ADLs and 
IADLs, health insurance, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of retirement.  <0.001 = ***; 
<0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +.  
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Table 19. Linear OLS regressions on non-housing wealth for unmarried respondents; Proportion of lifetime married 
model (coefficients).  
 
All Unmarried Respondents Gender-Specific Models 
 No controls 
except gender  
Full model, 
all controls 
Full + gender 
interactions Men only Women only 
 SET OF VARIABLES: MODEL 3 
Proportion of lifetime 
married 0.670 ** 0.895 *** 0.646 + 0.483  1.005 *** 
Female 
-0.594 *** -0.380 ** -0.538 * n/a  n/a  
Age 61 and younger 
 
 0.439 ** 0.436 ** -0.096  0.568 *** 
Age 64-65 
 
 0.568 ** 0.558 ** 0.792 ** 0.496 + 
Age 66 and older 
 
 0.343 + 0.336  0.777 * 0.157  
Female x lifetime married   
  0.358      
N 1,134  1,016  1,016  288  728  
F 16.16 *** 41.55 *** 39.56 *** 26.36 *** 43.96 *** 
R-Squared 0.022  0.465  0.465  0.510  0.470  
Reference group: Age 62-63. Control variables (not shown): race/ethnicity, cohort, education, work history, homeownership, self-
reported health, ADLs and IADLs, health insurance, childrearing patterns, number of living children, resident children, and wave of 
retirement. <0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Table 20. Predicted values of non-housing wealth for unmarried respondents by length of longest 
marriage (models for men and women performed separately) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Unmarried Men Only 
(N = 298) 
Unmarried Women Only 
(N = 748) 
Length of Longest Marriage     
Never Married $26,003.28 *** $14,396.99 ** 
Less than 10 Years $35,775.80 ** $12,794.09 ** 
10 to 19 Years $31,824.67 *** $17,657.08 + 
20 to 29 Years $28,529.70 *** $20,567.61  
30 to 39 Years $30,672.94 *** $34,072.25  
40 or More Years $177,458.80  $28,216.72  
Reference group: 40 or more years; <0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
Estimated values calculated from the gender-specific regression models shown in Table 18. 
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Associations with Control Variables  
Married Respondents 
 For the married respondents, Tables 21 and 22 display multivariable regression 
results containing the simplest set of marital history variables and all control variables 
included in the fully-adjusted models. Table 21 presents the binomial regression results 
on Social Security benefits and pension benefits, and Table 22 shows linear regression 
results for Social Security income, pension income, and non-housing wealth.  
In terms of demographics, people with higher levels of education have more 
Social Security income, pension income, and non-housing wealth than people with lower 
levels of education. They also have higher odds of receiving an employer-sponsored 
pension. People with higher levels of education, however, have slightly lower odds of 
receiving Social Security benefits than those with lower levels of education. Race and 
ethnicity only appears to be related to non-housing wealth; married Black or Hispanic 
individuals have lower non-housing wealth compared to married Whites. Those who 
retired before age 62 have more pension income compared to those who retired at age 62 
and 63; however, the odds of receiving Social Security benefits increase with retirement 
age. Finally, married respondents who own a home have more Social Security income 
and non-housing wealth, as well as higher odds of receiving an employer-sponsored 
pension compared to those who do not own a home. 
The covariates representing work history have a relationship to the retirement 
resources studied. Length of longest job tenure is positively related to the odds of 
receiving pension benefits, and to the amount of Social Security income, pension income, 
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and non-housing wealth. Total years worked is related to higher odds of receiving Social 
Security benefits and employer-sponsored pension benefits, as well as more Social 
Security income. There is a negative relationship, however, between total years worked 
and employer-sponsored pension income. People who reported having a voluntary 
retirement have higher odds of receiving Social Security and pension benefits, as well as 
more pension income and non-housing wealth, compared people who reported a forced 
retirement. Individuals who have employer-sponsored health insurance have higher odds 
of receiving a pension and have more pension income than individuals who do not have 
employer health insurance, perhaps because the two often go together in an employer’s 
retirement package. People with employer-sponsored health insurance also have more 
non-housing wealth compared to people without employer health insurance. In contrast, 
people who have an employer-sponsored health plan have lower odds of receiving a 
Social Security benefit compared to those without an employer health plan. 
Married respondents’ self-reported health has a strong relationship to the receipt 
of both Social Security and employer-sponsored pensions; people in better health (i.e., 
excellent, very good, and good health) have higher odds of receiving these benefits than 
people in fair/poor health. People in better health also have more non-housing wealth 
compared to people in fair/poor health. Furthermore, people who have ADL limitations 
possess less wealth than those without limitations. In contrast, people with ADL 
limitations have higher odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension compared to 
those without ADL limitations. 
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Family variables include spouse characteristics and covariates related to children. 
These variables only have a relationship to pension benefits and non-housing wealth. 
With regard to children, those who have children living in the home have lower non-
housing wealth compared to individuals without resident children. There is also a 
negative relationship between the number of living children and non-housing wealth. In 
terms of spouse characteristics, married respondents with a spouse who is taking home a 
paycheck, whether the earnings are more or less than $3,176, have statistically lower 
pension income compared to respondents with a non-working spouse. Wealth is also 
related to the spouses’ health, and people whose spouses self-reported excellent, very 
good, and good health have more non-housing wealth compared to respondents whose 
spouses reported being in fair/poor health.    
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Table 21. Binomial logistic regression models for married respondents, all control  
variables and basic marital status (odds ratios) 
 Dependent Variable 
 Social Security Binomial Pension Binomial 
Remarried – one divorce 1.402  0.960  
Remarried – one widowhood 0.963  1.403  
Remarried – multiple disruptions 0.833  0.657 * 
Female 1.113  0.569 *** 
Black 0.850  1.257 + 
Hispanic 0.675  1.354  
Other race 0.902  0.916  
School Years (0-17) 0.904 ** 1.088 *** 
Retirement age <62 --  0.951  
Retirement age 64-65 2.057 * 0.978  
Retirement age >65 3.576 * 0.978  
Longest job tenure 0.979 + 1.026 *** 
Total years worked 1.033 ** 1.015 ** 
Voluntary retirement 2.325 *** 1.606 *** 
Partially voluntary retirement 1.373  1.757 ** 
First child as a teen 1.063  1.207  
First child age 20-25 0.801  1.066  
Number of living children 0.943  0.937  
No resident children 1.192  0.907  
Spouse Earnings < $3,176 1.126  1.012  
Spouse Earnings > $3,176 1.030  1.076  
Spouse health is excellent 1.075  0.958  
Spouse health is very good 1.022  0.948  
Spouse health is good 0.851  1.162  
ADLs dummy 0.593  1.408 * 
IADLS dummy 0.799  0.815  
Employer health insurance 0.520 ** 3.500 *** 
Medicare  1.420  1.352  
Spouse health insurance 0.672  1.273 + 
Respondent health is excellent 3.064 * 1.613 *** 
Respondent health is very good 2.552 *** 1.274 * 
Respondent health is good 1.663 * 1.132  
Homeownership 1.027  1.471 * 
War Babies cohort 0.411 + 0.722 * 
Retired in wave 3 1.690  0.926  
Retired in wave 4 1.303  1.166  
Retired in wave 5 1.910  1.302  
Retired in wave 6 1.170  0.806  
Retired in wave 7 1.828  1.181  
Retired in wave 8 2.739  0.969  
Retired in wave 9 0.505  0.340 *** 
N 1,641  2,814  
F 3.01 * 19.76 *** 
Reference groups: Continuously married, White, age 62-63, retirement involuntary, first child at age 26+, no  
spouse earnings, spouse health is poor, respondent health is poor, retired in wave 2.  
<0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Table 22. Linear regression models for married respondents, all control variables and basic 
marital status (coefficients) 
 Dependent Variable 
 Social Security 
Income 
Pension and 
Annuity Income Non-Housing Wealth 
Remarried – one divorce 0.010  -0.010  -0.031  
Remarried – one widowhood 0.130 * -0.034  0.157  
Remarried – multiple disruptions 0.047  -0.095  -0.322 * 
Female -0.276 *** -0.501 *** 0.186 ** 
Black -0.026  0.030  -1.053 *** 
Hispanic -0.061  0.078  -0.582 *** 
Other race 0.019  0.214  -0.028  
School Years (0-17) 0.017 *** 0.109 *** 0.162 *** 
Retirement age <62 --  0.315 *** 0.097  
Retirement age 64-65 0.012  0.039  0.204 + 
Retirement age >65 0.032  0.050  0.014  
Longest job tenure 0.004 ** 0.022 *** 0.016 *** 
Total years worked 0.004 ** -0.009 * 0.003  
Voluntary retirement 0.023  0.260 *** 0.318 *** 
Partially voluntary retirement 0.034  0.084  0.359 *** 
First child as a teen -0.025 + -0.009  0.040  
First child age 20-25 0.016  -0.064  0.048  
Number of living children -0.006  -0.029  -0.047 * 
No resident children -0.011  -0.076  0.319 *** 
Spouse Earnings < $3,176 -0.041  -0.115 ** -0.195 * 
Spouse Earnings > $3,176 -0.027  -0.136 * 0.061  
Spouse health is excellent 0.061  0.057  0.943 *** 
Spouse health is very good 0.056 * -0.040  0.676 *** 
Spouse health is good 0.004  -0.057  0.512 *** 
ADLs dummy -0.033  -0.084  -0.320 ** 
IADLS dummy 0.021  -0.004  0.157  
Employer health insurance 0.026  0.392 *** 0.347 *** 
Medicare  0.007  0.005  0.197 + 
Spouse health insurance 0.019  0.212 ** 0.318 *** 
Respondent health is excellent 0.068 + 0.113  0.516 *** 
Respondent health is very good 0.035  0.077  0.466 *** 
Respondent health is good 0.033  0.063  0.288 *** 
Homeownership 0.092 * 0.109  1.110 *** 
War Babies cohort -0.014  -0.053  0.054  
Retired in wave 3 0.003  0.082  -0.135  
Retired in wave 4 0.048  0.128  0.128  
Retired in wave 5 0.138 *** 0.192 * 0.245 + 
Retired in wave 6 0.270 *** 0.371 *** 0.122  
Retired in wave 7 0.325 *** 0.426 *** 0.073  
Retired in wave 8 0.376 *** 0.442 *** 0.403 * 
Retired in wave 9 0.278 *** 0.125  0.069  
_constant 1.731 *** 0.382  -0.603 ** 
N 1,512  1,330  2,814  
F 32.24  *** 22.13 *** 84.10 *** 
R-Squared 0.305  0.362  0.392  
Reference: Continuously married, White, age 62-63, retirement involuntary, first child at age 26+, no spouse earnings, 
spouse health is poor, respondent health is poor, retired in wave 2. <0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
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Unmarried Respondents 
For the unmarried respondents, Tables 23 and 24 present the regression results of 
models including the simplest marital history variables and all control variables. Table 23 
presents the binomial regression results for Social Security benefits and employer-
sponsored pension benefits of the unmarried respondents. Table 24 shows the linear 
regression results for Social Security income, pension income, and non-housing wealth. 
Below are highlights of the major covariates for this sample, but in general the covariates 
that are significant in the married models are also significant in the unmarried models. 
In terms of demographic characteristics, unmarried people with higher levels of 
education have more Social Security income, pension income, and non-housing wealth, 
and higher odds of receiving a pension than people with lower levels of education. People 
with higher levels of education, however, have lower odds of receiving Social Security 
benefits. Unmarried Black and Hispanic individuals have lower non-housing wealth and 
Social Security income compared with unmarried Whites. Those who retired young, 
under age 62, or between age 64 and 65, have more non-housing wealth compared to 
those who retired at ages 62 or 63. People who retired under age 62 also have more 
employer-sponsored pension income, while people who retired at later ages (64 and 
older) have higher odds of receiving Social Security benefits compared to people who 
retired at ages 62 or 63. Finally, similar to married individuals, unmarried people who 
own a home have more Social Security income and non-housing wealth, and higher odds 
of receiving an employer pension than people who do not own a home. 
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The relationship between unmarried respondents’ work history and retirement 
security is similar to the relationship observed for the married sample. The length of an 
unmarried person’s longest job tenure is associated with higher odds of receiving an 
employer-sponsored pension, and is associated with more pension income and non-
housing wealth. It appears the total number of years worked is positively related to Social 
Security income for unmarried respondents, but has no relationship to the other 
retirement resources. Individuals who reported experiencing a voluntary or partly 
voluntary retirement have higher odds of receiving Social Security benefits compared to 
those who experienced an involuntary retirement. People who reported a voluntary 
retirement also have higher odds of pension receipt, and more pension income and non-
housing wealth than people who reported an involuntary retirement. Individuals with an 
employer-sponsored health insurance plan have higher odds of receiving a pension, and 
have more pension income and non-housing wealth compared to people without 
employer health insurance.  
Unmarried respondents in excellent, very good, or good health have higher non-
housing wealth compared to persons in fair/poor health. People in good health also have 
higher odds of receiving Social Security benefits and pension benefits, and have more 
pension income compared to people in fair/poor health. Individuals with the presence of 
IADLs have less non-housing wealth and lower odds of receiving Social Security benefits 
compared to those who do not have IADL difficulties. 
In terms of family variables, unmarried respondents with children living in the 
house have lower non-housing wealth than those without resident children. In terms of 
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childrearing for the unmarried sample, people who were between the ages of 15 and 19 
when their first child was born have lower pension income compared to those who had 
their first child at age 26 or older. 
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Table 23. Binomial logistic regression models for unmarried respondents, all control  
variables and basic marital status (odds ratios) 
 
Reference groups: Widowed from first marriage, White, age 62-63, retirement not voluntary, first  
child at age 26+, respondent health is poor, retired in wave 2. <0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Social Security Binomial  Pension Binomial 
Divorced from 1st marriage 0.908  0.682 * 
Divorced, multiple marriages 0.622  0.584 ** 
Widowed, multiple marriages 2.987 + 0.788  
Never married 0.724  0.683  
Female 0.662  0.941  
Black 0.912  1.052  
Hispanic 0.829  1.300  
Other race 0.332  2.382  
School Years (0-17) 0.822 ** 1.074 ** 
Retirement age <62 --  1.025  
Retirement age 64-65 4.043 ** 1.178  
Retirement age >65 15.590 *** 1.185  
Longest job tenure 0.985  1.023 * 
Total years worked 0.997  0.999  
Voluntary retirement 3.411 *** 1.542 ** 
Partially voluntary retirement 5.725 * 1.688 + 
First child as a teen 1.256  1.264  
First child age 20-25 0.781  1.192  
Number of living children 0.989  0.970  
No resident children 0.889  0.841  
ADLs dummy 1.427  0.991  
IADLS dummy 0.299 * 0.735  
Employer health insurance 0.982  3.657 *** 
Medicare  0.560  1.150  
Respondent health is excellent 1.353  0.853  
Respondent health is very good 1.738  1.313  
Respondent health is good 2.045 * 1.694 * 
Homeownership 1.472  1.645 ** 
War Babies cohort 0.231 + 0.653  
Retired in wave 3 2.378  0.662  
Retired in wave 4 1.039  0.795  
Retired in wave 5 0.447  0.472 ** 
Retired in wave 6 1.566  0.661  
Retired in wave 7 1.547  0.594 + 
Retired in wave 8 3.865  0.900  
Retired in wave 9 0.899  0.316 ** 
N 723  1,047  
F 6.08 *** 7.74 *** 
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Table 24. Linear regression models for unmarried respondents, all control variables and basic 
marital status (coefficients) 
 Dependent Variable 
 Social Security 
Income  
Pension and 
Annuity Income Non-Housing Wealth 
Divorced from 1st marriage 0.003  0.025  -0.230 * 
Divorced, multiple marriages -0.151 ** 0.192  -0.397 * 
Widowed, multiple marriages 0.027  -0.011  -0.105  
Never married -0.052  0.044  -0.474 ** 
Female -0.147 *** -0.092  -0.398 ** 
Black -0.093 * 0.070  -1.275 *** 
Hispanic -0.144 ** 0.013  -0.799 ** 
Other race -0.102  0.312  -0.128  
School Years (0-17) 0.022 ** 0.129 *** 0.168 *** 
Retirement age <62 --  0.359 *** 0.414 ** 
Retirement age 64-65 0.000  0.050  0.567 ** 
Retirement age >65 0.035  0.253 + 0.367 + 
Longest job tenure 0.000  0.018 *** 0.016 ** 
Total years worked 0.004 * 0.000  -0.004  
Voluntary retirement 0.033  0.274 ** 0.449 ** 
Partially voluntary retirement 0.035  0.141  -0.038  
First child as a teen 0.028  -0.247 * -0.140  
First child age 20-25 0.043  -0.026  0.081  
Number of living children 0.003  0.002  -0.069 + 
No resident children -0.034  -0.037  0.251 * 
ADLs dummy -0.099 + -0.097  -0.220  
IADLS dummy 0.016  0.223 + -0.634 ** 
Employer health insurance 0.019  0.303 ** 0.534 *** 
Medicare  -0.029  -0.103  0.160  
Respondent health is excellent 0.043  0.079  0.749 *** 
Respondent health is very good 0.016  0.264 * 0.436 ** 
Respondent health is good 0.013  0.210 * 0.347 ** 
Homeownership 0.142 *** -0.006  0.917 *** 
War Babies cohort -0.131  0.109  0.194  
Retired in wave 3 0.024  0.035  -0.315  
Retired in wave 4 0.033  0.039  0.013  
Retired in wave 5 0.152 * 0.088  -0.099  
Retired in wave 6 0.286 *** 0.203  -0.005  
Retired in wave 7 0.297 *** 0.396 ** -0.019  
Retired in wave 8 0.415 *** 0.416 * 0.214  
Retired in wave 9 0.253 ** 0.138  -0.147  
_constant 1.776 *** -0.524 + 0.075  
N 653  533  1,047  
F 11.39 *** 21.22 *** 44.31 *** 
R-Squared 0.277  0.415  0.462  
Reference groups: Widowed from first marriage, White, age 62-63, retirement not voluntary, first child at age 26+, 
respondent health is poor, retired in wave 2. <0.001 = ***; <0.010 = **, <0.050 = *, <0.100 = +. 
 
 
  
139 
 
 
 
 
Results Summary 
The analyses suggest that marital history is associated with each retirement resource 
in a different way, and that there are differences in marital history’s relationship to these 
resources by whether the person is currently married or unmarried. The study also finds a 
number of gender differences in how marital history relates to retirement income and 
wealth.  
For the married sample, married men’s retirement resources have no relationship to 
the marital pathways they experienced before retirement. The retirement security of 
married women, however, is associated with marital history; women who had shorter 
marriages have more Social Security and pension income compared to those women who 
remained continuously married into retirement. This result is in the opposite direction 
than expected. Overall, these findings may suggest that for people who are married or 
remarried, marital history’s relationship to their retirement security is limited. 
For the unmarried sample, both men and women’s marital histories have a 
relationship to their retirement resources. Examining within group differences by 
removing the confounding married to unmarried comparison appears to be a successful 
strategy. The findings indicate that marital history does not relate to all unmarried 
people’s retirement resources the same way. Never marrieds, divorcees, and people who 
had multiple previous marriages have less retirement resources than widow(er)s. How 
long an unmarried person was married prior to becoming single also has a strong 
relationship to retirement resources and this relationship is moderated by gender. Further 
discussion of these findings will be presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Both marriage and retirement are important life events whose normative pathways 
have become less and less standard over time. The establishment of most of our social 
policies and provisions related to the institutions of marriage and retirement occurred 
well over a half a century ago, and was based on the behaviors of people and families 
living at that time.  Since that time, these behaviors shifted and became less uniform, 
which resulted in increasingly outdated and inadequate retirement systems. As the 
experience of having a single, lifelong marriage became less common, marital 
experiences became increasingly varied. For one thing, marriage rates declined: a 
growing number of people chose not to marry and options like cohabitation were more 
widely accepted by society. In addition, people delayed marriage, stayed unmarried for 
longer, and remarried less often. The average time a person spent married, therefore, was 
also decreasing. Conversations regarding the degradation of marriage flourished in 
politics, religion, and social discourse. People attempted to understand why these marital 
changes occurred, yet the situation could not be ignored; this variation in marital history 
was unlike any we had seen among previous generations. Current research confirms that, 
in fact, the next population of retirees will have the most diverse marital history of any 
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generation (Cherlin, 1992; Goldstein & Kenney, 2001; Harrington Meyer et al., 2006; 
Kreider & Ellis, 2011; Ruggles, 1997). 
Just as we are seeing the populations who experienced these marital shifts enter 
into old age, research focused on the relationship between marriage and retirement has 
faded. Research in this area peaked between the 1980s and 2000s. Today, marriage is 
typically included in studies as a status, effectively ignoring the substantial variability 
that has grown within married and unmarried groups. The literature has arguably lacked a 
thorough and systematic investigation of the relationship between work, family, and 
retirement pathways (Szinovacz et al., 2012).  Learning from the experiences of current 
retirees is therefore vital to understanding whether complex marital histories have a 
relationship to their ability to amass sufficient financial resources for retirement. 
Exploring how inequalities associated with marital status, gender, and family formation 
accumulate over the life course increases our knowledge of the relationship between 
family life and retirement security, and can help to improve our retirement policies and 
mechanisms for saving. 
Study Significance 
The purpose of this research was to explore how marital changes over the life 
course relate to retirement resources (i.e. savings, Social Security, and pensions), and 
whether the relationships differ for men and women. Several studies investigating the 
relationship between marriage pathways and wealth accumulation provided valuable 
information on the connection between marriage and personal finances (Angel et al., 
2007; Ulker, 2009; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zissimopoulos, 2009; Zissimopoulos et al., 
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2008). The relationship between specific marital history factors and retirement resources 
such as Social Security and pensions had yet to receive the same attention. Within-group 
differences among married and unmarried populations were also largely ignored, and 
there was limited literature on the influence of marriage formation and/or dissolution and 
its relationship to retirement finances.    
This study made a significant contribution to the literature in several ways. First, 
this study was one of the few studies to analyze several marital history factors and to 
systematically examine the within-group differences of married and unmarried retirees in 
order to avoid multi-collinearity issues. The life course perspective and cumulative 
advantage/disadvantage theory, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, both strongly suggest 
that married and unmarried people have different life pathways and experience different 
levels of advantage and disadvantage related to their marital decisions. Researchers have 
established that unmarried people are economically disadvantaged relative to married 
people (Lin & Brown, 2012), but the differences between the continuously married and 
the remarried, and the variability in economic vulnerability among unmarried groups is 
less understood. Though being unmarried puts people at an economic disadvantage, some 
scholars argue that this finding is misconstrued and that authors’ interpretations of the 
benefits of marriage often “imply that if divorced people had only remained married they 
would experience economic circumstances similar to married people” (Smock et al., 
1999, p. 809). Work in this area is still needed in order to develop a better understanding 
of the complexity of the family-work-retirement relationship (Smock et al., 1999; 
Szinovacz, 2012). This study conducted all analyses separately by married and unmarried 
  
143 
 
 
 
 
status, and considered within group differences by gender, which was imperative for 
discussing any family-work life relationship.  
Second, the present study was methodologically distinct from much of the 
previous literature on marital history and wealth because it explored the financial 
situation of individuals at retirement, rather than during their working years. This 
approach was important for a number of reasons. First, people often misrepresent the 
amount of benefits they will actually receive in retirement and generally overestimate 
their financial resources (Ekerdt & Hackney, 2002; Gustman & Steinmeier, 2001). They 
are also likely to increase retirement planning and financial contributions the closer they 
get to retirement age (Ekerdt et al., 2000). This suggests that examining the retirement 
income of working individuals, particularly those under age 60, may provide an 
inaccurate measure of retirement resources. The present study analyzed a narrowly 
defined group of retirees within the first years of retirement in order to capture a full 
picture of available resources before a major “spend down.” One of the tangential 
discoveries from doing this research was that many people do not begin collecting their 
Social Security benefits immediately at retirement, though most people still claim 
benefits early at age 62 (Sass, Sun, & Webb, 2007). Many of these individuals are not 
receiving Social Security benefits because they retired before age 62 and are thus unable 
to begin withdrawal (N = 706). This is not uncommon, and previous research on the 
reasons behind delaying Social Security benefits indicates that about 40 percent of 
eligible women postpone receipt (McNamara, O'Grady-LeShane, & Williamson, 2003b) 
and may intentionally delay collecting benefits in order to increase the final benefit 
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amount (Munnell, Sass, Golub-Sass, & Karamcheva, 2009; Social Security 
Administration, 2008). One study found that about 10 percent of men chose to retire early 
but delayed benefits for at least a year after they were eligible (Coile, Diamond, Gruber, 
& Jousten, 2002). The timing of claiming benefits appears to be influenced by education, 
health, and wealth (Benitez-Silva & Heiland, 2008; Coile et al., 2002).   
The final major contribution of this study was the examination of all three sources 
of retirement income by marital history. The results suggested that, in fact, each 
retirement resource had a different relationship to a person’s marital past. Consistent with 
the current literature, more marital disruptions and shorter marriages were associated with 
lower wealth accumulation for both married and unmarried individuals (Holden & Kuo, 
1996; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002). Marital status also mattered; never married men were the 
most disadvantaged group among the unmarried men, while remarried widows were 
better off compared to continuously married women among the married groups. While 
other studies have confirmed the findings that marital status and duration have a 
relationship to wealth accumulation, this study expanded on this information by 
examining Social Security and employer-sponsored pension income as well. There was a 
significant relationship between the marital history of the unmarried groups and Social 
Security income. Never married men and women, and divorced women with multiple 
past marriages had fewer Social Security benefits than widow(er)s. Unmarried 
respondents’ longest marriage also had a positive relationship to Social Security income. 
Furthermore, this was the only model where the timing of marital disruptions appeared to 
matter; unmarried individuals who became widowed earlier in life had less Social 
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Security income than those widowed after age 50 and those divorced in mid-life between 
ages 30 and 49 (73% of these early widow(er)s never remarried).  
Though pension income was the retirement resource with the fewest associations 
to marital history factors, there was still a relationship between marital duration and the 
probability of pension receipt for women. Married women with shorter marriages had 
higher odds of receiving a pension, but unmarried women with shorter marriage had 
lower odds compared to women with longer marriages. There was also a strong 
relationship between marital status and pension receipt; no matter when in life the 
disruption occurred, divorcees had lower odds of receiving a pension compared to 
widow(er)s. This was likely because marital assets were not divided following 
widowhood, like in the case of a divorce. The never marrieds, however, were also at a 
disadvantage and had the lowest odds of receiving pension benefits. Though each of the 
retirement resources had a different relationship to marital history, taken together several 
themes emerged. This study’s research limitations are discussed next, followed by a 
summary of the findings and their relationship to the study hypotheses. A detailed 
discussion of the major themes to emerge from these results is presented in the following 
section.  
Research Limitations 
The work from this analysis will illuminate whether marital events of the past are 
associated with retirement security but, as with any research, the study has some 
limitations. First, this analysis used cross-sectional data which limited the interpretation 
of results. For example, marital status is a temporary state for many individuals, and this 
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study’s division of married and unmarried groups for the analyses may limit 
interpretation of the findings. Alternative approaches to the analyses may enhance the 
work of this dissertation, including longitudinal analysis of martial events and their 
relationship to retirement resources in order to understand the gains and losses associated 
with marital changes over time. Typological analysis may also guide the interpretation of 
this study’s findings through the development of a set of categorizations of marital 
history pathways. Such typologies may help focus the analysis on certain marital groups, 
avoid multicollinearity issues related to different marital history factors, enhance our 
understanding of selection effects, and sort out causal links between marital history and 
retirement resources.  
Second, marital history data were collected using retrospective data collection 
techniques, meaning answers were dependent on a respondent’s memory of past events 
and dates. A survey researcher asked the respondent to recall past events and dates in 
order to build the history. Recall bias is an inherent limitation of using retrospective data. 
Since the HRS only began in 1992, however, there was no other way to determine marital 
history information without a time consuming investigation of all marriage licenses, 
divorce papers, and spousal death records for each respondent. 
Third, this study explored individuals’ retirement income and assets at the start of 
their retirement, which posed several limitations. Respondents who elected not to apply 
for benefits had no income coming from Social Security or pensions, though they may 
possess these income sources in the future. This research treated individuals who delay 
benefits the same as those who will never receive a benefit, which limited the 
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generalizability of the findings. The strict definition of retirement used in this study 
excluded partial-retirees and those individual who simply never self-identify as “retired.” 
This exclusion may have biased the results or underrepresented people who were 
healthier, more educated, and willing and able to work in old age (Giandrea et al., 2007). 
It could have also excluded disabled minorities; since some research indicates Black 
Americans with disabilities do not identify as retirees in later-life (Gibson, 1991). The 
Baby Boomer cohort was also excluded from analysis because of their age. Further study 
will be needed to determine if conclusions drawn from this work can translate to this 
cohort.  
Finally, some researchers hypothesized that the personal characteristics that predict 
marital disruptions or remaining never married were the same factors that predict low 
earning potential (Booth & Edwards, 1992). This important concept should be addressed 
in future research but requires longitudinal analysis of employment and assets, and was 
beyond the scope of this research. Given these limitations, this research made a 
significant contribution to the literature and broadened our knowledge on marital history 
and retirement resources in several major areas. 
Summary of the Research Hypotheses  
 I explored whether certain marital history factors had any relationship to Social 
Security, employer-sponsored pensions, and non-housing wealth. Married and unmarried 
respondents were separated in the analyses, which allowed the complexities of marital 
history to manifest in the results. The first study objective was to examine the 
relationship between retirement security and marital statuses and transitions. Three 
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hypotheses were derived from this research objective. Hypothesis 1 (H1) stated that 
among the married sample, those who experienced a prior marital disruption would have 
less retirement income and assets than those who have been continuously married. H1 
was not supported by the results and, for Social Security income, the results were in the 
opposite direction than expected. The relationship observed between marital status and 
Social Security income suggested that remarried widow(er)s had more Social Security 
benefits than the continuously married.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2) stated that individuals with more marital disruptions would 
have less retirement income and assets than those who had experienced one disruption. 
The results provided support for H2, specifically in relation to non-housing wealth.  
Among the unmarried groups, widowers with multiple previous marriages had less non-
housing wealth than widowers who were married once. With regard to Social Security, 
the results were more complex; currently divorced women with multiple marital 
disruptions had less Social Security income compared to women widowed once. People 
currently widowed after multiple marital disruptions, in contrast, had more Social 
Security income than people widowed once.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3) stated that the reduction in retirement income and assets 
associated with marital disruptions would be greater for those who experienced divorce 
than all other marital statuses. The results generally supported H3 however, a gender 
relationship was observed. Divorced women with multiple past disruptions received less 
Social Security income than women widowed from their first marriage. For men, 
divorced men had slightly lower odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension 
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compared to widowed men. The disruption timing models further supported these results 
by indicating that respondents who were divorced in mid-life (age 30-49) or later-life 
(age 50 or older) had lower odds of receiving a pension compared to people widowed at 
age 50 or older.    
The second study objective was to examine whether marital duration had a 
relationship to retirement resources. Specifically, Hypothesis 4 (H4) stated that 
individuals who spent a greater proportion of their lives married would have more 
retirement income and assets. Hypothesis 5 (H5) stated that marriage stability would be 
positively related to retirement security, so those with longer marriages would have more 
income and assets than those in shorter marriages. Based on the findings, marital duration 
was the marital history factor with the most associations with retirement resources. Three 
variables represented marriage duration: the proportion of a respondent’s lifetime spent 
married, the length of a respondent’s first marriage, and the length of a respondent’s 
longest marriage. Each of these variables had a significant relationship to at least one 
retirement resource (i.e., Social Security, employer-sponsored pensions, and non-housing 
wealth). For the unmarried population, all three resources were related to the marital 
duration variables. For unmarried respondents, length of longest marriage was negatively 
related to the odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension. Social Security income 
and non-housing wealth, in contrast, were positively related to unmarried individuals’ 
length of longest marriage. With regard to married respondents, there was a positive 
relationship between marriage duration and non-housing wealth. The relationship, 
however, was in the opposite direction than expected for currently married women with 
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regard to their Social Security income and employer-sponsored pension income. This 
unexpected finding is further explored in the “Major Findings” section below. 
Examining a relationship between the timing of marital transitions and retirement 
income sources was the third study objective. There was no support for Hypothesis 6, 
which suggested that people who got married earlier in life would have more retirement 
income than people who got married at later ages. Hypothesis 7 (H7) stated that people 
who experienced their first marital disruption later in life would have less retirement 
income and assets than those who became unmarried earlier in life. The results provided 
support for H7 with regard to pension receipt. As mentioned above on H3 related to 
divorce, people who were divorced in mid-life (age 30-49) or later-life (age 50 or older) 
had lower odds of receiving a pension compared to those widowed at age 50 or older. 
These results could have more to do with divorce itself than with the timing of the 
disruption. The results suggested the opposite relationship than what was proposed in H7, 
however, with regard to the Social Security income of unmarried respondents. Unmarried 
people who experienced widowhood before age 50 had less Social Security income than 
people who were widowed after age 50 and people who were divorced in mid-life (age 
30-49). Early divorcees (i.e., divorced before age 30) also had less Social Security 
income than people who were divorced between ages 30 and 49. For the married sample, 
the results were also unexpected. People widowed before age 50 had more Social 
Security income and non-housing wealth compared to the continuously married.  
Finally, the fourth study objective was to examine whether the relationships 
between retirement resources and marital history differed by gender. Hypothesis 8 (H8) 
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stated that the loss in retirement income associated with marital disruptions would be 
greater for women than men. Hypothesis 9 (H9) stated that never married men would 
have less retirement income and never married women would have more relative to other 
unmarried men and women. The majority of the results supported H8, that women’s 
marital histories would have more associations with their retirement resources than 
men’s. For married men, for example, there was almost no relationship between the 
marital history factors studied and Social Security, employer-sponsored pensions, and 
non-housing wealth. For married women, the results suggested their marital histories 
played a role in the accumulation of retirement resources, but the association was not in 
the direction predicted (see Major Findings). For unmarried men and women, marital 
histories had a relationship to retirement resources but in different ways. Unmarried 
women who were divorced after multiple past marriages had less Social Security income 
compared to women who were widowed from their first marriage. Never married men 
were worse off than other unmarried men on Social Security income, pension benefits, 
and non-housing wealth, which provided support for H9. Taken together several themes 
emerged from these study results. A detailed discussion of these major themes is 
presented next. 
Major Findings 
Though there were a number of significant findings in this study, the four most 
important themes will be described in the context of existing literature below. The first 
major finding suggested that marital duration was the marital history factor with the most 
associations with retirement resources; however, the relationship was complex. Second, 
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contrary to the hypotheses that stated a complex marital history would disadvantage 
retirees, this research indicated currently married women benefit from having shorter 
marriages. Third, this work improved our understanding of the retirement security of 
never married people and the results suggested that never married men were a 
particularly disadvantaged population. In fact, never married men were statistically worse 
off than other unmarried men on all three retirement resources tested. Finally, this study 
highlighted the negative consequences of divorce on retirement security and found that 
divorcees had less retirement resources than widow(er)s. If divorced individuals are 
inherently disadvantaged, regardless of when in the life course the marital disruption 
occurs, this may have important practical and policy implications. Each of these major 
findings will be discussed in detail below. 
Getting and Staying Married: Marriage Duration Plays the Largest Role 
Based on previous literature examining marital history and wealth, I hypothesized 
that marriage duration would be positively related to Social Security, employer-
sponsored pensions, and non-housing wealth. The results confirmed that the longer 
individuals were married the more financial resources they had, with the exception of 
currently married women. Married men benefitted from having a longer marriage or 
spending a greater proportion of their lifetime married. For unmarried individuals, men 
and women who had longer marriages prior to becoming unmarried had more in Social 
Security income and non-housing wealth, and higher odds of receiving a pension 
compared to unmarried men and women with shorter marriages. For currently married 
women, however, the relationship between marriage duration and retirement resources 
  
153 
 
 
 
 
was negative for Social Security and pension income; therefore, the special case of 
married and remarried women will be discussed in the next section.  
Wealth accumulation is typically a lifelong process and, therefore, it may not be 
surprising that research overwhelmingly indicates stable marriages produce more wealth 
(Dechter, 1992; Guner & Knowles, 2003; Loughran & Zissimopoulos, 2008; Ulker, 
2009; van Eeden-Moorefield, Pasley, Dolan, & Engel, 2007; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; 
Zissimopoulos et al., 2008). The present study’s examination of non-housing wealth 
provided additional support and showed a strong positive relationship between the 
proportion of lifetime spent married and non-housing wealth. Building upon this 
literature, this study also found that people with longer marriages had more Social 
Security income and higher odds of receiving employer-sponsored pensions. 
For Social Security benefits, the proportion of lifetime spent married was 
positively associated with Social Security income for both married men and for 
unmarried men and women. In other words, individuals who lived in a state of marriage 
for longer have more Social Security income. Remember that the sample for the Social 
Security income models only included individuals receiving a benefit. Marital duration 
should be related to Social Security benefits, since marriage length would increase the 
worker’s benefits if her own work history produced a benefit that was less than 50 
percent of her spouse’s. The findings from this study confirmed this assumption; 
marriage duration had a positive association with Social Security income. For both 
married and unmarried men, this may have had more to do with the relationship between 
family life and work history than marriage length per se. Studies have observed a positive 
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relationship between men’s marriage stability and their income and career 
attainment(Burstein, 2007). Thus, even those currently unmarried may have benefitted 
from their previous years spent married. Men who were married for longer had more time 
to accumulate advantages associated with marriage.  
For both married and unmarried women, those who were married longer before 
retirement age may have received more in benefits from their spouses’ or previous 
spouses’ retirement resources than their own. Spouse and widow benefits remain a major 
source of income for older women (Favreault & Steuerle, 2007; Harrington Meyer et al., 
2006; Tamborini & Whitman, 2007). This study found, however, that this was only true 
for the unmarried women; unmarried women whose first marriage lasted less than 15 
years had lower odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension compared to women 
whose first marriage was 30 years or longer. The combination of findings on unmarried 
women’s Social Security and pension benefits suggested that the time they spent married 
prior to becoming single had a major relationship to their retirement security.  
A significant statistical issue surrounding marriage duration, however, relates to 
selectivity; wealthier people are more likely to get and stay married. Marriage stability is 
related to higher earnings (Bergstrom & Schoeni, 1996; Guner & Knowles, 2003) and 
higher education (Isen & Stevenson, 2010). Wealthier individuals are also more likely to 
remarry, and they remarry sooner following a marital disruption (Vespa, 2012). While 
older research suggests that financially independent women are more likely to divorce 
and less likely to remarry than women who are financially dependent on their husbands 
(Dechter, 1992; Ono & Stafford, 2001), more recent literature actually indicates the 
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opposite relationship (Isen & Stevenson, 2010; Ozcan & Breen, 2012). An important 
exception to this discussion was the finding that there was a negative relationship 
between marriage length and married women’s retirement resources. The selection effect 
issue and the finding that continuously married women were actually disadvantaged with 
regard to their individual retirement resources will be addressed next. 
Less Retirement Resources for Continuously Married Women 
For married women, marital history’s relationship to wealth was in the direction 
expected and supported existing literature. Marital disruptions damage the wealth and 
asset accumulation of individuals so that people who were married for a shorter amount 
of time, as discussed above, have less wealth and the benefits gained by remarriage are 
arguably minimal (Western, Bloome, Sosnaud, & Tach, 2012; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; 
Zissimopoulos et al., 2008). A less studied area of retirement security, however, is the 
Social Security and employer-sponsored pension income of remarried persons. The 
present study focused on these resources, and a detailed marital history analysis revealed 
unanticipated findings with regard to currently married women.   
Compared to their continuously married counterparts, remarried women were 
taking home more Social Security and employer-sponsored pension income. First, 
married women whose longest marriage lasted between 10 to 29 years were receiving 
more in Social Security benefits than women with a longest marriage lasting over 40 
years. This result was supported by the negative relationship between the proportion of a 
married woman’s lifetime spent married and her Social Security income. Gender-specific 
analyses provided further support and showed that women with late-life disruptions who 
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remarried before retirement received more Social Security income than continuously 
married women. With regard to employer-sponsored pension income, women with a first 
marriage length of 15 to 29 years had more pension income than those women whose 
first marriage was 30 years or more. There is limited literature to directly support or 
refute these Social Security and pension findings, as the focus has been primarily on 
understanding remarriage’s relationship to wealth; however, decades of research on 
marriage and retirement help to illuminate these findings.   
Despite the increase in women’s labor force participation, women continue to 
have lower earnings and are more likely to be working part-time or to take time away 
from their career to care for family members than men (Bovbjerg, 2012; Budig & 
England, 2001; GAO, 2012; Szinovacz et al., 2001). Research also suggests women 
contribute to pension plans at lower rates than men (GAO, 2012) or are less likely to 
participate, though this may be changing for younger generations (Hardy & Shuey, 2000; 
Shuey & O'Rand, 2006). Yet a growing body of work has begun to differentiate between 
married and remarried women, and is finding that there are benefits to remarriage, and 
that these benefits may be substantial even above and beyond remaining continuously 
married. 
There are economic benefits attained from remarriage, and these benefits are 
stronger for women than men (Ozawa & Yoon, 2002; van Eeden-Moorefield et al., 
2007). One study found that the financial benefits of remarriage outweigh the benefits 
associated with returning to the labor force for unmarried women (Jansen, Mortelmans, & 
Snoeckx, 2009). Similar to the present study, some scholars have found that remarried 
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women have more wealth than the continuously married (Zissimopoulos, 2009) or that 
the wealth difference is small enough to suggest remarriage mitigates the financial loss 
associated with a marital disruption (Ulker, 2009). There is, however, a relationship 
between wealth and marital status, and remarried women may in fact have more 
retirement income and assets because they are marrying men who are wealthier and/or 
have more retirement benefits than their previous husbands (Vespa, 2012). This study 
provided additional evidence that remarried women have more retirement resources, but 
this was only true for remarried widows. Since widows often have pension income and 
other marital assets from their previous marriage that they can contribute to the new 
marriage, it is reasonable that widows who remarried before retirement age would have 
more retirement resources than their continuously married counterparts.  
This relationship between marital status and wealth indicates a possible selection 
effect related to who remarries after marriage dissolution. Women are less likely than 
men to remarry after becoming divorced or widowed, and in general they prefer to stay 
single (Stevens, 2002; Talbot, 1998; Karlsson & Borell, 2005). As previously discussed, 
wealthier people are more likely to remarry and take less time to do so. In fact, one study 
suggests a relationship between a woman’s age at disruption and her remarriage timing 
that is moderated by her socioeconomic status; women who are wealthier and more 
educated appear to delay remarriage if they are younger, but accelerate remarriage if they 
are older (Sweeney, 1997). In other words, for women separating at younger ages, having 
a higher occupational status or education level means they are more likely to wait to 
remarry and may broaden their search for a partner. Older women with higher 
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socioeconomic status are more likely to remarry quickly than women in low 
socioeconomic standing, and this may be related to their ability to attract a mate 
(Oppenheimer & Lew, 1995).  
Marriage markets appear to play a role in marital choices and, sequentially, 
remarriage rates. Favorable marriage markets, typically measured by the ratio of men to 
women, increase the likelihood that a woman will marry a man with more education and 
a higher occupational status. In fact, women in unfavorable marriage markets are more 
likely to forgo marriage entirely than to marry a man with low socioeconomic status 
(Harknett, 2008; Lichter, Anderson, & Hayward, 1995). Researchers suggest that this has 
something to do with people’s disinclination to marry heterogamously (i.e., marry 
someone with sociocultural traits different from their own). There is unwillingness, 
among women but not men, to lower their standards and consider a wider range of 
marital prospects when the pool is limited (Lichter et al., 1995; Stone, Shackelford, & 
Buss, 2007). It is important to note, especially when considering the application of these 
findings to remarriage, that the study samples yielding these findings are typically based 
on individuals between the ages of 18 and 30 years.  
A descriptive analysis of currently married women’s detailed marital status by 
select characteristics (Table 25) shows that remarried women who had multiple past 
marriages tend to be White (91.5%) and have longer work histories than other married 
women (36.3 total years of employment compared to 30.0 years for continuously married 
women). Though these characteristics were controlled in the analyses, other 
socioeconomic factors associated with race and work history, such as earnings, were not 
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controlled. It is possible that privileged, higher paid women self-selected into the 
remarried category or that they have more favorable marriage markets. For example, 
compared to their White counterparts, research suggests that single Black women have a 
shorter supply of “marriageable” Black partners (Hamilton, Goldsmith, & Darity, 2009) 
and are less likely to marry and stay married (Sweeney & Phillips, 2004). Additional 
research on the relationship between wealth, race, and marriage patterns confirms that 
there are major disparities in marital history among Black and White women, but that the 
differences in marital history cannot solely explain differences in wealth holdings in later 
life (Addo & Lichter, 2013). This may be because, though there are racial disparities in 
accumulated wealth, elderly Black women are less economically dependent on their 
deceased husband’s pension or wealth than White women (Tamborini et al., 2009). 
Though women are less likely to remarry than men, if they remarry, women tend 
to partner with men who are older and wealthier than their first spouses (Shafer & James, 
2103; Vespa, 2012). This suggests a potential increase to their financial resources that 
would not be possible if they remained in their previous marriage. Women who 
experienced divorce financially benefit from remarriage and, in particular, those women 
who had low incomes in their first marriages may gain the most from remarrying 
(Dewilde & Uunk, 2008; Holden & Smock, 1991). Thus, when comparing continuously 
married and remarried low-income women, if women do generally “marry up” in their 
second marriage with greater frequency than in first marriages, the gains from remarriage 
may be even greater for these low-income women. In other words, the saying, “the first 
time you marry for love, the second for money,” may be a concept that partially explains 
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why remarried women have more retirement resources than their continuously married 
counterparts.  
Compounded with the finding that women marry wealthier men the second time 
around, remarried women, particularly widows, have the benefit of adding any wealth 
and assets obtained from their previous marriage to the financial resources of the new 
marriage. This study found that remarried widows had more Social Security income than 
continuously married women, which may be related to a higher benefit amount from their 
current spouse as well as the possibility of receiving benefits from both their previous and 
current marriage. Certain groups of older women may also be more knowledgeable about 
remarriage penalties and plan for remarriage accordingly. For example, one study found 
an uptick in remarriage after age 60 so that widows could receive Social Security benefits 
based on their previous spouse’s work history (Brien, Dickert-Conlin, & Weaver, 2004). 
Though this research cannot determine whether remarriage occurred after age 60, 
frequencies do show that 26 percent of remarried widows became widowed after age 50. 
This suggests it is possible that several are receiving benefits from both their deceased 
spouse and their current spouse. 
Remarried women may also develop a stronger attachment to the labor force, and 
therefore have higher income and wealth than continuously married women. Though 
divorced women have less worth (Mammen, 2008), a number of studies find women who 
experienced divorce have more years of employment (Lillard & Waite, 2000) and higher 
earnings than other married and unmarried women (Tamborini, Iams, & Reznik, 2012) . 
A descriptive analysis of currently married women’s marital status by work history 
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characteristics (Table 25) shows that, for this sample, continuously married women have 
the fewest total years of employment, while remarried women with multiple past 
marriages have, on average, the most years of employment. Recent studies indicate 
marital disruptions have less of an economic impact than they used to (McKeever & 
Wolfinger, 2001) and one study actually suggests previous findings on the disastrous 
economic consequences of divorce were highly inflated (Peterson, 1996). Researchers 
have also found that continuously married dual-earners are increasingly ineligible for 
Social Security spousal benefits because their own earnings are too high (Butrica & 
Smith, 2012a; Harrington Meyer et al., 2006; Iams & Tamborini, 2012). Thus, part of the 
reason remarried women have more retirement resources may be related to their work 
history and potentially greater attachment to the labor force. 
The retirement literature on currently divorced and widowed women finds 
important financial disadvantages relative to married women, yet the distinction between 
being continuously married or remarried must be further explored in future research. 
Remarriage is not a universal phenomenon, and it is distinctly different than a first 
marriage because it occurs later in the life course and people bring with them the unique 
experience of a failed first marriage (Sweeney, 1997). The present study suggests that 
women with longer marriages may have less of a work history and less retirement 
resources than women with shorter marriages. For the unmarried women, the results may 
indicate that remarriage is the best way to alleviate the economic consequences 
associated with marital disruptions. 
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Financial Shortcomings for the Never Married  
This study illuminated the retirement security of an understudied population, the 
never married, in comparison to other unmarried groups. Similar to other research, the 
descriptive analysis showed that being never married in retirement was an uncommon 
marital pathway, and its occurrence was more common among men than women (Kreider 
& Ellis, 2011). Based on the relatively limited literature on never married people’s 
retirement security, I hypothesized that never married people would have significantly 
less retirement resources than other unmarried groups, but that the relationship would 
vary by gender. Specifically, unmarried men were expected to have less retirement 
income and women to have more relative to other unmarried men and women. The 
results supported the hypothesis for never married men but there was less support for the 
hypothesis for never married women.  
Compared to other unmarried groups, the never married had the lowest predicted 
probability of receiving both Social Security benefits and an employer-sponsored 
pension. Though there was no difference in the actual dollar amounts for those who did 
take home these benefits, the results indicated that never married people were less likely 
to have a benefit in the first place. Literature on this subject is limited but generally 
suggests that the never marrieds are economically vulnerable in old age, particularly 
never married men (Tamborini, 2007; Zissimopoulos et al., 2008); however, some studies 
indicate this may be due to a selection effect. Characteristics related to the likelihood of a 
person getting married include higher education, earnings, and wealth suggesting never 
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married individuals may be disproportionately in a low socioeconomic status (White & 
Rogers, 2000).  
With regard to Social Security receipt, the nature of the entitlement program is 
one based on both work history and marital history. Yet regardless of their marital status, 
employees all pay 6.2% of their wages into the system. Given that Social Security 
provides not only a worker’s benefit but a spousal benefit when the employee becomes 
either disabled, retired, or deceased there is an obvious benefit for individuals who are or 
were married (for at least 10 years for divorcees). These auxiliary benefits have 
represented an important source of financial security for older divorced and widowed 
people. This research suggested that never married people were the least likely to receive 
a benefit, and therefore the population should receive greater attention in the Social 
Security literature. 
For pension receipt, more and more companies are shifting to defined contribution 
plans, but the majority of retirees in this sample is from a generation that primarily 
receives defined benefit pensions. Defined benefit pensions generally pay the employee a 
benefit, and then provide a benefit to his or her spouse after the retiree is deceased 
(Larson & Larson, 2008). Access to a spousal pension means the person was married, 
which is obviously not the case for never married individuals. Consequently, currently 
widowed and divorced individuals are expected to be more likely to possess a defined 
benefit pension than their never married counterparts. Previous literature anticipated the 
likelihood of lower rates of pension receipt for never married retirees (Tamborini, 2007) 
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but the present study was one of the few to support this prediction and showed a 
statistically significant relationship. 
In addition to the lower probability of receiving Social Security benefits and an 
employer-sponsored pension, this research found that never married people also 
possessed less non-housing wealth compared to all other unmarried groups. Again, 
research on this subject is limited and the findings are mixed. While several scholars also 
find that the never married have less wealth, savings, or net worth than other unmarried 
people (Lee & Rowley, 2009), some studies suggest never married people are financially 
better off than the divorced (Choi, 1996). This difference in findings may have something 
to do with the generation studied, and the growing number of people who are choosing 
never to marry. These younger never married individuals are found to have a higher level 
of education and socioeconomic status compared to other unmarried groups (Kreider & 
Ellis, 2011; Lin & Brown, 2012). Never married Baby Boomers, for example, had the 
highest levels of education compared to other unmarried Boomers (Lin & Brown, 2012).  
The differences between never married men and never married women compared 
to other unmarried groups may partially explain the conflicting findings from previous 
research. This study found, as others have, that there were different economic outcomes 
related to being a never married man versus a never married woman. Never married men 
had less Social Security income and non-housing wealth than other unmarried men. They 
also had the lowest odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension, and this was 
supported by other research (Tamborini, 2007; Yabiku, 2000). Table 26 presents a 
descriptive analysis of unmarried respondents’ detailed marital status by gender and 
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selected characteristics, and reveals that never married men have the shortest average 
work history than all other unmarried men. They are also retiring at earlier ages, on 
average, and this may partially explain why they are financially disadvantaged in 
retirement compared to other unmarried men.  
Tamborini (2007) conducted a focused analysis of the retirement resources of 
never married seniors and the results from his work closely match the present study’s 
findings. His study found that only 25% of never married men were taking home a work 
pension, the lowest proportion receiving a pension among unmarried men. He also found 
that never married men had the lowest median Social Security benefit of all unmarried 
men. Yabiku’s research (2000) further supported the finding that never married men had 
lower odds of receiving an employer-sponsored pension but he compared this population 
to continuously married men. As these authors stress in their papers, research on the 
economics of being unmarried has focused primarily on women, and specifically on 
women who experienced divorce or widowhood. The importance of their work and the 
present study’s results suggest that never married men are a similarly disadvantaged 
group and need to be a major focus for future research.  
The only significant finding for never married women suggested that they have 
less non-housing wealth compared to other unmarried respondents with a marriage that 
lasted 40 years or more, which contradicted the hypothesis and previous research. The 
result may be due to the generation studied. Recent research on the Baby Boomer cohort 
suggested that never married women were doing better financially than other unmarried 
women (Tamborini, 2007; Zissimopoulos et al., 2008), yet the present study excluded this 
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cohort in the analysis. Taken together, the results of this study and previous research 
suggests more attention must be paid to whether there is a growing inequality between 
never marrieds and other unmarried groups. Specifically, there needs to be a better 
understanding of the increasing variability within the never married population.  
Divorce, Gender, and Retirement Savings: A Complex Relationship  
This study’s findings on the retirement security of individuals who experienced 
divorce was generally consistent with previous research. Whether or not they experienced 
a divorce appeared to have a weak relationship to remarried people’s retirement 
resources. This result provided support for studies that suggested remarriage can be 
financially beneficial (Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zissimopoulos, 2009). This study also 
found, similar to existing literature that unmarried people who experienced divorce had 
less retirement income from both Social Security and pension benefits than widowed 
respondents.  
The Social Security benefit structure is tied to work history, marital history, and 
age which means there is the potential for the accumulation of disadvantages over the life 
course (O'Rand, 2003; Szinovacz et al., 2012). Research continues to provide evidence 
that family-related events such as raising children, caring for aging relatives, or retiring 
early are all work interruptions that disproportionately affect women (Budig & England, 
2001; Holden & Smock, 1991; Szinovacz et al., 2001) and that women’s increasing labor 
force participation rates do not offset the financial consequences of these interruptions 
(Holden & Fontes, 2009). The majority of articles show divorced women have lower 
wealth and financial assets (Holden & Smock, 1991; Smock, 1993), and are less prepared 
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for retirement than widows (Lee & Rowley, 2009). The present study suggested this is 
true, however, only older divorced women with multiple previous marriages had less 
Social Security income than widows. 
As the rates of women with multiple marriages and fewer than 10 years married 
increases, some scholars are predicting higher rates of women ineligible for benefits 
related to their marital history (Butrica & Iams, 1999; Harrington Meyer et al., 2006). An 
increase in longevity may also mean future generations of divorced women may be worse 
off because of Social Security’s benefit structure; a divorced widow will receive 100 
percent of benefits if the former spouse is deceased, instead of 50 percent in cases where 
the former spouse is alive (Vetrano, 2010). These trends predict a rise in poverty among 
older divorced women, yet recent studies indicate the negative effects of divorce on 
financial resources may be changing for younger generations who experience less 
economic costs associated with marital dissolution than previous generations (Butrica & 
Smith, 2012c; Lin & Brown, 2012; McKeever & Wolfinger, 2001). As rates of 
widowhood before retirement or in early retirement continue to decline and divorce 
remains a common status in retirement, more attention must be paid to studying older 
divorcees in future research. 
In term of employer-sponsored pensions, when in life the divorce happened did 
not make much difference; divorced individuals had lower odds of receiving a pension 
compared to older widow(er)s. Pension entitlements for divorcees are more complicated 
than Social Security entitlements and retirement assets, such as 401(k) plans, earned 
during a marriage tend to be considered marital property. These assets are subject to 
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being split between the employee and his/her former spouse. The combination of 
different types of pension plans, complicated work histories, and detailed pension laws 
mean mistakes can be made when lawyers are distributing marital assets (Rattiner, 2011). 
The splitting of pension assets and the complexity surrounding asset distribution during a 
divorce may be part of the reasoning behind such a strong relationship between divorce 
and pension receipt. The present study found that divorced men had lower odds of 
receiving a pension compared to widowed men, but for unmarried women there was no 
relationship. Yabiku (2000) also found a lower probability of pension benefits for 
divorced men but this was compared to their continuously married counterparts. Pension 
receipt, however, may have something to do with the age at retirement, since a 
descriptive analysis suggests widowed men and women in the sample are older than 
divorced men and women (Table 26). These older retirees may be more likely to begin 
collecting their pension benefits the year they retire than the younger groups. 
This study found that there was no difference between the non-housing wealth of 
individuals who experienced divorce and other marital groups. Though inconsistent with 
much of the previous literature, this study’s methodological design, with married and 
unmarried respondents analyzed separately, helped to minimize the influence of the 
advantages of marriage on the results. Married people who experienced a divorce and 
then remarried were no different than the continuously married with respect to wealth. 
Remarried people with multiple previous marriages, however, did possess less non-
housing wealth than the continuously married as well as those who remarried after one 
divorce. This supports previous work that suggests it may not be the divorce per se, but 
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the experience of multiple marriages that hurts wealth for currently married individuals 
(Ulker, 2009; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002). People are less likely to divorce from their first 
marriage than their second, third, and so on, but most researchers disregard the 
occurrence of previous marriage events in their analyses. Thus, more research needs to be 
conducted to understand the effects of divorce and the influence of a combination of 
marital events on retirement resources. 
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Policy Implications 
Changes in work-life, such as the rise in dual career couples, and changes in 
family-life, such as the increasing rate of divorce, influence the way people save for their 
retirement. The cohorts studied in this research are among the first to retire after these 
demographic shifts took place. Taken together, the results suggest that our understanding 
of retirement security may be limited if literature continues to view retirement from a 
solely economic perspective and fails to incorporate life factors such as family patterns 
and marital history (Szinovacz, 2012; Szinovacz et al., 2012). Indeed, models of 
retirement security often acknowledge sociodemographic influences but do not address 
large within group variations that may exist in certain populations. If our retirement 
policies and saving mechanisms inherently result in accumulated disadvantages for 
certain populations, then reevaluation is needed. Policy makers, researchers, and financial 
advisers must consider both previous and existing life circumstances when dealing with 
people’s retirement.  
A number of policies favor marriage, and this study found that people with longer 
marriage lengths had more retirement resources. Several factors have influenced the 
increasing divorce rate, including the change in our divorce laws. These laws originally 
favored staying married but were altered to make it easier for individuals to leave a 
marital relationship. These policies have updated with the changing times, yet our Social 
Security benefit system has not; it is still largely based on lifelong marriages being the 
norm. As a number of scholars have proposed, our system needs to be modernized so that 
the policies mirror the current experiences of many Americans. For example, reform 
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proposals that eliminate the spouse and survivor benefit often suggest replacing it with an 
“earnings sharing” benefit. With an “earnings sharing” strategy, spouses receive credit 
for one-half of the joint earnings accumulated during their years married. This approach 
is argued to be more appropriate for today’s workers since it is neutral to the differences 
between one-earner and two-earner couples (Favreault & Steuerle, 2007; Ferber, 
Simpson, & Rouillon, 2006), though it is controversial and criticized for being too costly 
and likely difficult to implement. 
With regard to divorce, this study found that individuals who experienced 
divorced had less retirement income and lower odds of benefit receipts compared to their 
widowed counterparts in the unmarried models. Pension benefits are marital property, but 
divorce is a complicated issue and can be laced with emotional and stubborn decision-
making. Divorce clearly has a negative effect on assets as it forces the division and often 
sale of property, and the separation of one household into two. Furthermore, although a 
pension is considered part of the marital property, this does not mean an ex-spouse will 
receive half of the retirement benefits, and she may not inherit the rest upon the worker’s 
death. It may help if individuals were aware of the entitlements and the implications of 
financial decisions made at the time of their divorce. Policies can also influence the 
division of resources during divorce, including pensions, and the complexity of current 
laws could be reduced to provide clarity and simplification (Haider, Jacknowitz, & 
Schoeni, 2003). This research found that divorced individuals had lower odds of 
receiving an employer-sponsored pension compared to widowed individuals. A widow, 
by default, receives all the household income and assets upon the death of her spouse 
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unless some are intentionally willed to another person; a divorcee will only receive a 
portion of the household finances, therefore, the difference in retirement resources among 
divorced and widowed women makes sense. Divorce settlements involve negotiations, 
and some women may prefer to forgo part or all of their spouses’ pension benefits in 
order to receive other assets, such as full ownership of the house.  
Social Security provides distinct benefits to divorcees whose marriage lasted 10 
years or more. The amount of benefits received is determined by factors including the 
length of marriage, the ex-spouse’s earnings history, and whether he is still alive (Haider 
et al., 2003). In fact, research suggests divorcees who qualify for Social Security benefits 
based on their ex-spouse’s work history are not all the same. Those whose ex-spouse died 
are receiving more generous benefits than those with a living ex-spouse (Butrica & 
Smith, 2012c). Increasingly, research is suggesting too much focus has been placed on 
older widows who are actually doing much better in retirement than divorced women. 
Some scholars are calling for more research on divorce’s influence on Social Security 
benefits because initial research suggests these benefits are related to divorce timing and 
remarriage (Vetrano, 2010). At the very least, the findings from this study indicate that 
current marital trends must be considered and addressed in any new Social Security 
policy proposals. This study found that women divorced after multiple previous 
marriages had less Social Security benefits than women widowed from their first 
marriage. Given the age of these women, it is likely most of the divorcees’ ex-husbands 
are still alive and that they are therefore receiving fewer benefits than widowed women 
by default through the Social Security pension system.  
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Though the divorced are doing relatively poorly, it appears never married 
individuals are the unmarried group who are the most disadvantaged in retirement. 
Though potential endogeneity and selection effects must be considered (i.e., that being 
never married is correlated to other model variables and therefore produces biased 
results), the results still indicate a better understanding of the never married population is 
needed. Much of our existing research on retirement planning, our retirement saving 
mechanisms, and our financial advice may be inappropriate for this population because 
they often focus on married couples. Never married seniors have historically been a very 
small group so it makes sense they received little attention, but this is changing rapidly as 
the Baby Boomers approach later life. Now is the time to understand how never married 
men and women build their retirement security, and whether our systems may be 
inadvertently disadvantaging them in retirement. Social Security policies favor those who 
are currently or previously married, and the current discourse around policy changes 
entirely excludes never married people. Policies around employer-sponsored pension 
benefits are more complex, yet never marrieds are again largely absent from the 
discussion. It is vital that the financial outcomes of being never married are considered if 
we plan to modify our social programs and retirement schemes in the near future.  
Emerging research suggests that the never married population may be 
exceptionally heterogeneous; on the one hand there is a highly educated, healthy, and 
well-off group while on the other we see an impoverished, uneducated population often 
made up mostly of minorities (Tamborini, 2007). Brief subgroup analysis conducted on 
the never married sample used in this study (see Table 27) identified a diverse 
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population. Compared to the entire unmarried sample, never married people who never 
graduated high school or have only their high school diploma are more likely to be 
minorities in poor health with less in non-housing wealth. In contrast, never married 
individuals with at least some college are more likely to be White, healthier, and 
wealthier on average than the total unmarried sample. Though factors such as education 
and health were controlled in the analyses, it is possible that socioeconomic 
characteristics may be driving the association between marital history and retirement 
security for the never married population. Indeed, the information in Table 27 and other 
research studies suggest that the never married group is the most racially and ethnically 
diverse of the unmarried groups (Lin & Brown, 2012). More research is needed in this 
area to further understand heterogeneity among the never married population and its 
implications for retirement security. 
Existing literature and this research also find a very clear gender difference 
among never married men and women that needs to be further studied. This study 
suggests that unmarried women are hurt most by divorce while being never married is the 
most vulnerable status for unmarried men. This study (see Table 27) and recent research 
have found that, while never married men are disadvantaged in retirement, there are 
really two very different groups among never married men. These two groups have 
drastically different socioeconomic characteristics and therefore, averages may be 
masking this distinction. Though never marrieds are disproportionally men, those women 
who choose to remain never married are also a very heterogeneous group.  Their 
heterogeneity, however, is clearly related to age; elderly never married women (75 and 
  
177 
 
 
 
 
older) are more likely to live in poverty than divorcees and widows (Tamborini, 2007) 
but younger never married women are more likely to have higher earnings and education 
(Lin & Brown, 2012). If this change among never married women continues, then the 
differences between being a never married man and a never married women may be 
increasing among younger generations. An example of a policy change that supports 
these lower-income Social Security recipients includes raising the minimum Social 
Security benefit amount. Yet, before making any major changes, the reasons behind 
remaining never married need to be better understood since marriage was not an option 
for gay, lesbian, and bisexual couples until very recently. Now that these couples can 
legally marry and receive spousal retirement benefits, further research is needed to 
determine whether the individuals who are choosing to remain never married are different 
than the never married population examined in this research and other studies (Larson & 
Larson, 2008).  
Though this study did not examine specific policies related to marital history and 
retirement security, it does suggest that certain groups with disrupted marital pasts will 
enter retirement with fewer resources. It is recommended that future research examines 
how our current policies support certain marital groups, and why these policies are 
favoring one group over another. Policies that encourage individuals and couples to plan 
for their retirement should also be studied, so that an understanding of how governments 
and the private sector can facilitate retirement planning and saving can be developed. 
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Table 27. Descriptive summary comparing the total unmarried sample to the never 
married subpopulation by education (% unless otherwise noted). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total Unmarried 
Sample 
 
 
(N = 1,165) 
Never marrieds 
with a high 
school diploma 
or less education 
(N = 83) 
Never marrieds 
with some college 
or a college degree 
 
(N = 84) 
White 66.3  47.0  75.0  
Black 25.5  43.4  19.0  
Hispanic 6.9  9.6  1.2  
Age (mean) (SD) 63.1 (4.3) 62.8 (4.6) 61.5 (3.9) 
Female 70.5  66.3  57.1  
Education (mean) (SD) 12.6 (2.9) n/a  n/a  
Homeownership 69.7  60.2  70.2  
Respondent's health excellent 10.4  10.8  7.2  
Respondent's health very good 26.7  13.3  39.8  
Respondent's health good 31.2  34.9  30.1  
Respondent's health fair/poor 31.8  41.0  22.9  
Presence of ADLs 15.3  14.4  9.5  
Presence of IADLs 11.2  10.8  4.9  
Longest job tenure in years 
(mean) (SD) 19.6 (10.3) 21.9 (11.4) 26.0 (10.3) 
Total years worked (mean) (SD) 36.9 (11.5) 35.9 (12.5) 40.2 (6.5) 
Non-housing wealth (mean) $127,779  $75,931  $228,014  
Non-housing wealth (median) $27,000  $4,900  $107,250  
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Conclusion 
The overarching conclusion from this study is that a better understanding of 
differences in the retirement experience can be achieved only if variations in the 
circumstances of family life and marital transitions are further explored. Though we 
know from decades of research and policy that marital status has a strong relationship to 
retirement income and wealth, the focus has been almost exclusively on tracking changes 
in marital trends or understanding the economic consequences of being an unmarried 
woman. Researchers have only begun to scratch the surface in understanding the extent to 
which a lifetime of marital patterns accumulate to produce varying financial outcomes in 
retirement. 
This research makes a significant contribution to the literature and broadens our 
knowledge on marital history and retirement resources in several major areas. First, this 
research finds strong support for marital history being related to retirement resources and 
in different ways based on the resources studied. Whether or not an unmarried person 
receives an employer-sponsored pension is related to their marital history; however, the 
amount of income received has no relationship. In contrast, Social Security income and 
non-housing wealth amounts do have a relationship to marital history and this occurs for 
both married and unmarried populations.  While marital history’s association with 
retirement resources may have more to do with the family-work life relationship, too few 
studies have explored this association directly for the accumulation of Social Security and 
pension benefits. The existing research identifies differences among the married and 
unmarried, focuses extensively on divorced and widowed women, and explores how 
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couples make decisions and plan for their retirement. Less research looks at the 
accumulation of retirement resources over the life course, and the relationship between 
these resources and family life.  
Regarding the relationship between marital history and retirement security, this study 
found several within group differences among the married and unmarried populations. In 
relation to their retirement income and assets, married men are better off than married 
women and their marital history appears to have no association with later-life financial 
outcomes. Remarried women, particularly remarried widows, , and married women with 
shorter marriages or who spent less of their lifetime being married have a better financial 
situation in retirement than the continuously married. For unmarried individuals, 
retirement income and assets are also related to marriage duration and for both men and 
women, those in longer marriages have more retirement security. The type of marital 
disruption and the frequency of marital changes are related to retirement security for the 
unmarried; never married individuals, particularly never married men, and divorced 
individuals have less retirement income and assets than other unmarried groups. In short, 
when compared to their unmarried counterparts, unmarried widow(er)s have a more 
financially secure retirement.     
This research suggests that future studies focusing on married and unmarried people 
separately will be valuable for advancing our knowledge and understanding of the 
consistent differences between these groups. In fact, this study argues for a closer look at 
the financial situation of certain populations. Specifically, remarried women and never 
married men are both populations identified by this study that are in need of further 
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exploration. Politicians, policy makers, and researchers need to discontinue their attempts 
to explain the reasons behind the changes in marital trends. The shift has occurred, and 
the generation who experienced this shift is retiring. The life course events and transitions 
behind the formation of our current policies no longer hold, and this calls our attention to 
the need for additional research and political action. 
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